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1 Introduction
"Failure to address the psychosocial determinants of human behaviour is often the weakest
link in social policy initiatives. Simply providing access to resources does not mean that
people will take advantage of them."
Albert Bandura (Talk for the British Psychological Society, The Psychologist 2009, p.505)
1.1. Research Objectives and Contribution
A growing literature in economics investigates explanations for why people remain poor.
While earlier research in the context of development economics has focused on external
constraints, such as credit, education or savings constraints, economists have recently
come to explore behavioral – internal – constraints in poor people’s decision processes
(Mullainathan & Thaler, 2000; Bertrand et al., 2004).1 One internal constraint that has
received increased attention are aspirations. Aspirations are goals that lie in the distant
future and motivate individuals to provide investments to attain them (Bernard et al., 2011;
Lybbert & Wydick, 2018).2 The lack of both hope and aspirations is one of the reasons
why poor individuals forego investments that may help them to escape poverty (Banerjee
& Duflo, 2011; Duflo, 2012). Individuals may believe that a specific state, for example
expanding a business, is unachievable and thus avoid necessary investments. The beliefs
and ideas formed by individuals about themselves and the world, so-called mental models,
influence which options people perceive and which actions they choose (World Bank, 2015).
The belief that one is not able to succeed can lead to low aspirations for the future and
reduces efforts to improve one’s situation. Several studies suggest that low aspirations are
1See Dalton et al. (2018), Lybbert & Wydick (2018) and La Ferrara (2019) for a more detailed description
of internal constraints studied in development economics.
2In the utility framework, aspirations are modeled as reference points that provide increasing utility up
to the aspiration threshold (Dalton et al., 2016; Genicot & Ray, 2017; Lybbert & Wydick, 2018). This
differentiates the concept of aspirations from expectations, as expectations are the weights attached to the
utility from uncertain events (Dalton et al., 2016).
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correlated with low levels of investments (Bernard et al., 2011; Janzen et al., 2017; Dalton
et al., 2018). Small-scale entrepreneurs in Indonesia, for example, who have low aspirations
are less likely to report to grow their business, to improve or implement record-keeping, or
to develop a business plan (Dalton et al., 2018).
This thesis provides new insights into aspirations focusing on their role in several de-
velopment outcomes as well as into their determinants. We consider how aspirations affect
cooperation in collective action and investigate its impacts in labor market participation.
Thereby, the thesis contributes to the literature on aspiration failures in various fields. It
starts by considering aspirations that concern community welfare and whose attainment
entails investments that benefit other community members. Just like an individual can
aspire for higher individual welfare (such as more education, income, assets and status as
in Bernard et al. (2014)), we argue that an individual can also aspire for higher community
well-being. We refer to these long-term goals for the community as community aspirations.
While there is a growing body of empirical research on individual aspirations (for overviews
see e.g. La Ferrara (2016); Lybbert & Wydick (2018); La Ferrara (2019)), community
aspirations have not yet received attention as a determinant of investment decisions.
The first research objective of this thesis is to investigate whether community aspira-
tions are an important determinant of collective action. We thereby extend the concept
of aspirations to include aspirations for the community. In addition, we include a new
concept into the analysis of pro-social behavior by considering the role of aspiring to higher
community well-being, which is different from other concepts, such as the expectation of
other people’s behavior (Keser & Winden, 2000; Fischbacher et al., 2001). As community
aspirations have not yet been conceptualized to the best of our knowledge, also no empirical
measures exist. Chapter 2 therefore starts with a conceptualization of community aspirations
and presents empirical measures for community aspiration dimensions. The chapter then
examines whether our proposed community aspiration measure is correlated with cooper-
ation in collective action problems using reported and experimental measures of cooperation.
The second research objective concerns the determinants of community aspirations. The
failure to make investments due to low aspirations has been coined aspiration failure (Ray,
2006). Aspiration failures are presumably prevalent among people living in poverty and
can be a source of a poverty trap (Appadurai, 2004; Ray, 2006; Dalton et al., 2016). The
potential role of aspirations for poverty traps is manifold. The first line of thought argues
that the poor have a weak "capacity to aspire" (Appadurai, 2004). According to this view,
the poor have fewer means to explore the future due to their resource constraints and limited
access to information compared to the rich. Having less experiences of how aspirations and
outcomes are connected, poor people are prone to have low aspirations that result in low
take up of investment opportunities (Appadurai, 2004). A second line of thought proposes
that poverty in conjunction with an economically polarized society results in aspiration
failures among the poor (Ray, 2006). Ray introduced the concept of the "aspirations
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window", which denotes all those people which an individual can cognitively perceive and
from whom an individual forms her aspirations. An aspiration failure consequently occurs,
if there are no people in one’s cognitive window who do better than oneself. As a result
the gap between one’s current and aspired outcome is too small to motivate effort. At
the same time, there are also no investments, if affluent individuals are in a poor person’s
cognitive window resulting in an aspiration gap that is too large (Genicot & Ray, 2017).
Then aspirations seem unattainable, the cost of effort needed to achieve them is too high
and expected benefits too low (Ray, 2006). This reasoning implies that aspirations and
effort have an inverted U-shaped relationship and aspiration failures occur because of either
too wide or too narrow aspiration gaps (Ray, 2006; Genicot & Ray, 2017).
The third line of thought provides a different explanation for an aspiration based poverty
trap that has to do with a behavioral bias in the aspiration formation. According to the
model of Dalton et al. (2016) higher aspirations lead to more effort and aspirations are
determined through the (private) outcomes achieved.3 The behavioral bias consists in
failing to realize this feedback loop from outcomes to aspirations, which leads individuals to
take aspirations as given. Poverty increases the negative effects of this bias, as poor people
have lesser means and information and therefore experience lower outcomes compared to
the rich. The behavioral bias can lead to a trap in which low efforts produce low aspirations,
which then determine investments in the future (Dalton et al., 2016).
One potential policy intervention to help people break out of an aspiration based poverty
trap is the exposure of people to role models to open their cognitive window (Duflo, 2012;
World Bank, 2015). Role models can both change individuals’ beliefs on what they can
achieve as well as provide information on the connection between aspirations and outcomes
(Bandura, 1977, 2004). Recent literature suggests that role models can have sizeable effects
on individuals’ behavior. Exposure to role models in television series, for example, is
associated with low fertility, higher divorce and separation rates (Chong & La Ferrara,
2009; La Ferrara et al., 2012). Empirical evidence also shows that role models can increase
aspirations (Beaman et al., 2012; Bernard et al., 2014).
This thesis aims to explore whether role models can increase aspirations for one’s community.
The underlying hypothesis is, that there is an aspiration failure which inhibits individuals
to make investments into their common future. The dissertation thus considers aspiration
failures with respect to community aspirations. Similar to a behavioral poverty trap, we
hypothesize that communities can be trapped in a situation with low collective action due
to a community aspiration failure. We use the conceptualization of aspiration failures by
Ray (2006) and Genicot & Ray (2017) and consider that these failures are a consequence
of poverty and emerge through a lack of successful examples that motivate individuals to
set higher goals. Based on this hypothesis, chapter 2 and 3 examine the research question
3In the model of (Dalton et al., 2016) aspirations are only determined by private experiences and not
through social outcomes as in the models of Bogliacino & Ortoleva (2015) and Genicot & Ray (2017).
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whether the provision of successful examples of collective action can change community
aspirations and the level of cooperation. Both chapters report on results from randomized
screenings of videos that show communities who successfully established village clubs. While
we use a real public good to measure collective action after the video screening in chapter
2, chapter 3 elicits unconditional and conditional cooperation with a public goods game
measured in a lab-in-the-field experiment.
A third research objective is to understand how different designs of the role model videos
and screenings alter community aspirations and collective action. In this regard, chapter 3
of this thesis examines two research questions. First, it assesses which type of information
used to describe the role model is more effective in increasing community aspirations and
unconditional and conditional contributions to a public good. To answer this question, we
compare the two videos from chapter 2 that use different frames with a no video condition:
The first video focuses on a descriptive picture of village life in communities that succeed
at setting collective action mechanisms and the second video entails prescriptive messages
promoting collective action.
The other research question pertains to the role of common knowledge of having seen
the video in the decision to cooperate. We hypothesize that community aspirations only
increase cooperative behavior if there is knowledge on shared higher community aspirations.
To test this hypothesis we varied who of the participants in the group of two got to see a
treatment video and assess their unconditional and conditional contributions in the public
good game. The study presented in chapter 3 is the first to our knowledge to compare the
effect of the framing in the literature on role models and aspirations. In addition, it extends
research on the role of common knowledge to behavior in public goods settings.
While the first part of the thesis is dedicated to the study of community aspirations
and its role in collective action, the remaining part of the dissertation examines the role of
individual aspirations in the behavior on the labor market. The fourth research objective is
thus to explore how exposure to role models influences adolescents’ aspirations and decision
to enter the labor market. Chapter 4 investigates the hypothesis that female adolescents
in developing countries have low self-beliefs and aspirations for their future due to a lack
of similar women who have become successful in entering the formal labor market and
hold responsible and competitive positions. This can trap adolescents in a situation where
low investments reinforce low aspirations. Previous research has demonstrated that role
models can increase female’s willingness to enter into competitive environments. We extend
this line of research by investigating whether role models in videos can increase females’




This thesis builds on results from field experiments. The use of field experiments in devel-
opment economics has grown tremendously in the last decade and gained visibility across
disciplines with last year’s winners of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences
(Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo and Michael Kremer) for their experiment-based approach
to alleviating poverty (The Nobel Prize, 2019). Randomized experiments provide a means
to isolate causal effects of treatments and are useful to test assumptions and theories
in settings where a counterfactual cannot be reliably established with other evaluation
methods (Harrison & List, 2004; Duflo et al., 2007). To answer whether role models can
influence aspirations and behavior using non-experimental methods can present challenges
for the identification due to self-selection and non-random variation of contextual factors.
Providing a control group through randomization, experiments are argued to yield the
most reliable counterfactual (Harrison & List, 2004). By varying only one element (the
video), we can receive an estimate of the average treatment effect that is internally valid
(Banerjee & Duflo, 2009). Experiments can also include a multiple of treatments that can
provide answers to the underlying mechanisms and thus improve conceptual understanding
(Banerjee & Duflo, 2009).
To measure cooperative and competitive behavior, we use preference experiments which are
validated method to measure social preferences (Cardenas & Carpenter, 2008). In Chapter
2 and 3, we use public goods games to quantify the level of cooperation and in Chapter 4 we
use the seminal design of Niederle & Vesterlund (2007) to measure competitive preferences.
To measure aspirations we follow established methods that use survey questions (Beaman et
al., 2012; Bernard & Taffesse, 2014). Since community aspirations have not been measured
before, we developed indicators using the methodology of individual aspirations by Bernard
& Taffesse (2014). We also propose dimensions for community welfare that are relevant
for the context of the study and are based on Amartya Sen’s (2001) five types of freedoms
that are essential for human development: political freedom, economic facilities, social
opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security.
1.3. Summary of the Chapters
In the following, an outline of the papers presented in chapter 2, 3 and 4 is provided.
The last chapter, chapter 5, concludes with a summary of the findings with the aim of
integrating the results of the different chapters and providing an outlook on possible future
work in this field.
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1.3.1 Chapter 2 Community Aspirations and Collective Action
This chapter starts from the perspective that collective action is important for rural devel-
opment as informal institutions can provide access to markets and enable the sustainable
management of natural resources. Yet, some groups succeed to self-organize, while others
fail. The literature on collective action has so far analyzed pro-social preferences (Fehr
& Fischbacher, 2003) and external constraints to behavior, such as group characteristics
(Zelmer, 2003) and the institutional environment (Agrawal, 2001), as determinants of indi-
viduals’ decision to cooperate. We instead focus on internal constraints. We propose that
the decision to cooperate is determined by the aspirations for one’s community and that one
reason for low levels of cooperation among community members could lie in a community
aspiration failure. The literature on aspirations has focused mainly on individual aspirations
and individual outcomes (Beaman et al., 2012; Bernard & Taffesse, 2014; Pasquier-Doumer
& Risso Brandon, 2015; Janzen et al., 2017; Riley, 2018; Lybbert & Wydick, 2019; Serneels
& Dercon, 2020). We extend the concept of aspirations to include long-term goals that
one has for the community. In this chapter we conceptualize community aspirations and
develop measures that we validate by assessing its correlation with cooperation in a field
experiment. In the second part of the chapter, we examine whether community aspirations
and the level of cooperation can be raised by showing videos of successful collective action.
We hypothesize that exposing individuals to role model communities can lead individuals to
change their mental models on what communities can achieve and lead to a rise in aspirations.
To test our hypotheses we make use of a randomized controlled trial in which we randomized
screenings of videos in 37 villages in Zambia in 2018. In treatment villages, participants
watched one of two role model videos. Both videos feature villages in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo who successfully organized themselves into village clubs. The
difference between the videos lies in the presentation of the role models. Whereas one video
does not explicitly mention that the welfare improvements shown in the video, for example
improved income and nutrition, are due to successful collective action, the other video uses
an explicit framing. After screening the video, we measured cooperation with a natural
field experiment in which participants were asked for their contribution to a real public
good: a savings group. We compare cooperation and aspirations of treated participants
compared with participants from control villages.
We find some support for our hypothesis that community aspirations determine coop-
eration, as participants with higher aspirations are more likely to report to work for their
village and make higher contributions to the public good. However, we also find that
there is no or a negative relation of community aspirations to other reported cooperation
measures such as contributions to the village treasury and general trust. In our role model
intervention we find that the video describing village life increases contributions to the
public good, while the video with the explicit messages on collective action has no significant
effect on reported contributions, but on observed average contributions at the village level.
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Both videos have a negative effect on community aspirations and trust, while we find a
positive effect on perceived participation beliefs. This result suggests that the mechanism
could run though a change in the perceived norm of cooperation.
1.3.2 Chapter 3 Community Aspirations and Cooperation: Prescriptive
vs. Descriptive Role Models
This paper also departs from the hypothesis that the reason for low levels of cooperation
among community members is an aspiration failure caused by a lack of role models that
motivate them to aspire higher. We advance from the study in Chapter 2 in several
ways. First, we investigate the role of normative messages in role model videos. Recent
research suggests that prescriptive and descriptive messages can have different effects on
pro-social behavior (Cialdini, 2003; Moyer-Gusé, 2008; Paluck, 2009; La Ferrara, 2016;
Blair et al., 2019). However, we are not aware of any entertainment education study
that has varied the framing of the messages in the presentation of the role models in the
same context. While the video of Chapter 2 displaying village life (village life video) with-
out explicit reference to collective action contains descriptive norms only, the other video
(collective action video) contains descriptive and prescriptive norms (what ought to be done).
We can thus compare which type of information is more effective in raising aspirations
and cooperation. Our hypothesis is that the video with the salient message (collective
action video) is more effective at increasing community aspirations and contributions to
the public good. In addition, we examine the role of common knowledge in the decision to
cooperate. Previous entertainment education studies have focused on the role of common
knowledge in risky sexual and violent behavior (Arias, 2019; Banerjee et al., 2019). This
study extends that research by focusing on the role of common knowledge in the decision
to contribute to a public good. We expect that shared knowledge on increased aspirations
increases contributions.
To answer these questions, we implemented a lab-in-the-field experiment with 358 in-
dividuals in eight villages in the same region as we conducted the randomized controlled
trial in Chapter 2. We randomly assigned the participants to one of the three conditions:
collective action video, village life video or no video. After the video screening we measured
cooperative behavior with a two-person one-shot linear public goods game in which we
asked for their unconditional and conditional contributions. To analyze the role of common
knowledge, we varied who of the person in the game watched a video.
We find that the village life video effectively promotes cooperation: Unconditional contribu-
tions and non-zero contributions are higher in this treatment compared to the no video
group. Unconditional contributions are even larger if both individuals watched this video.
We also find a larger share of positive conditional cooperators in the village life video group.
In addition, conditional contributions are higher in the village life video treatment compared
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to the control if both contributors watched the video. While community aspirations are not
related to contribution decisions, we find that individual aspirations are correlated with
unconditional contributions.
1.3.3 Chapter 4 Can Role Model Videos Influence Female’s Decision to
Participate in the Labor Market?
The paper included in chapter 4 presents the results of a framed field experiment conducted
in Madagascar in 2018. Similar to other countries in the world, women in Madagascar are
underrepresented in the formal labor market, earn lower wages and hold fewer leadership
positions compared to men. We argue that one reason for the gender gap in labor market
outcomes could be a lack of successful females that can serve as reference points. Analogous
to the argumentation on behavioral poverty traps above, females could be trapped in a
situation of low aspirations and low investments. In this chapter we test the hypothesis
that role models in videos can increase female students’ aspirations and willingness to apply
to a (competitive) job. Previous literature has found that role models can increase female’s
willingness to enter into competitive environments focusing mainly on decisions in the lab
or on the choice of studies (Stout et al., 2011; Breda et al., 2020; Ginther et al., 2020; Meier
et al., 2020; Porter & Serra, 2020; Schier, 2020). We extend this research by considering
the decision of females to apply to competitive jobs.
We randomly assigned 336 students in their last year of secondary education to watch
either a female role model, a male role model, or a placebo video. The role model videos
are about a woman or man, who comes from the same region and background as the
students. Each of them recounts how they succeeded in attaining their goal and the journey
they embarked on in order to achieve it. In the placebo video both characters talk about
the differences in the rural and urban life in the region. After the students watched the
video, we measured students’ aspirations and beliefs with survey questions and conducted a
lab-in-the-field experiment to measure competitive preferences and performance. At the end
of the experiment, we informed the students about two job openings in the research project
of one of the principal investigators. The students could either apply for an assistant or a
coordinator position. The latter involves more responsibilities and thus entails a higher
wage. A week after the visit, when we distributed the earnings from the lab experiment,
students could fill in an application form.
We find that the female role model is successful in motivating females as well as males to
apply to one of the job. Interestingly, we find that the male role model reduces the gender
gap in the applications to the coordinator position that is prevalent in the placebo group.
Our results suggests that this is driven by increases in applications by females compared to
the placebo. We examine possible mechanism by controlling for aspirations, beliefs and the
decisions in the lab experiment. While competitive preferences can explain the decision to
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apply to the coordinator position in the male role model treatment, we find that aspirations
and the current achievements can partly explain the motivation to apply to any position in
the female role model treatment.
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2 Community Aspirations and Collective Action1
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Martin C. Parlasca, Jorge Luis Sellare as well as the participants from the GlobalFood doctoral seminar
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Monsieu of the Dimitra Project for the permission to use their videos and Felix Betzenbichler for including
the subtitles. We also thank Paul Malambo, Sarah Hanyama, Harriet Chibuta, Naomi Munthali, Nathanael
Nsana, Emmanuel Juunza, Magdalene Trapp, Muyambo and Charity Sipangule for their excellent research
assistance in the field and Malte Becker, Maximilian Köster, Merindah Lössel and Henrike Sternberg for
their great data preparation and data cleaning support.
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2.1. Introduction
Collective action plays an essential role in development. Communities that manage to
self-organize can avoid poverty traps and achieve sustainable development. For example,
communities that set and enforce rules on the management of natural resources can avoid
depleting natural resources, commonly referred to as the tragedy of commons (Ostrom,
1990; Vélez et al., 2020). Agricultural cooperatives can facilitate farmers’ access to markets,
decrease credit constraints, and facilitate the diffusion of new technologies (Valentinov, 2007;
Wollni & Zeller, 2007; Fischer & Qaim, 2012). Despite the potential benefits of collective
action, not all communities succeed in self-organizing and in establishing stable processes
of collective action.
This paper puts forward a new explanation of why collective action fails. We propose that
cooperative behavior depends on the goals and desires set for community well-being. We
refer to those as community aspirations. Consistent with Sen’s (2001) idea that freedom is
both the end and a means to development, we conceptualize community aspirations as a
multidimensional notion that includes five dimensions: political and economic freedoms,
social opportunities, transparency and protective security. Our conjecture is that when
individuals experience a low level of aspirations for the well-being of their community, they
would lack incentives to cooperate in collective action problems.
Poverty can constrain aspirations (Appadurai, 2004; Dalton et al., 2016). Aspirations
are formed by the lives and achievements of individuals that one can observe. Individuals
living in poverty and a polarized society might lack the resources and examples to form
higher aspirations (Appadurai, 2004; Ray, 2006). Low aspirations thus can lead to low co-
operation, which can ultimately lead to pessimistic aspirations. Opening people’s cognitive
window by showing an alternative view of what they could achieve can help them escape
the trap and achieve economic development (Ray, 2006).
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we develop the concept of community aspiration
and present an empirical measure. We assess the validity of the proposed measure by
exploring its correlation with cooperation in the field. Second, we investigate whether giving
examples of successful collective action cases can positively influence community aspirations
and cooperation levels. Participants in the treatment group watched one of two videos
depicting villages who cooperated successfully in collective action problems. The literature
discusses distinct ways of presenting role models in order to foster behavioral change. While
the literature on educational entertainment posits that the educational content should not
be made too obvious (Bandura, 2004; La Ferrara, 2016), other studies have found that
prescriptive messages are effective in behavioral campaigns (Cialdini, 2003). Our study
compares two different ways of presenting role models. The first video used a narrative
describing living conditions in organized communities; and the second a prescriptive frame
explicitly explaining how organized communities can achieve better living conditions. We
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compare cooperation and community aspirations in the treatment videos with a control
group that is not exposed to any video.
The analysis is based on survey and experimental data with 749 individuals living in
43 villages in Zambia. To capture the level of cooperation we allowed a sample of par-
ticipants to make real contributions to a local public good that is common in Zambia.
Participants could contribute part of their endowment of ten Kwacha (about 0.78 Euro2) as
seed capital for new savings groups. The amount contributed was doubled by us, generating
a social dilemma in which collectively it was better to cooperate, but individually it was
better to retain the endowment.
The results of our study indicate that individuals hold optimistic aspirations. Compared
with the current level, participants aspire that community welfare will be six standard
deviations higher. Confirming our hypothesis, we find that more optimistic participants
report more frequent participation in collective workdays. Yet, no differences are found on
other cooperation indicators such as contributions to the treasury or value spend in village
activities. The field experiment results indicate that contributions to the savings group are
higher among participants exposed to the narrative video than those in the control group.
Yet, this does not seem to be due to changes in community aspirations. Robustness checks
indicate that the results are consistent for some measures of community aspirations.
Our contribution to the literature is the following. To the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to conceptualize community aspirations and develop an empirical measure that
builds on Bernard et al. (2014) validated instruments on individual aspirations. Previous
research on aspirations has focused mainly on the relation between individual aspirations
and wealth (for an overview see La Ferrara (2016)). Second, we contribute to the literature
on the determinants of collective action by analyzing the role of community aspirations
in the decision to cooperate in a public goods setting. Earlier studies on aspirations
considered how collective action influences individual aspirations (Ray, 2006; Mojo et al.,
2016).3 Yet, these studies have not investigated how aspirations affect collective action. We
contribute to the behavioral economics literature by including a new concept in the study of
pro-social behavior. Empirical evidence largely supports the view that individuals behave
as conditional cooperators increasing contributions as they expect higher contributions of
the peers (Keser & Winden, 2000; Fischbacher et al., 2001). Community aspirations refer
instead to imagining and aiming at realizing higher communal welfare.
Our paper also relates to research considering how exposure to role models through media
2The exchange rate at the time of the experiment was around 12.81 Kwacha equivalent to one Euro.
3It has, for instance, been argued that groups can influence individual aspirations by their ability to (1)
share information and experiences, (2) credibly share information to external agents and thereby induce
social change, and (3) by their ability to coordinate actions (Ray, 2006). Empirical evidence shows that
cooperative members have higher aspirations for income, education, and assets than non-members (Mojo et
al., 2016).
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affects attitudes and economic behavior (Chong & La Ferrara, 2009; Jensen & Oster, 2009;
Paluck, 2009; Paluck & Green, 2009; La Ferrara et al., 2012; Banerjee et al., 2019). In
particular, our paper closely relates to studies that have experimentally examined the effect
of role models on aspirations and behavior. For instance, Beaman et al. (2012) showed
how a random allocation of political positions reserved for women in Indian village councils
reduced the gender gap in aspirations for young adolescents and their parents and eliminated
the gender gap in educational outcomes. Showing videos of successful individuals from
similar backgrounds to smallholders in Ethiopia was found to increase individual aspiration
levels and changed the treated individuals’ investment behavior compared with those in the
control group half a year after the screening (Bernard et al., 2014). Another experimental
study conducted with secondary school students in Uganda revealed that a role model
movie changed educational outcomes (Riley, 2018). The author found that students from
the treatment group were less likely to fail mathematics in the national exam than students
from the control group. We extend that research to consider whether communities can
serve as role models to promote cooperation.
Lastly, our paper also relates to literature in psychology on hope and utopian think-
ing and its role in collective action (Braithwaite, 2004; Greenaway et al., 2016; Fernando
et al., 2018, 2019; Badaan et al., 2020). Greenaway et al. (2016), for instance, analyze
whether hope, defined as a positive emotion directed at the future and the wish to change
current states of the world, is related to intentions to engage in collective action to support
people in an out-group. Using survey data they find that hope correlates with intentions
to participate in political protest among respondents in the United States and in the
Netherlands. The study by Fernando et al. (2018) provides evidence that utopian thinking
– imagining ideal or better societies – is correlated with increased intentions to change the
current situation. Imagination and a positive evaluation of an ecologically friendly future
has also been shown to be associated with higher contributions to charity (Fernando et
al., 2019). Compared to this literature we consider how the level of aspirations for one’s
community is related to experimental measures of collective action in a middle income
country.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the conceptual framework ex-
plaining how community aspirations affect cooperation. We present our approach to
measuring community aspirations. Section 3 explains the empirical strategy. In this section,
we explain the experimental design and procedures used in data collection. The results are
presented in Section 4. First, we give an overview of community aspirations and examine
its relation with cooperation. We then present the results of our field experiment. Section
5 discusses the results and section 6 concludes.
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2.2. Conceptual Framework
Recent work in development economics focuses on aspirations. Aspirations are the set
of goals that individuals hold for the future (Bernard et al., 2011). The common use of
the concept of aspirations in economics entails several attributes. First, aspirations are
goals that lie in the distant – and not in the near – future (Bernard et al., 2011). Second,
aspirations are different from hope as the former require agency to accomplish the goals
(Lybbert & Wydick, 2018). Lastly, aspirations are different from expectations. Expectations
refer to the belief in potential future outcomes, while aspirations are the preference for
specific outcomes (Bernard et al., 2011).
In the theoretical models, aspirations are the relevant items in the choice set that motivate
individuals’ behavior (Bernard et al., 2014). A higher aspiration increases the expected
benefit of an action promoting higher effort. Yet, if the difference in the standard of living
that is aspired to and the standard of living that one already has is too small or too big,
investment effort would be low (Ray, 2006).
The existing economic literature has focused on aspirations that entail personal goals
such as income, education or social status. For instance, aspirations have been related
to educational investment, educational attainment and school enrollment (Beaman et al.,
2012; Bernard et al., 2014). Other studies found that aspirations predict savings, use of
credit, investment and business expansion (Bernard et al., 2014; Macours & Vakis, 2014;
Janzen et al., 2017; Lybbert & Wydick, 2018; Dalton et al., 2018). We propose that the
concept of aspirations can be extended to account for preferences for goals that increase
community well-being and have a public good nature. We refer to those preferences as
community aspirations.
We adopt Sen (2001)’s conceptualization of development and consider that well-being
depends on the freedoms that individuals enjoy. He proposes that freedom of choice is a
multidimensional concept that includes five dimensions: political freedoms, economic facili-
ties, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security. Political freedom
is defined as the possibility to participate openly and without coercion in decisions that
affect the community such that citizens enjoy the freedom of expression and are protected
from abuse of power (Bollen, 1986). Decisions are guided by democratic principles where
the majority of citizens participate in decision making. The most commonly used measure
of political freedoms is the Index of Political Rights which accounts for freedom of speech,
freedom of religion, individual economic choice, freedom of association, freedom of assembly,
violence and crimes, freedom of movement, and women’s rights (Krueger & Malečková,
2003; Abadie, 2006). In our analysis, we capture political freedom by considering the aspi-
rations regarding the right of assembly. The indicator variable that we use is the number
of times per year that villagers would like to hold open meetings to discuss community issues.
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There is a well-established tradition in economics that associates welfare with freedom of
choice. For any two choice sets that allow the individual to choose the most preferred
element, the one containing more choices would receive a higher ranking (Gravel, 1994;
Sen, 1991; Puppe, 1996; Pattanaik & Xu, 1998). The dimension of economic facilities
therefore has been operationalized as the possibility to live a decent life outside poverty
and deprivation. While the Human Development Index (HDI) measures this dimension
by income per-capita (Anand & Sen, 1994), the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI)
considers household standard of living (Alkire & Santos, 2014). At the community level,
this entails access to water, sanitary services, electricity and good quality of housing. We
measure this dimension asking the aspirations regarding the number of households in the
community with good housing conditions (made of red brick, burned brick or asbestos and
with iron sheets on the roof) relative to the estimated number of households in 10 years.
Freedom of choice requires that individuals are capable of deciding. The economic opportu-
nities and political liberties enhance this capability, but also access to public education and
health services. The HDI, considers for example, the life expectancy at birth and expected
and mean years of schooling (Anand & Sen, 1994). The MPI, on the other hand focuses
on child mortality, under-nutrition, school attendance and mean years of schooling. As
it is difficult to imagine that households would want fellow community members to be
deprived of any of this dimensions, we used an alternative measure that is likely to have
more variability among respondents. We measure social opportunities as the number of
minutes individuals aspire children to travel to reach primary school.
Transparency warranties refer to the possibility to live a secure life where individuals
can trust the government and fellow citizens. The Index of Economic Freedom, measures
this dimension as the degree of a country’s legal protection of private property rights and
degree of enforcement of those laws and the prevalence of corruption (Miller et al., 2016).
Considering that a key component in providing security is the enforcement of norms, we
proxy this dimension as preferences for access to police protection. We ask for the aspired
number of security guards relative to the population in 10 years.
Access to protection from a social security net confers individuals the support and protection
that wars, epidemics, and natural disasters can cause (Platteau, 1997; Dercon, 2005). We
proxy the dimension of protective security as aspirations regarding the proportion of the
population having access to support from the social network in case of need. Protective
support is also manifested as contributions to community public goods. Therefore, we also
consider a measure of aspired contributions to the village.
In a community context, attaining the five dimensions of freedom requires investment
by individuals that ultimately benefit other people in the community: Political Freedom
entails that each individual must invest time to hear the other’s opinions and concerns.
Further, the dimension Economic facilities has characteristics of a public good, as making
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resources available to the village network creates positive externalities (Coleman, 1988).
Transparency and Protective support also have the properties of a public good since villagers
(in Zambia) themselves are responsible for the organization of village security guards and
solidarity networks. Further, (Zambian) villagers often provide labour and materials for
the construction of the nearest school, benefiting (mostly) other villagers.
2.2.1 Collective Action and Community Aspirations
In a similar way in which aspirations for personal goals motivate effort, we advocate that
cooperation depends on community aspirations - the goals for the common welfare-. The
causal link between aspirations and cooperation is depicted in Figure 2.1.
There is a three stage process by which community aspirations affect cooperation in
collective action comprising (1) imagination, (2) evaluation and (3) action. Imagination is
the component in which community aspirations are formed (Appadurai, 2004). Cognitive
and non-cognitive skills might influence the ability to imagine a different communal future.
Recent research shows that intelligence, executive functions and automatic associative
processes correlate with creative performance (Beaty et al., 2014; Benedek et al., 2014;
Silvia, 2015). Aspirations can also be considered a social construct. Appadurai (2004)
argues that aspirations are determined largely within a given community as a system of
shared ideals. Previous experiences of oneself and others in our cognitive window can
influence the propensity to aspire (Ray, 2006).
Non-cognitive factors such as income, political and social constraints can also affect the
imagination. For example, Appadurai (2004) considers that poor and marginalized people
are likely to have a weak capacity to aspire as they lack the resources and opportunities to
train this capacity exploring how aspirations and outcomes are connected. Additionally, a
large aspirations gap, the difference between the standard of living one aspires to and the
present, can create disincentives to provide effort (Genicot & Ray, 2020). Greater equality
therefore, can yield higher aspirations, incentives to provide effort and growth (Bogliacino
& Ortoleva, 2015).
After an individual has formed a community aspiration and set goals for the commu-
nity welfare, she goes over an evaluation stage in which a decision is taken on whether
to act towards the imagined goals. In Stage 2: Evaluation, several factors determine the
costs and benefits an individual attaches to following specific community aspirations. First,
we consider that collective action entails a strategic interaction setting, as the decision to
cooperate is based on the expectation of other’s people behavior (Keser & Winden, 2000;
Fischbacher et al., 2001). The perceived norms on cooperation describe whether cooperative
behavior is perceived to be valued in the community one lives in. Second, we propose that
altruistic preferences will lead to a higher perceived benefit of investing resources to attain
community aspirations. The third factor that affects the evaluation is beliefs in the efficacy
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of one’s collective, so-called group efficacy beliefs increase the likelihood that an individual
assesses the attainability of the aspiration.
The last component of our framework is called Action and denotes the actual invest-
ment of resources to attain the community aspiration. An action could take place at
many points in time confronting the individual to decide whether to stick to pursuing the
goal. Executive functions as the capacity to exert self-control and flexible thinking can
determine whether the action is sustained over time and the goal is successfully reached.
Finally, an individual assesses the attained state with the aspired one and is satisfied if
the reference point was achieved and frustrated in case it was not met (Genicot & Ray, 2017).
Community aspirations can be affected by exposing individuals to successful examples of
collective action. Exposure to village role models directly affects imagination by expanding
an individual’s aspiration window. In addition, exposure to role models indirectly affects
the evaluation by magnifying the perceived benefits and changing the perceived norms of
cooperation (Tankard & Paluck, 2016; Blair et al., 2019). Locus of control and group-efficacy
beliefs can also be raised by successful experiences by others, such as by observing how a
role model succeeds through his/her own work (Bandura, 2012). Exposure to village role
models is therefore expected to increase cooperation.
Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework


























2.2.2 Measurement of Community Aspirations
Community aspirations have not been conceptualized and thus also have not been measured
before. We therefore base our measurement strategy on existing instruments of individual
aspirations. Distinct approaches to measuring individual aspirations have been proposed.
For instance, aspirations are measured with questions on minimum income (Stutzer, 2004;
Knight & Gunatilaka, 2012), positive attitudes and depression (Macours & Vakis, 2014),
as well as on the desired education level, desired age of marriage and desired occupation
(Beaman et al., 2012). We use a method similar to the ones applied in Beaman et al. (2012)
and Bernard et al. (2014). The latter study used measures from Bernard & Taffesse (2014),
who tested the reliability and validity of the questions on individual aspirations in the
field. We adapted the survey questions to fit community aspirations and to our field context.
Community aspirations entail five different dimensions. Table 1 presents the indicators we
use for each of the dimensions. We selected the indicators based on the following criteria.
First, they should be understood by the respondents and be feasible to compare across
communities. We therefore chose indicators that can be found in the local context (derived
through our pilot study) and where participants easily understand the best and the worst
level. Further, we chose indicators based on whether they have sufficient variation. This
excludes indicators where participants would always want 100 or 0 percent (such as life
expectancy or infant mortality). Also, respondents should be able to modify them at the
local level such as the number of village meetings instead of variables that determine political
freedom at higher levels of authority (such as federal institutions). For each dimension, we
first asked respondents about the current level so that individuals have a reference level of
actual conditions in their community. Then, we asked the level they aspired to have in ten
years. Finally, we asked for the level they expected to reach in this time window. To convert
some of those measures into shares, we also asked for their population estimates in 10 years.4
For obtaining the community aspiration index, we standardize the responses for each
dimension using the mean and the standard deviation of the control group and aggregated









where σdc is the standard deviation and µdc the sample mean from the control group c for
each aspiration question from dimension d.
To measure the individual aspirations index, Ai, we included questions on the level of
education that they would like their youngest child to achieve, how many goats and cows
4Outliers in the population estimates were replaced with the mean values.
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they would like to have and how big they would like their plot to be in ten years.
As self-efficacy and locus of control are argued to be determinants of aspirations (Bandura,
1977) and have been found to correlate with individual aspirations in empirical studies
(Wydick et al., 2013; Bernard et al., 2014), we also included a questions on locus of control
and individual village efficacy belief.5
Table 2.1: Community Aspiration Indicators
Dimension Description
Community aspirations
Political Freedoms The number of times a month he/she would like villagers to join for a village meeting or celebrations
Economic facilities The share of households in the village he/she would like to have very good housing conditions
Social opportunities The number of minutes he/she wants students from their village to walk to a primary school
Transparency The share of the population they would like to have in their village as policemen/-women/voluntary guards
Protective security The Kwacha amount they would like each villager to contribute to village projects on average in a year
The share of households he/she would like to get supported in case of need
Individual aspirations





Locus of control To be successful, above all one needs to work very hard
Village efficacy People have influence in making this village a better place to live
2.3. Empirical Strategy
To assess the role of community aspirations in collective action, we collected survey and
experimental data in rural Zambia in summer 2018. Two localities were selected for the
study. The first locality are villages in Southern Province, where we collected lab-in-the-field
data on cooperation. We use these villages to be part of our control group. The second
locality comprises also villages in Southern Province located left and right of the main road
(see map in Figure 2.2) in which we conducted our field experiment.
Below we present the experimental design, outcome measure of cooperation, hypothe-
ses, and procedures.
5We took one of the question Bernard et al. (2011) use to measure locus of control: "Please tell me with
which of the two statements you agree more: a) ’To be successful, above all one needs to work very hard.’
b) ’To be successful, above all one needs to be lucky.’" (p. 7). Self-Efficacy is measure as "Do you think
people like yourself have influence in making this village a better place to live?"
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Figure 2.2: Location of Study
Note: The red and blue pins denote the location of the treatment villages. The grey
pins show the control villages. Source: Own data.
2.3.1 Experimental Design
The stages of our intervention can be found in Figure 4.1. Our experiment uses two
treatment conditions and one control group. In Stage 1 participants in the treatment
group watched one of two videos showing examples of communities that were successful at
self-organizing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In Stage 2, they decided how
much they wanted to contribute to a real public good: a savings group. Participants in
the control group did not watch any video and started directly in Stage 2. A sample of
participants completed a survey where we measured aspirations and obtained information
on socioeconomic characteristics (Stage 3). After completion of the survey, we paid the
participants the survey fee and screened another video that explains how savings groups
work. We describe the content of the treatment videos and design of the field experiment
in more detail in the following.
Figure 2.3: Experimental Design
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2.3.2 Treatment Videos
For the intervention we used already existing videos created within the Dimitra Project,
a participatory communication project on gender and rural development from the Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). The original versions are freely
accessible via YouTube.1 We used sequences of two videos (Community Mobilization, Food
Security and Nutrition) and edited a new video with a total duration of 11 minutes. Both
treatment videos used the same images, but they used different scripts dubbed into the
local Zambian language (Tonga) and displayed English subtitles.6 The screenings either
took place at a house, a communal space or at a school in a village. We projected the
videos onto a screen with a projector that was powered by a generator.
Participants in the treatment group watched a video depicting the positive outcomes
of Dimitra Clubs in rural areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We focus on the
effects of the clubs on development and hence we substituted Dimitra Club with Village
Club.2 The village clubs comprise men and women who self-organized into groups to work
actively in the development of their community.
The first video, village life video (VL video), is narrative and describes the life in ru-
ral communities in Congo. During the screening participants observe sequences where
the villagers work together in road maintenance or hold community meetings. While
the participants see improved living conditions in the area, the video does not provide
information that these outcomes can be attributed to collective action. The narrator and
characters only talk about villager’s source of income, diet, and the geography and climate
of the villages’ locations.
The second video, collective action video (CA video), explicitly discusses how the commu-
nity’s living conditions can improve when the community cooperates in solving collective
action problems. These true stories are told by a narrator and by the villagers themselves.
The community members report their experiences of how the clubs positively influenced
their lives (e.g., nutrition improved or their income increased). We showed images of
villagers sitting in a club meeting, while the narrator explained how the groups facilitated
collective action and increased social cohesion. It also includes a short sequence where a
village chief expressed his satisfaction with the clubs and an agricultural inspector reports
observing more active community participation.
The impacts of the intervention are measured as the difference in community aspira-
tions and cooperation in a real public good between the treatment and control groups.
Next, we explain the measure of cooperation we used.
1https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLzp5NgJ2-dK6OBbZpPuTMn_7wSrclUE0I
6The video scripts can be found in the Appendix.
2The logo of the FAO was kept in the video.
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2.3.3 Cooperation Measure
To measure cooperation, we employ a one-shot n-public goods game. Each participant
was handed out an envelope with ten Kwacha in ten one Kwacha coins. Subjects decide
how much of this endowment they would like to invest in a real village project, where the
amount contributed is multiplied by two.
The project was seed capital for all newly formed savings groups. Savings groups are
common in rural Zambia, with 73 percent of our sampled villages having at least one savings
group. The use of this public good has the advantage that it enables us to measure the
video interventions’ short-term (contributions) and long-term effects (savings group growth).
The participants were informed about the game structure in the experimental instruc-
tions, which were read out in the local language in front of the whole group (see the
Appendix for the English version of the instructions). At the beginning of every session, a
research assistant read out general instructions, which included, among other things, that
participation is voluntary, decisions are anonymous, drop-out of the game is possible at any
stage, questions can be asked to the research assistants in private and that there should
not be any discussion in the group about the intervention and the game (see the Appendix
for the English version of the general instructions).
After the experimental instructions were read out, participants were given the envelopes
and were asked to wait at a pre-specified place (usually in a shaded area next to a building)
until they were given further instructions. Participants were asked to put the Kwacha
amount for the village project in a paper box that was installed behind another building.
The rest was either put into their pocket or in their Chitenge (the traditional gown of
women). The team of research assistants made sure that only one participant at a time was
going behind the building in order to assure that the contribution decision was private. To
rule out experimental demand effects, we also did not write ID numbers on the envelopes,
so that the decisions were completely anonymous. The other participants, who were waiting
to be called, were instructed not to communicate with each other during the waiting period
to prevent consultation.
Once everybody made their contribution decision, a research assistant, village headman,
village treasurer, village secretary (village committee) collected the box and counted the
money invested in the village project. Village committee members were asked to be present
for the counting for credibility reasons. Meanwhile, the rest of the research team already
started some smallholder interviews. At the end of the interviews, the village treasurer
announced the total contributions to the whole group. We added the same amount of
money and reminded the group that the village treasurer would be distributing the money
equally among the newly established groups. We proposed that they meet a week from our
visit to discuss how many groups they would like to form. Even though savings groups are
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not uncommon in the region, it was expected that not everybody is aware of how savings
groups work. Therefore, we showed another video which explained how savings groups are
established before we continued the smallholder interviews. We further handed out three
documents to the village leaders, including the same information shown in the video and
some examples of accounting and templates for them to use later.
2.3.4 Hypotheses
We argue that community aspirations affect the incentives to cooperate in collective action
problems. We expect that individuals who hold more optimistic aspirations will contribute
more to the public good.
Hypothesis 1: Community aspirations are positively correlated with cooperation in collective
action problems.
Community aspirations are expected to be influenced by an individual’s cognitive window.
We hypothesize that individuals in rural areas who have limited access to examples of
villages who do "better" than themselves have low community aspirations for their village.
By showing examples of communities that succeed at organizing collective action, a role
model video can lead to a change in people’s mindset on the possibilities that can arise
by coordinated action and thus raise aspirations. This reasoning is in line with the argu-
mentation of how a role model intervention could have changed individual aspiration and
future oriented behavior in the study of Bernard et al. (2014). We expect that a video that
shows examples of successful collective action (imagination stage: previous experience of
others) will increase community aspirations, and perceived social norms on cooperation, as
individuals generalize from the behavior of the role models to that of their village (Blair
et al., 2019). We expect that the role model intervention also has an impact on actual
collective behavior: By setting higher aspirations for one’s community, individuals also
invest more into collective action.
Hypothesis 2: The screening of a video that shows successful examples of collective action
by similar individuals increases community aspirations, perceived norms of cooperation and
increases cooperation.
We expect that the frame used to depict successful examples of collective action will
influence the message’s effectiveness at changing community aspirations and cooperation.
It has been shown that messages that include prescriptive as well as descriptive content
were more successful in fostering pro-social behavior compared to descriptive messages
alone (Cialdini, 2003). We thus expect that prescriptive messages that explicitly highlight
how cooperation can affect collective action will be more effective at changing community
aspirations and promoting cooperation.
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Hypothesis 3: The collective action video that depicts how village groups can change
community welfare is more effective at changing community aspirations and promoting
cooperation than the village live video.
2.3.5 Experimental Procedures
For the randomization we made use of villages lists with information on the location, name
and population size of the villages in Southern Province, given to us by the Zambian Central
Statistical Office (CSO) in Lusaka. We selected villages with 70 to 270 adult inhabitants
that were located within 20 kilometers (right and left) of the main road.
Before we conducted the intervention in every village, we visited each village’s head-
man to ask for his permission. We informed him about our research project, without
specifying the exact measures, and the time the study would take us in his village. A
letter from a Zambian governmental agency that states their support to our research was
also presented. Having the village headman’s consent, we asked for his assistance in the
recruitment of the villagers. We communicated that we need as many people as possible
for our study. Setting no limit to the number of participants was important to reduce
selection bias. Further, we emphasized that only people can participate in the study from
the targeted village and are above the age of sixteen.
In total, we collected data from 45 villages: 8 control villages, 18 in the village life video
condition and 17 in the collective action video. We formed village pairs that were within a
five-kilometer radius. The pair of villages were visited on the same day, but were assigned
to different treatments.7 On average, 40 villagers came to each session. The minimum
group size was 18 and the maximum was 78. In cases in which there was not enough space
in the room, we did multiple rounds of screenings (maximum of three) to ensure that all
participants in the session were exposed to the same treatment. Besides, in each session, we
randomly chose twenty individuals to answer a survey. Participants in the survey received
five Kwacha as an incentive. The survey contained several questions to measure individual
and community aspirations and asked control questions on socio-economic characteristics of
participants as well as perceived social capital in the village. The village headman answered
a village survey on existing public goods in the village.
2.4. Results
Our data set comprises survey information from 749 individuals in three treatment condi-
tions (145 participants in the control, 310 in VL Video and 294 in CA video). Out of the
7We have one village more in the village life video compared to the collective action video group as in
one village appointment it turned out that the original village documented in the CSO data is now made
up out of two.
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participants in the control group 38 reported their contributions to a real public good. The
rest (101), participated in a public goods game in the lab.
The socioeconomic characteristics of our sample are presented in Panel A in Table 2.2.
Participants are on average 38 to 44 years old, have completed 7 years of education, own
5-8 hectares of land and have lived in the village for 26 to 30 years. More than half of
the surveyed participants are members of at least one group and use a mobile phone on a
daily basis. Respondents participate in village work 3 to 5 times a year and report to have
average spendings of 217 to 439 Kwacha for village activities in a year. General trust in
fellow villagers is on average quite high with values between 3.12 and 3.34 (out of 4). The
last column reports the p-value from a joint orthogonality test of the treatment arms. The
results indicate that our randomization strategy worked for most of the variables.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics by Treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control Village Collective Orth. test
life action p-value
Panel A
Age 38.72 42.54 44.17 0.00
(1.22) (0.86) (0.89)
Female 0.54 0.47 0.48 0.35
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Highest grade 7.29 7.38 7.18 0.69
(0.21) (0.17) (0.16)
Single 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.34
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Daily use of mobile phone 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.84
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Size of plot(s) 5.77 8.06 6.76 0.57
(2.44) (1.30) (1.06)
Index herd size -0.00 0.09 -0.05 0.37
(0.11) (0.07) (0.06)
Group member 0.54 0.51 0.59 0.18
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Time lived in village 26.19 27.91 30.23 0.08
(1.46) (1.08) (1.11)
Participation village work 2.66 4.85 4.97 0.20
(0.38) (0.87) (1.15)
Spendings village 217.20 439.64 394.66 0.07
(24.37) (59.80) (64.28)
Treasury contributions 8.11 29.50 15.33 0.00
(0.52) (1.75) (0.68)
General trust 3.12 3.30 3.34 0.05
(0.09) (0.05) (0.05)
Security group 0.63 0.79 0.82 0.00
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Reported amount sent 6.76 7.62 7.32 0.20
(0.57) (0.17) (0.19)
Share of endowment sent 0.44 0.76 0.73 0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
N 145 310 294
Panel B
Actual amount sent 6.32 6.52 6.40 0.94
(0.41) (0.24) (0.29)
N 2 18 17
Notes: The p-value refers to the p-value from a joint orthogonality test of treatment arms. Mean
values are shown. Standard errors in parentheses. Panel A shows the results for the sample with
survey information. The herd index was derived with Principal Component Analysis. Panel B
reports the mean and the p-value of the actual contributions for participants in the artefactual
field experiment.
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2.4.1 Community Aspirations
The summary statistics of the current and aspired dimensions of welfare are presented
in Table 2.3.8 Aspirations reflect the level of welfare that individuals would like their
community to achieve in ten years. Pairwise correlation of our community aspiration and
current community index reveals a high and significantly positive correlation (Spearman
ρ = 0.3435 and p − value < 0.001). On average participants hold optimistic aspirations
about the future, particularly with respect to individual welfare. We find that for all
dimension of community aspirations, aspirations are significantly higher than the current
level (two-sided t-test p− value < 0.1).
The Political Freedom dimension is measured as the preferred number of times villagers
meet to discuss community issues or to celebrate together. Currently smallholders report
to meet with their village on average 1.9 times per month and aspire to meet 3.4 times per
month. For the dimension Protective Support we use two measures. First we consider how
many households receive support in case of need. Smallholders aspire for 47 percent of the
households in their village to get support in case of need compared with an estimate of 26
percent currently receiving support. The second measure is the amount of Kwacha they
would like village members to contribute to finance village projects on average per year.
Smallholders currently contribute 105 Kwacha (about 7 Euro) but aspire that villagers
contribute 157 Kwacha in ten years (about 9.6 Euro). However, the standard deviation is
very high and explains why the median is much lower compared to the mean, both for the
current and aspired levels (40 and 50 Kwacha, respectively).
To quantify access to security, our proxy for the dimension Transparency, we asked the
respondents for the number of policemen/women or voluntary guards they currently have
and would like to have for their village and divided this number with the estimated amount
of current or future number of households living in their village. The villagers would like to
have on average 10 police/-women or voluntary guards for their village per 100 inhabitants;
this is 4 more persons than they actually have (0.06).
Social Opportunities is our proxy for access to education and is measured as the min-
utes the smallholders would like students from their village to walk to a primary school.
We inverted the measure so that higher numbers in the aspiration variables are always
associated with better outcomes.9 On average, smallholders aspire that students only have
to walk ten minutes (1/0.10) or one third of the time they currently walk (33 minutes).
Our measure for the dimension Economic Facilities is the proportion of households that
have very good housing conditions. Smallholders would like 81 percent of the households in
8We excluded outliers of the community aspiration index that are above 10 and replace missing
observations in the dimensions with the mean value.
9However, one could argue that a certain number of policemen/women are optimal and above that they
could also be decreasing individual and collective welfare.
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their village to have very good housing conditions. This is 34 percentage points more than
the current estimate (47 percent).
We also report on the individual aspirations and current level. On average, smallholders
aspire for 13.85 years of education for their youngest child10, while their current level of
education amounts to 3.7 years. We measure wealth in terms of the size of their plot as
well as the number of goats and cows an individual owns. We find that aspirations to have
extreme values resulting in a high standard deviation. On average, smallholders report to
own six goats, three cows and have 7.1 hectares of land. They aspire for 46 goats, 38 cows
and 16 hectares of land.
The last two rows in Table 2.3 present the standardized measures of well-being. The
values reported compare the difference with the control group. Column 1 reports the
current welfare levels. It shows that mean index of community welfare is 0.96 standard
deviations higher than in the control group and that individual welfare is 0.22 standard
deviations higher. To account for these differences in wealth between treatment and control
groups, we include controls of welfare levels in the analysis.
In the analysis we are interested in measuring how the treatment video changes aspi-
rations. Column 2 in Table 2.3 reports the community and individual aspiration indices
standardized by the control group. While the z-score for individual aspiration index is 16,
this value is negative for community aspirations. This descriptive analysis indicates that
the videos might have reduced community aspirations. In section 4 we do a formal test.
Table 2.7 in the Appendix reports the correlates of community and individual aspira-
tions. We regress covariates at the individual level on the Community Aspiration Index
in Column 1 and on the Individual Aspiration Index in Column 2. We find that the time
respondents have lived in the village is positively related to community aspirations. Being
female is associated with lower individual aspirations. This is in line with the study by
Beaman et al. (2012) who find a gender gap in (educational and career) aspirations.
10For those who do not have children, we used the mean value.
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Table 2.3: Current and Aspired Welfare
Current level Aspirations
Mean SD Mean SD Diff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Community aspirations
Number of meetings 1.892 1.729 3.439 2.450 -1.547∗∗∗
Share good housing 0.468 0.354 0.814 0.968 -0.346∗∗∗
School distance 0.036 0.052 0.104 0.106 -0.068∗∗∗
Security 0.061 0.057 0.099 0.076 -0.038∗∗∗
Share receiving support 0.262 0.389 0.478 0.580 -0.216∗∗∗
Contributions to village 105.409 206.176 157.123 350.845 -51.714∗∗∗
Panel B: Individual aspirations
Education child 3.668 2.652 13.855 1.539 -10.187∗∗∗
Plot size 7.105 22.652 16.108 35.843 -9.003∗∗∗
No. cows 3.418 5.827 38.270 113.913 -34.852∗∗∗
No. goats 5.601 8.482 44.519 75.002 -38.919∗∗∗
Panel C: Indices
Community welfare 0.969 3.543 -0.812 1.294 1.781∗∗∗
Individual welfare 0.228 2.975 16.023 36.312 -15.795∗∗∗
Observations 749 749
Notes: Mean values and standard deviations are presented. Current refers to the actual
levels and aspirations to the desired one in 10 years. Variables are defined in section 2.1.
2.4.2 Econometric Analysis
In the analysis we first consider the relation between community aspirations and collective





iβ + µa + εi (2.2)
where yi is the vector of cooperation outcomes for individual i. We consider various
self-reported measures of cooperation at the community level as participation in meetings,
membership in community groups, contributions to the village. X ′i is a vector consisting of
socioeconomic control variables at the individual level and εi is the error term. We also
include area fixed effects, µa, to control for unobserved differences in the villages. We use
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation and cluster the standard errors at the village level.
Our main outcome of interest is Aspirations.
The second part of the analysis focuses on the impact of the village role model videos on
cooperation and community aspirations. We estimate the average treatment effects running
the following regression:
yi = α+ δTv +X
′
iβ + µa + εv (2.3)
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where, yi denotes the outcome variable for individual i. We consider various outcome
variables as reported contributions, community and individual aspiration index, and other
psychological variables. Tv is an indicator variable for the type of video that was presented
(0 for control, 1 for VL video and 2 for CA video). All other variables have the same
definition. The coefficient of interest is δ which captures the Average Treatment Effects on
the Treated (ATT).
2.4.3 Impact of Community Aspirations on Cooperation
We propose that cooperation in collective action depends on community aspirations. To
investigate this relation we estimate the model in Equation 2. Since exposure to the
treatment videos could affect the self-reported cooperation in collective action problems,
we estimate the model only for the sample of participants in the control group.
The indicator variables of cooperation that we use in the analysis are the following:
1. Group member: measured as an indicator variable equal to one if the participant is
member of a group and zero otherwise,
2. Participation group: measure as the number of times per year that the individual
participates in village work,
3. Spend village: measured as the value spent for village activities per year.
4. Contributions to the treasury in Kwacha.
5. Trust: generalized measure of trust,
6. Security group: indicator of whether the respondent participates in a policing group.
In the analysis we control for individual socioeconomic characteristics as age, gender, educa-
tion and wealth level of the participant. In addition, we include control variables of village
wealth measured as the number of households with access to water and perceived norm of
cooperation measured as the level of perceived participation of other community members
(low, average, high). The estimated coefficients for community aspirations are presented in
Table 2.4. We find that community aspirations are positively and significantly correlated
with participation, but negatively correlated with contributions to the treasury. We find
that there is a negative and significant correlation of community aspiration and trust. We
conclude that community aspirations explain cooperation in the form of networking, but
have negative impact on monetary contributions.
Panel B in Table 2.4 presents the correlation of individual aspiration measures and collective
action. We find that participation in security groups is positively correlated with individual
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aspirations. For the other indicators we find no significant correlation.
Table 2.4: Aspiration and Cooperation in Collective Action
Group Partic. Spend Contr. General. Security
member work vill. treasury trust group
Panel A:
Community aspiration 0.008 0.431∗∗ 1.718 -0.622∗∗ -0.060∗∗ 0.006
(0.035) (0.172) (13.335) (0.246) (0.023) (0.035)
Constant -0.137 -3.766 359.294 22.654∗∗∗ 2.822∗∗∗ -0.094
(0.338) (5.205) (241.585) (6.198) (0.737) (0.714)
Panel B:
Individual aspiration -0.001 0.004 -0.392 -0.016 0.000 0.003∗
(0.002) (0.007) (1.559) (0.013) (0.006) (0.001)
Constant -0.116 -3.647 370.937 22.773∗∗∗ 2.779∗∗ -0.160
(0.355) (5.213) (247.032) (6.409) (0.838) (0.695)
Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145
Fixed effects No No No No No No
Socioeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Panel A presents regressions for community aspirations. Panel B present results for individual
aspirations. Regressions include controls for: gender, age, relationship status, highest grade attained,
size of the plot in hectares, herd size index, group membership, daily mobile phone usage, and area fixed
effects. Missing values for mobile phone usage (1 missing), participating in village work (8 missings)
and generalized trust (1 missing) were replaced with mean values. Columns indicate the indicators of
cooperation in collective action. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.
2.4.4 Treatment Effects on Cooperation
In this section we analyze the effect of the two videos on the decision to cooperate and
community aspirations. We asked the smallholders several control questions on the videos to
identify whether they rate the videos differently across treatments and to find out whether
the role model intervention was successful. About 50 percent of the participants do not
agree that the characters are similar to them. The answers point to the fact that they see
the villages as more successful compared with their village and thus could potentially serve
as role models. Only 30 percent of all participants state that they strongly agree that the
characters are similar to them.
Using a two-sided Wilcoxon ranksum test we find no difference in the rating among
VL and CA videos (p-value = 0.75). Further, participants from the VL and CA video
intervention both equally agree to the question whether their village will be as successful
as the ones depicted in the video (3.66 out of 4). These results point to the direction that
the participants see role models in both videos. Participants in CA video agree to like the
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characters of the video more than those in VL video with the difference being statistically
significant at the one percent level.
The outcome variables that we consider are Actual Contributions, which are the observed
contributions in the experiment and Share of Endowment Sent, which is the share of
contributions based on their endowment participants reported to have sent obtained in the
post-experimental survey. We restrict our analysis to the 642 individuals that reported
contributions in the public good.
We first examine Actual Contributions. Participants from CA video villages contribute
on average 6.40 Kwacha and participants from control villages 6.32 Kwacha. Using a
two-sample t-test, we find that the difference is not statistically significant (p-value =
0.930). Average contributions in the VL video treatment amount to 6.5 Kwacha, which is
not significantly different from the average contributions in the other groups (p-values ≥
0.754).
Reported contributions are significantly higher compared to actual contributions. Partici-
pants in the CA video group report on average to have contributed 7.45 Kwacha, compared
with 7.66 Kwacha in the VL video group and 6.76 in the control group. The difference
between actual and reported amounts in the video treatment groups is statistically signifi-
cant (p-values = 0.000).11 This shows that participants in both video treatment groups
misreport their actual contributions in the smallholder survey. Yet, the bias in reporting is
not different between the two treatment groups.
Participants in the CA video group report to have sent 73 percent of their endowment and
participants in the control group 68 percent. Using a two-sided t-test, we find no significant
difference. In the VL video treatment participants sent 73 percent of their endowment.
This is not significantly different from the share in the CA video and the control group
(two-sided t-test p-values > 0.105).
In the following we use regression analysis to control for important covariates. In Ta-
ble 2.5 we estimated two regressions on the village level for the outcome variable Average
Actual Contribution, which is the model we specified in Equation 2. In both regressions
we control for village level and session characteristics. Column 1 shows the results of
OLS estimation. Since the p-value of the F-test for the overall significance of the model
is not significant (p-value = 0.164), Column 2 provides the estimates from robust re-
gression analysis to account for outliers, which is not unsurprising with a small sample
size of 37 observations.6 Controlling for village level observable characteristics, we find
that the VL video and the CA video have a positive effect on average contributions at
11The sample size of the control villages is too small to conduct a two-sample t-test.
6We replaced the missing value for the variable Adults village and for the variable Already savings group
for one village each in models in column 1 and 2 with the sample mean.
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the village level. Participants in the VL video contribute on average 1.18 Kwacha and
participants in the CA video 1.54 Kwacha more compared to individuals in the control group.
Next we estimate OLS regressions for the outcome Share of Endowment Sent and control
for individual observables. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.5 present the regression results
using area fixed effects and clustering the standard error at the village level (Equation
3). In Column 5 we additionally control for community aspirations. The estimations
partially confirm the results of the actual contributions regression above. The CA video
treatment does not affect the share sent in the experiment at the individual level, but the VL
video. Individuals in the VL video treatment contribute on average 9.4 percentage points
more compared to individuals in the control group. If we further control for community
aspirations in Column 5, the effect size increases to 10.4 percentage points. Community
aspirations are positively related to the reported share sent.
Table 2.5: Actual and Reported Contributions
Average actual contributions Share of endowment sent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VL video 0.739 1.183∗ 0.088∗ 0.094∗ 0.104∗
(0.939) (0.589) (0.052) (0.052) (0.055)
CA video 0.388 1.539∗∗ 0.060 0.066 0.078
(0.991) (0.622) (0.051) (0.053) (0.055)
Comm. aspirations 0.021∗∗
(0.009)
Constant 7.382∗∗∗ 7.197∗∗∗ 0.676∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.596∗∗∗
(1.297) (0.814) (0.001) (0.071) (0.070)
Observations 37 37 642 642 642
R2 0.356 0.703 0.056 0.075 0.080
Fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Robust regression No Yes No No No
Controls Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Column (1) and (2) report the results on regressing
the treatments on average actual contributions at the village level. Regressions control for:
adults village, already savings group, vehicles for transportation, frequency of meetings, treasury
contributions, health group village, distance health facility (min) and availability medicine.
Standard errors are in parentheses. Column (3), (4) and (5) report the results on regressing the
treatments on the share of the endowment sent and include the individual-level control variables:
gender, age, relationship status, highest grade attained, size of the plot in hectares, herd size
index, group membership, daily mobile phone usage and area fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered at the village level are in parentheses.
2.4.5 Treatment Effects on Aspirations and Beliefs
We hypothesize that the videos can change the reference point on what villages can achieve
by working together and result in higher community aspirations. Further, we assume
that the videos can lead to changes in individual aspirations, efficacy beliefs, trust and in
perceived norms of cooperation.
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First, we examine the effect of the video on our community aspiration outcome vari-
able, the community aspiration index.8 A two-sided Wilcoxon ranksum test does not yield
a significant difference in the community aspiration index between CA video, VL video and
control villagers (p-values ≥ 0.219). In Table 2.6 Columns 1 to 3 we present OLS regression
results with the dependent variable Community Aspiration Index. The regressions control
for the same individual level controls as for the outcome Share of Endowment Sent and
additionally for locus of control and village efficacy beliefs. We use area fixed effects and
cluster the standard errors at the village level. We find that both the VL video as well as
the CA video have a negative effect on reported community aspirations. Treated individuals
have a 0.46 and 0.59 standard deviations lower aspiration index compared to participants
in the control villages.
Next, we are testing whether the role model intervention has an effect on the level of
individual aspirations. Using a two-sided Wilcoxon ranksum test, we find a no significant
difference in the reported individual aspiration index between respondents from three
treatment arms (p-values ≥ 0.248). In Column 2 of Table 2.6 we present the regression
results for the individual aspiration index. Controlling for the same covariates as in Column
1, we find that the video treatments do not affect individual aspirations.
Since exposure to role models has been found to affect efficacy beliefs, we also test whether
our role model intervention changes village efficacy. Column 3 of Table 2.6 shows that
we do not find any treatment effects on participants’ belief on the possibility to bring
about positive change for their village. As discussed above in Section 2.2, exposure to the
treatment videos could also affect the perceived social norm of cooperation. We test whether
exposure to the CA and VL video treatment affect individuals’ perceived participation in
their village. The results are reported in Column 4. We find that individuals in the CA and
VL video group report higher scores of perceived participation in their village compared
to individuals in the control group. For reported trust we find that the treatments have
a negative effect for participants in the VL and CA video group compared to individuals
in the control group. This suggests that the two videos increase perceptions of the social
norm of cooperation, while it crowds-out social capital.
8For our analysis we did not exclude outliers in the community and individual aspiration index.
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Table 2.6: Treatment Effects on Aspirations and Beliefs
Comm. aspirations Ind. aspirations Village efficacy Perceived participation Trust in villagers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VL video -0.463∗∗∗ -1.550 0.334 0.168∗∗ -0.271∗∗∗
(0.103) (4.578) (0.301) (0.066) (0.074)
CA video -0.590∗∗∗ -5.709 0.351 0.176∗∗ -0.258∗∗∗
(0.102) (4.773) (0.302) (0.066) (0.066)
Constant -1.116∗∗∗ 22.453 2.831∗∗∗ 1.526∗∗∗ 3.228∗∗∗
(0.276) (14.820) (0.362) (0.154) (0.181)
Observations 642 642 642 642 642
R2 0.112 0.528 0.160 0.078 0.086
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the village level are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Regressions include the
individual-level control variables: gender, age, relationship status, highest grade attained, size of the plot in hectares, herd size index,
group membership, daily mobile phone usage, and area fixed effects. Regressions in Column 1 and 2 additionally control for locus of
control and village efficacy.
2.4.6 Robustness
In the following section we provide some robustness checks on our outcome measure of
community aspirations. First, we analyze the effect of the videos on each community
aspiration dimension separately. As can be seen in Table 2.8 in the Appendix, the negative
treatment effect is driven by aspirations for village meetings. Participants in the VL and
CA video treatment report 0.35 and 0.36 standard deviation lower aspirations for the
number of community meetings. However, we also find that there is a positive effect of
both videos on the dimension Economic Facilities, proxied with the share of population
with good housing conditions, yet the effect size is small compared to the one for for village
meeting aspirations. For all the other dimensions, we find no significant treatment effects.
These results suggest that the videos do not consistently affect all dimensions of aspired
community welfare.
As a second robustness check we test whether the negative treatment effects on the
community aspiration index are robust to how the aspiration index is constructed. First,
we consider whether the results change if we use different approaches of standardizing the
measure. Table 2.9 Panel A shows four possibilities. Column 1 presents the index based
on the method of Beaman et al. (2012) and Bernard et al. (2014) used in the analysis
above, Column 2 presents the index with the same method but excluding the dimension
Transparency, proxied by the share of security guards. Higher aspirations in this dimension
can be interpreted in the way that an individual could expect more crime to happen,
which is not associated with higher social welfare. We find that the results are robust to
exclusion of this dimension. In Column 3 we constructed the index using the current level
of achievements (from the control group) for the standardization. The negative treatment
effect of the VL video disappears, while for the CA video the effect still remains. We find
the same results, when we exclude the Transparency dimension from the index (Column 4).
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Another possibility to construct the index is using the growth rate or aspiration gap (see
e.g. Janzen et al. (2017)). The growth rate denotes how far an individual aspires in relation
to her current level (g = a-c/c).12 We construct the growth rate for each dimension and
take the mean to comprise the growth rate index. In Panel B of Table 2.9 Column 1
we find that using this measure as an outcome variable for community aspirations that
there is no treatment effect – also, if we take out the dimension Transparency from the
growth rate index. The growth rate can also be used to create a standardized measure of
community aspirations. Using the current level for the standardized growth rate we again
find a negative treatment effect of both of the videos, which persists if the Transparency
dimension is not considered.
In summary, we find that the treatment videos have a negative effect on the level of
community aspirations (when standardized with the aspirations of the control group), but
no effect on the gap between their aspired and current level (growth rate).
2.5. Discussion
We find evidence that videos depicting successful examples of collective action can increase
contributions to a real public good. At the village level we find that on average participants
in the treatment villages contribute 12 to 15 percentage points more than participants from
control villages. For reported contributions we only find a treatment effect of the village
life video. While we exclude demand effects from not identifying individual decisions, we
also acknowledge it is less credible compared to using observed measures of contributions
in the experiment. Yet, the effect size is similar to the ones for actual contributions (10.4
percentage points). Further, our results are based on a control group that only includes few
villages. Future research should therefore test whether the results are robust to using a
control group with a larger sample size.
While the role model intervention was successful in increasing contributions to the public
good, we find negative treatment effects on our preferred measure of community aspirations.
Analyzing the effect on each community aspiration alone, we find that both videos have
a positive effect on the dimension Economic facilities and a negative effect on Political
Freedom proxied with the number of village meetings participants would like to have in
a month. These results could suggest that role model videos could have different effects
on distinct dimensions or that the number of village meetings is not a valid proxy. It
could be that more village meetings are associated with higher opportunity costs of time.
A similar argument could be made for our indicator of Transparency, measured as the
share of security/police guards an individual aspires to have for her community. Above a
certain threshold a security guard could also decrease community and/or individual welfare.
12For individuals who reported to have zero current level (e.g. no plots) the growth rate could not be
calculated so that we increased all current levels by 0.1.
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These results suggest that some indicators might be capturing aspirations for community
welfare better than others. Future research should therefore test the validity of the different
indicators for community welfare dimensions. While we find that the aspiration index is
correlated with reported and experimental measures of cooperation, our paper does not
provide a test of determinants of aspirations and correlates of aspirations with cooperation
behavior for each dimension. Further, future projects should assess the external validity
and reliability of the indicators by testing the questions in different settings, at different
points in time and with variation in the order of measures and enumerators’ experience in
data collection (as done for individual aspirations in Bernard & Taffesse (2014)).
Future work should also analyze the mechanism of the role model intervention on co-
operation. While we only find inconclusive results for community aspirations, we find that
the videos changed perceived participation beliefs of participants. This suggests that the
effect could run through a change in expectations of other people’s behavior. Yet, while
we find positive effects on perceived norms of cooperation, we find a negative treatment
effect on social capital, i.e. generalized trust in village members. This is contrary to the
findings of Paluck (2009), who report that an radio edutainment intervention on the roots
and consequences of violence changed descriptive and actual, but not prescriptive norms.
To shed light on the mechanism of behavioral change, future projects could vary the degree
to which groups are exposed to the video to analyze the role of expectations.13
Our study provides evidence that a 11 minute long video can modify aspirations, be-
liefs and cooperation levels directly after exposure. It is also important to consider the
long-term effects, as reported in Bernard et al. (2014) for individual aspirations. In their
study they find evidence of long-term effects, yet the effect size is smaller six months after
the intervention. We provide the results of an evaluation one year after our intervention in
a later study.
2.6. Conclusion
We provide a new explanation on why collective action fails: Individuals could lack aspira-
tions for their community that prevent them from investing in collective action. Survey
and experimental evidence presented in this paper provide some support for our hypoth-
esis. Participants, who are more optimistic about the common welfare, engage more in
participation and contribute more in the public good. Yet, community aspirations are also
associated with lower contributions to the treasury and lower trust.
This finding suggests that changing community aspirations is crucial to promote cooperation.
Based on this premise we implemented an field experiment in which community members
13In the study by Banerjee et al. (2019) analyzing the effect of a video series on HIV and risky sexual
behavior, the authors do not find evidence that the positive treatment effects on health behavior can be
explained by a change in perceived social norms.
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could contribute to finance a local public good: a savings group. We test whether expanding
individuals’ imagination by showing successful examples of cooperation induce cooperation.
Our results show that a video that depicts communities that succeed at achieving higher
welfare through collective action induce higher cooperation. Yet, using an explicit message
to promote cooperation did not affect contributions to the public good. This finding
suggests that examples and narratives are more effective at promoting cooperation.
The treatment videos had a negative effect on community aspirations compared with
the control condition – yet, the effects are only robust to some ways of constructing the
index. Instead, the videos changed perceived norms of cooperation. Treated smallholders
report to perceive the participation of their fellow villagers in village activities higher
compared to smallholders in the control group. However, we find a negative treatment
effect on reported levels of trust.
We further examined the impact the treatment has on concepts related to aspirations. We
do not find a treatment effect on locus of control or village efficacy beliefs. These results
are different from Bernard et al. (2014), who found that their intervention not only changed
individual aspirations, but also locus of control beliefs. However, the literature also argues
that aspirations are more easily affected by outside interventions than self-efficacy or locus
of control beliefs (Wuepper & Lybbert, 2017).
A limitation of our study is that concept of community welfare that we use in our analysis,
is not autochthonous. While this concept is acceptable by development practitioners and
international organizations, local communities might have a very different idea of common
welfare. Therefore, the indicator of community aspirations needs to be validated in the field.
This exercise can also help to identify alternative or complementary indicators of welfare.
The indicators could be developed using a participatory poverty assessment approach (Robb,
1998).
We find that community aspirations are positively correlated with some measures of
cooperation but not others. More research is needed to understand how institutional factors
interact with collective aspirations to promote cooperation. Future work should also asses
the direction of the causality. In particular, participation in collective action could increase
social aspirations. For example, Feigenberg et al. (2013) shows that more frequent meetings
of saving groups are more likely to poor risk and less likely to default second loans. We
recommend that self-reported cooperation measures are complemented with secondary
information on actual participation.
We implemented the treatments at the village level and did not obtain individual measures
on contributions to the public good. Further, this paper only included an analysis of the
short-term effects of the video screening. A future extension is to consider the long-term
effects of the intervention. While video interventions are cost-effective in reaching a large
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number of people, future work should examine whether alternative interventions can succeed
at changing collective aspirations.
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2.7. Appendix A – Tables
Table 2.7: Correlates of Community und Individual Aspirations
(1) (2)









Use mobile phone 0.126 -3.855
(0.206) (5.667)
Size of plot(s) -0.003
(0.003)
Index herd size -0.073 6.405
(0.086) (6.134)






Notes: Standard errors clustered at the village level are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01. Missing values for mobile phone usage (1 missing), participating in village work (8
missings) and generalized trust (1 missing) were replaced with mean values.
Table 2.8: Treatment Effects on Community Aspirations Dimensions
Number of meetings Share good housing School distance Contributions to village Share receiving support
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VL video -0.345∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ -0.046 -0.049 -0.024
(0.055) (0.018) (0.073) (0.042) (0.031)
CA video -0.358∗∗∗ 0.030∗ -0.089 -0.072 -0.021
(0.059) (0.017) (0.074) (0.044) (0.031)
Constant -0.197 -0.321∗∗∗ 0.173 -0.540∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.094) (0.171) (0.098) (0.048)
Observations 642 642 642 642 642
R2 0.127 0.067 0.043 0.143 0.052
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the village level are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Regressions include the individual-level
control variables: gender, age, relationship status, highest grade attained, size of the plot in hectares, herd size index, group membership, daily mobile
phone usage, locus of control, village efficacy and area fixed effects.
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Table 2.9: Treatment Effects on Different Indices
Panel A - Standardized measure
Std. aspirations Without transparency Std. current level Std. current level w.t.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VL video -0.463∗∗∗ -0.414∗∗∗ -1.096 -0.827
(0.103) (0.075) (0.696) (0.515)
CA video -0.590∗∗∗ -0.517∗∗∗ -1.770∗∗ -1.372∗∗
(0.102) (0.072) (0.688) (0.510)
Constant -1.116∗∗∗ -0.575∗∗ 2.860∗∗ 3.387∗∗
(0.276) (0.277) (1.407) (1.422)
Observations 642 642 642 642
R2 0.112 0.103 0.097 0.086
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B – Growth rate
Not standardized Without transparency Std. current level Std. current level w.t.
(5) (6) (7) (8)
VL video -2.367 -2.819 -0.185∗∗∗ -0.176∗∗∗
(8.110) (9.731) (0.053) (0.049)
CA video 1.533 1.873 -0.219∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗
(7.210) (8.651) (0.053) (0.049)
Constant 42.322∗∗ 50.950∗∗ -0.214∗∗ -0.287∗∗
(19.882) (23.861) (0.104) (0.107)
Observations 642 642 642 642
R2 0.067 0.067 0.127 0.122
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the village level are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Regressions include the
individual-level control variables: gender, age, relationship status, highest grade attained, size of the plot in hectares, herd size index, group
membership, daily mobile phone usage, locus of control, village efficacy and area fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the village level are in
parentheses.
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Table 2.10: Variable Description
Variable Explanation
Adults village Number of adults living in the village
Age in years Reported age in years
Agree similar characters Whether the respondent disagrees/agrees that the video
characters are similar to themselves (1=yes, 0=no)
Average actual contributions Average contributions in the public goods game in each
village in Kwacha
Average reported contributions Average reported contributions in the public goods
game in each village in Kwacha
Community aspiration index Standardized index made up of five community aspira-
tion dimensions proxied by: economic welfare, access
to education, security, village contributions, mutual
support and village meetings
Daily use of mobile phone Respondent uses mobile phone daily (1=yes, 0=no)
Distance health facility (min) Distance to the nearest health facility in walking min-
utes
Frequency of meetings Frequency of village meetings (1=twice per year, 2=
once per month, 3=more than once per month)
General trust in villagers Trust in fellow villagers measured with the question:
"Do you think that most people in this village are basi-
cally honest and can be trusted?" (1=strongly disagree,
2=slightly disagree, 3=slightly agree, 4=strongly agree)
Group member Respondent is a member of (a) group(s) (1=yes, 0=no)
Highest grade Highest grade of schooling attained in years
Household has child(ren) Whether there are children in the age from 6 to 18 in
the respondent’s family (1=yes, 0=no)
Individual aspiration index Standardized index made up of two individual aspira-
tion dimensions: education and assets
Index herd size Index capturing the herd size derived with principal
component analysis
Like character How strongly the respondent disagrees/agrees to like
the character (1=strongly disagree, 4=strongly agree=)
Listens to radio daily Respondent listens to radio daily (1=yes, 0=no)
Locus of control If the respondent agrees to be successful: one needs to
work hard = 1, one needs to be lucky =0
No. of goats Number of goats the respondent owns currently
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Table 2.11: Variable Description 2
Variable Explanation
No. of hh with access to safe water Number of households with access to safe drink-
ing water (i.e. protected wells, boreholes, pumped
water)
No. of hh with good housing Number of households in the village with very good
housing conditions (reported); good housing con-
ditions: houses with walls made out of red brick,
burnt brick or asbestos and/or with iron sheets on
the roof
Participation in village work per year Number of times per year the respondent partici-
pates in village work such as road clearing, village
clean up, insaka maintenance
Perceived participation How the respondent rates the spirit of participation
in the village (1=low, 2=average, 3= high)
Reported contributions The amount the respondent reported to have con-
tributed to the village project in Kwacha
Security group Security group exists in village (1=yes, 0=no)
Share of endowment sent Amount of Kwacha that was sent in proportion to
the endowment
Single Respondent is single (1=yes, 0=no)
Size of plot(s) Size of the plot(s) the respondent owns currently in
hectares
Spendings village activities (individual/year) Respondent’s average spending for village activities
in a year in Kwacha
Time lived in village Time the person has lived in the village in years
Treasury contributions (hh/year) Households’ contributions to the village treasury on
average per year in Kwacha (reported by the village
leadership)
Village efficacy Whether the respondents thinks that people like
themselves have influence in making the village a
better place to live (1 = agree, 0=disagree)
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2.8. Appendix B – Experimental Instructions and Surveys
2.8.1 General Instructions
Good morning/afternoon. Thank you for taking the time to come to this activity today.
We are a group of researchers from the University of Göttingen and the University of Kiel
in Germany and from Zambia. We are conducting a study on socio-economic conditions
in Zambia. In this activity, we will ask you to make decisions involving money and to
complete a survey. You will get 10 Kwacha for an activity. The money you will get will
be yours to keep and take home. The activities of this study are financed by the German
Research Foundation. Before we start, we would like to tell you some important points.
Today’s activities may take three hours. Before we begin we would like to make some
general comments about what we are doing here today and explain the rules that we must
follow. Participation in this study is completely voluntary. If at any time you do not
want to participate, you are free to leave whether the activities have begun or not. In this
case you will not receive the payment, though. Only people from this village are able to
participate in this study. If you are not from this village, you can stay and watch, but not
participate in the activities.
All decisions will be made in private. That means no one of the other participants
will know how you have decided and what answers you have given. The information we
collect will be saved in an anonymized manner. We will treat the information confidentially.
If you have heard anything about these types of activities, you should try to forget about
that because each activity can be completely different. That is why it is important that
you listen as carefully as possible.
Before we explain the activities, each of you will draw a card from the bag with a number
on it. This number is your ID number in our activity. We will show a video to all of
you. If the number of participants is large, we will ask you to take turns to watch the
video, beginning with lower numbers and going to larger numbers.. When all participants
have watched the video, we will do an activity in the group which we will explain then.
Afterwards, numbers 1 to 20 will also be asked to answer a survey.
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2.8.2 Experimental Instructions
Thank you for coming together. For this task you will receive 10 Kwacha. Here is a box in
which you can put some, all or no money from the 10 Kwacha we give you. This money
that is put to the box will be kept in your village. In addition to the money that you put
into the box that belongs to your village, we will put the same amount of money which
has been put to the village box on top of it. Thus, the total amount of money that you
give to the village box will be doubled by us. Let us take an example. Suppose that the
total amount of money that has been put into the village box is 60 Kwacha, so that the
village has earned 60 Kwacha. This 60 Kwacha will be doubled by us, so that you will re-
ceive 60 Kwacha by us on top. In total you will have 120 Kwacha in the village box in the end.
The total amount of money in the village box will form the seed capital for new sav-
ings groups in your village. This means that village members can save money regularly
and when in need of capital, they can borrow money for a private productive investment.
Often the households lack access to capital to undertake productive investments. Therefore,
setting a saving goal and having access to credit can facilitate the needed resources. This
has been shown in the video, where the women in the village of Lilanda were able to buy
household items together.
The suggestion that we have for you is that you form several savings groups in your
village. Each saving group could consist of 8 to 15 households. Only newly established
savings groups will be eligible to receive the money earned in this study today, not already
existing groups. Members of already existing groups are free to also be a member of a
newly formed savings group. Further, village members who have not been able to come to
this study today will be able to be a member of the newly created savings groups. People
from other villages, however, should not become members of the new groups. Similarly, the
seed capital that you receive today cannot be send to saving groups with people from other
villages.
The savings groups should meet regularly to collect the savings of group members. Once that
the members have accumulated sufficient capital, members can borrow to finance productive
investments such as buying seeds, animals, fertilizers or vaccinations, etc. Members of the
group should repay the loan on periodic installments and on pre-determined dates. Do you
understand the procedure? Control question: If the total amount of money given to the
village box is 50 Kwacha. How much money will we give to you on top? How much money
is then in the village box? We will now explain how you will make your decision. Please do
not ask questions or talk while you are here in the group. This is very important. Please
be sure that you obey this rule, because it is possible for one person to spoil the activities
for everyone. If one person talks about the activities while others can hear it, we would not
be able to carry out the activities today.
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We will call you one by one to come to a place where you will be given 10 Kwacha
in 1 Kwacha coins in an envelope. We then ask you to go another place where you will wait
in line until you will be called to come to the location where the box for the village box
contributions is located. The box is located in such a way that nobody can see how much
you contribute. You can put no coin, one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine or
ten Kwacha coins to the village box. If you have decided how much you want to put, you
leave this amount in the envelope and place the envelope in the box. The money that you
want to keep for yourself, you will take into your pocket. Please remember, nobody will get
to know how much you put.
Once everybody has put their envelope into the box, we will take the box and open
the envelopes to count the money that has been given to the village box together with the
village treasurer. After we know the total amount that has been put into the box, we will
double the total amount of coins. In the end we will give the total money, the money that
you have given and that we have put on top, to the village treasurer. We would like to ask
you to hold a village meeting in the next week. In this meeting you can set up the new
saving groups. You will need to decide on who will be the leader of the group, the secretary
and the treasurer. In addition you will decide on the individual productive use you want
to give to the loan, as well as the conditions on the savings and loans. The money that
you have contributed to the village box and the amount that we have put on top will be
equally divided among the newly established saving groups by the village treasurer.
We will give you a booklet which shows how a saving group can be established. When
you meet in the next week, you can discuss with each other how your village saving group
should look like and determine the rules. The booklet also contains an accounting sheet
with which you can keep track of the outgoing and ingoing money and the total amounts
of money that has been borrowed and paid back by each individual in the saving group.
Further, we kindly ask you to keep records of the meetings and the discussions. Please
register who has taken part in the village meeting next week by each of you writing down
your name on a form that can also be found in the booklet. We will give several booklets
to the headman who will distribute them to each group. How many of you are already
members of a savings group? Please raise your hands. Thank you.
You can now go to the car where our research assistants will hand out the envelopes
with the 10 Kwacha coins to you. Please form two lines and do not speak while you are
waiting in line. This is very important.
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2.8.3 Smallholder Survey
1. Name of the research assistant (First, Last)














12. Relation to household head
13. What tribe are you?
14. How long have you lived in this village? (years)
15. What is the highest grade of schooling that you have completed? (Number of years)
16. How many 1 Kwacha coins did you leave in the envelope for the village treasury?
Please be reminded, that this information will be kept private.
___________ Kwacha
17. What kind of change would you like to bring about in your village? Please tell me any
desire/goal you want to achieve in your village in the future. [RECORD ANSWER]
___ Education:
___ Health:





(Please list the order in which the goals were mentioned)













 Other, specify: ___________
20. How many households in your village have very good housing conditions, i.e.
houses with walls made out of red brick, burnt brick or asbestos and/or with iron
sheets on the roof?
21. For how many households in your village would you like to have very good
housing conditions in the future? (desire/goal)
22. How many households do you expect to actually have very good housing
conditions in your village in ten years? (expectation)
22.1 If the expectation is higher than the desire/goal, why is this the case?
23. How many minutes do students from your village have to walk to get to a primary
school?
24. How many minutes would you like students to walk to get to a primary school in
the future? (desire/goal)
25. How many minutes do you expect students will actually have to walk to primary
school in ten years? (expectation)
25.1 If the expectation is higher than the desire/goal, why is this the case?
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26. How many policemen/-women or voluntary guards does your village have?
27. How many policemen/-women or voluntary guards would you like your village to
have in the future? (desire/goal)
28. How many policemen/-women or voluntary guards do you expect your village will
actually have in ten years? (expectation)
28.1 If the expectation is higher than the desire/goal, why is this the case?
29. How much money do households in this village contribute to finance village
projects in a year? (Kwacha/year)
30. How much money would you like that households in your village contribute
annually to finance village projects in the future? (desire/goal) (Kwacha/year)
31. How much money do you expect households actually contribute annually to
finance village projects in ten years? (expectation) (Kwacha/year)
31.1 If the expectation is higher than the desire/goal, why is this the case?
32. How many households in your village get support in case of need, such as
suffering from economic loss due to crop failure?
33. How many households would you like to get support in case of need in the future?
(desire/goal)
34. How many households do you expect to actually get support in case of need in ten
years? (expectation)
34.1 If the expectation is higher than the desire/goal, why is this the case?
35. How many times do people in your village meet each other (for example for
celebrations or village discussions) in a month?
36. How many times a month would you like people in your village to meet in the
future? (desire/goal)
37. How many times a month do you expect people to actually meet in ten years?
(expectation)
37.1 If the expectation is higher than the desire/goal, why is this the case?
38. Are there children in the age of 6 to 18 in your family?
 Yes
 No (Go to question 42)
39. What is the education level that the youngest child achieved until now?
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40. What is the level of education you would like this child to achieve in his/her life?
(goal/desire)
41. What is the level of education you expect this child will to achieve in his/her life?
(what they will probably achieve)
41.1 If the expectation is higher than the desire/goal, why is this the case?
42. Do you own land, cows and goats? How big is the size of your plot and how many




43. What is the size of your plot and number of cows and goats you would like to have









44.1 If the expectation is higher than the desire/goal, why is this the case?
45. How many households live in this village? No. of households
46. How many households do you expect to live in this village in ten years? (no. of
households)
47. Please tell me with which of the two statements you agree more:
Statement A: “To be successful, above all one needs to work very hard.”
Statement B: “To be successful, above all one needs to be lucky.”
 I agree more with A
 I agree more with B
48. Do you think that women and men have equal rights in your village?
 Yes








49. Are you a member of any clubs, groups, organizations, committees or associations?
 Yes
 No (if no, go to question 64)
50. If yes, in which one(s):










51. How often do you meet with your savings group?
 Once a week
 Twice a month
 Once a month
 Less than once a month
52. What is the name of your savings group?
53. How many members does your savings group have? (Open ended answer)
54. How many women are in the savings group?
55. How many men are in the savings group?
56. How long has the savings group been in existence? (in years)
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57. What is the goal of the savings group? (Open ended answer)
58. Does your group make regular deposits?
 Yes
 No (if no, go to question 60)
59. If yes, how much money does each member deposit every meeting?
__________ Kwacha
60. How often does each member on average borrow money from the saving group in a
year? (Open ended answer)
61. Would you say that the group is successful in achieving its group goal (such as









62. Did you have problem(s) in your saving groups?
 Yes
 No (if no, go to quesstion 64)
63. If yes, which ones? (Open ended answer)
64. Do you consider yourself to be active in the group(s), such as by attending meetings




65. How many times a year do you participate in village work (such as road clearing,
village clean up, insaka maintenance)?
___ times per month
66. How much money do you spent on average for village activities or village problems in
a year?
___ Kwacha/year
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67. How much money do you spend on schooling on average per school term?
___ Kwacha/school term













 yes, a lot
 yes, a little bit
 No




71. Do you have friends and/or family in the village . . . ?
 Yes
 No
72. How often do you visit the village . . . .? (Open ended answer)
73. How often do you use a mobile phone?
 Every day
 Once a week
 Once a month
 Once a year
 Never
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74. How often do you listen to a radio?
 Every day
 Once a week
 Once a month
 Once a year
 Never















if no: why do you think that they are not similar?
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1. Name of the research assistant (First, Last)
2. Date of interview (dd/mm/yr)
3. Name of the interviewee (First, Last)
4. Role of the interviewee (e.g. headwoman/-man)
5. Village
6. How many households does your village have?
7. How many adults live in your village?
8. How many households in your village have access to safe drinking water (i.e.
protected wells, boreholes, pumped water)?
9. On average how many minutes does it take a household to get access to safe drinking
water?
10. What is the main market where villagers sell their products? (specify the name of the
city where the main market is located)
11. How many kilometers away is the main market?
12. How many minutes does it take to reach the main market?









14. How many children in the village go to primary school?
15. How many children, who are in the age to go to primary school, do not attend
primary school?
16. How far is the nearest health facility?
______ distance (in walking minutes)
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18. Does the village have police or a neighborhood security committee?
 Yes we have police
 Yes we have neighborhood security committee
 No








20. Do you have a resource that is used jointly such as a well or a village field/garden?
 Yes
 No (go to question 22)
21. If yes, which one(s)? (specify)
22. How often do the people come together for a village meeting?
 More than once a month
 Once a month
 Twice a year
 Never happens
23. Which regular activities do the people in the village do together (such as the
improvement of insaka, cleaning of roads and paths, maintenance of borehole)?
(specify)
24. How often does the village meet per year?
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25. Do you document your village meetings and/or the regular activities (when they take
part, what was done/spoken and how many people participate?)
26. In the last three years, has the village organized to address a need or a problem?
 Yes
 No (go to question 27)
a. Around which issue(s) did the village organize?
a) ___________
b) ___________









27. How many programs and institutions (such as WHO, UNICEF) assist your village?




28. Which of the following organizations, clubs, committees, or groups exist in this
village?
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29. How many saving groups exist in this village?
a. How many people participate in the first savings group?
b. How many people participate in the second savings group?
c. How many people participate in the third savings group?
d. How many women in the village are members of a savings group?
e. How many men in the village are members of a savings group?
30. Do any persons or organizations (such as for example government, religious
organizations, and businesses) help or support these village-based organizations?
 Yes
 No (go to question 31)
a. If yes, who/which one(s)? (specify)
31. Does this village have a village treasury?
 Yes
 No (go to question 32)
a. Who is in charge of the accounting of the village treasury? (specify)
b. Do you have accounting records?
 Yes
 No
c. How much money is in the village treasury at present?
d. How much money is in the village treasury on average in a year?
________ Kwacha/year
e. How much money do people contribute to the village treasury on average per
year?
________ Kwacha/year
f. Does the village treasury have other sources of money than financial
contribution of people living in this village? (specify)
g. For what has the money in the village treasury spent in the last year? (specify)
32. How often do village members on average give money to a village member who is in
need?
 More than once a month
 Once a month
 Twice a year
 Once a year
61
 Never happens
33. What kinds of crimes (such as robberies, violent disputes, etc.) exist in this village?
(specify)
34. How often do crimes happen in a year?
________ Times/year
35. Are there members of this village who go to other places to work during certain
periods of the year?
 Yes
 No
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2.9. Appendix C – Video Scripts
2.9.1 Collective Action Video
Village Clubs: Community Mobilization
Narrator: "In rural communities local development is everyone’s business: men, women,
youth and elders alike. Village clubs create quite a community dynamic. Each time a club
is created people’s participation and social cohesion are reinforced. At the entrance of the
village of Iaosongi, in the heart of the Congo forest, the rehabilitation of the road was
decided within the villagers in their village club. The clubs are used to facilitate dialogue
and stimulate collective action. Village clubs are groups of people that meet regularly to
discuss challenges, to find and implement solutions."
Woman: "Together, we decided to rehabilitate the road. Look how it looks now. First the
men of the village enlarge the way and then women follow with their machetes."
Narrator: "It was a great challenge, indeed, as this route is the main one that leads to
the village. Until recently it could only be used by bicycles and pedestrians. The road
is not quite finished. Only a few hundred meters remain. But it is already having an impact."
Woman: "In the village, it is cheaper to buy cassava sticks than before. The price
has dropped from 500 to 200, even to 150 Congolese Francs. And we manage to sell our
fish for a higher price."
Villagers: "If you are afraid to be on the front-line, let us take your place and we
will show you how to develop your environment."
Narrator: "In Lilanda, another village of the Tshopo Province it is harvest day and
many people are here together as this is a community field. The traditional chief allocated
land to the village clubs. The clubs then decided to use it for producing seeds and called
upon the local union of producer organizations. Together they identified and adapted
a variety of seeds and experimented with seldom used techniques such as line planting
and double cropping. The partnership between producer organizations and the village
clubs benefits the entire community. Production has increased and better quality seeds
are now available. The whole population of Lilanda joins in and takes advantage of this
new impetus. Taking its inspiration from the village clubs, 100 women producers created
their own association spontaneously. Today they share the goods they have jointly acquired
thanks to their individual contributions."
Woman: "We were inspired by the way the clubs operate and have decided that we
too could be involved in the development of our community this is why we have created
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our association."
Village Clubs in DR Congo: Food Security and Nutrition
Narrator: "The Tshopo Province in the Northeast of the Democratic Republic of Congo
is covered by rainforests and watered by the Congo River and its tributaries. On this huge
territory fishing is a key economic activity that is traditionally controlled by men. Women
bring occasional support. Therefore, in order to increase household incomes, why not allow
women to fish? This question was raised during the discussions of the local village club in
the fishing village of Isangi. The club was formed by the villagers. They have spaces in
which rural men and women get organized, express themselves, and take collective action
to improve their living conditions. Henry and Rebecca are husband and wife. They have
been members of the village club for three years and have taken part in the discussions
about fishing."
Man: "Men-women equality and the gender division of responsibility were discussed
in our village club for the first time. We have realized that women can also play a proactive
role in fishing activities."
Narrator: "Behaviors have gradually changed. It is now accepted for women to carry out
tasks that were previously attributed to men. Rebecca, Henry’s wife, fishes with a friend.
The redefinition of women’s roles has increased the households fish catches and increased
their incomes as a result. At the same time the clubs have discussed and brought awareness
to the issue of nutrition. The diet of the community is now more varied and balanced.
People now eat vegetables, meat and, of course, fish. However, for Rebecca and her friends
the benefits of this new gender division of tasks goes far beyond food and nutrition."
Woman: "Today, we pay school for five children. Three others are at home. We have also
started to buy metal sheets to change the roof which currently leaks because it is in straw.
Thanks to the club, we have increased our incomes and acquired new skills."
Narrator: "A few kilometers from Isangi, in Yalosuna, village clubs have encouraged
communities to fight against food taboos and resulting malnutrition. Adama is busy
preparing food for her family. On today’s menu there is a variety of fish that, until recently,
women were not allowed to eat."
Woman: "Traditions forbade us from eating catfish. People said that: “If you eat it,
your eyes, belly and arms will swell, your hair will fall out and your body will be ripped in
pieces.”
Narrator: "Thanks to discussions and awareness activities in the village clubs, things have
changed. Adama and the other women of the village are now allowed to eat forbidden food
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which represents a new source of protein and an important step towards gender equality.
In this village, as well as in many other places, such changes have been possible thanks to
the support of traditional chiefs."
Man: "I am so proud of this! It is an encouraging sign of trust with my people.I hope that
in the future we will even improve this way of working."
Narrator: "In fact this is the very nature of the village clubs – to collaborate with
all development stakeholders. The clubs also work closely with the local authorities."
Man: "I have seen the changes. Before when I visited the villages as an Agriculture
Inspector, people used to ask me for machetes, seeds, . . . But now they don’t ask for
everything. Instead they say ’come and see what we’ve done!’".
Narrator: "On the other bank of the Congo River, in the village of Bossokulu, the
local village club has introduced a new crop, the soya bean, a legume that is highly rich
in protein. Zhang is the leader of the local club that has played a key role in this change.
After discussions in the club, members realized that the diets in the village in the province
were not diversified enough; consisting mainly of cassava and banana. So they decided to
introduce new varieties of crops."
Man: All this helps us for a good diet. Here, Fally takes care of his field where he
has planted soya as a result of our discussion in our village club."
Narrator: "All of these experiences are worth being shared and it happens through
a community radio. Each week the clubs discover what other clubs do, talk about it, and
even build on these experiences. Thanks to their work and their networking, village clubs
allow communities to redefine their daily life and to shape their future."
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2.9.2 Village Life Video
Village Life in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Farming
Narrator: "In Sub-Saharan Africa, more than half of the population lives in the rural
areas. For example in the Democratic Republic of Congo, almost 60% of the population
live in rural areas. The village of Iaosongi is a good example of a traditional village in the
Congo. [no speaking]. This village is located in the heart of the Congo forest. The village
is very remote and it takes several hours to travel to the capital. The main access to the
village is by an unpaved road. Regularly, it is necessary to do maintenance."
Woman: "I am Christine Sombotolea. I come from Iaosongi. This road connects us
to other villages in the area. As it is no concrete road, it has to be maintained by machetes."
Narrator: "There are also other roads, which are smaller compared to the main one
and that can only be used by bicycles and pedestrians. It is important for the village to be
well connected to the other surrounding villages."
Woman: "Farmers from other villages come and sell their cassava sticks here. We get
them for about 150 to 200 Congolese Francs. We mainly sell fresh fish."
Villagers: "If you are afraid to be on the front-line, let us take your place and we
will show you how to develop your environment."
Narrator: "This is Lilanda, another village in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It is
harvesting time. People here rely on farming. They grow a variety of crops. Among them
are cassava, manioc, peanuts, corn, beans, rice and also bananas and pineapples. Drought
is not a big problem here, as the village lies in an area with regular rainfall. The majority
of people in the Democratic Republic of Congo work as subsistence farmers. Typically,
farms are about four acres large and maintained by simple tools. Today, the women in
Lilanda meet to share the goods that they have bought for their household: mattresses,
pots and other household items they need for their living. They next bigger town is far
away and people often lack transport possibilities."
Woman: "We do not have a car which we can use to drive to the next city, so we
order our needed household items from a supplier who brings them to our village."
Village Life in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Fishing
Narrator: "The Tshopo Province in the Northeast of the Democratic Republic of Congo
is covered by rainforests and watered by the Congo River and its tributaries. On this huge
territory fishing is a key economic activity that is traditionally controlled by men. Women
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bring occasional support in order to increase household incomes. For fishing, people here
use traditional methods: Unmotorized canoes, seine nets, gill nets, hand lines and fish
baskets.The fishing village of Isangi is meeting today to discuss their last week’s catches
and experiences. The fish are not easy to catch. Most of them only live in specific areas
such as in channels and creeks with only little current. This is where the fish find their
food. Henry and Rebecca are husband and wife. They have been living in Isangi for their
whole life. They also depend on fishing for their living."
Man:"During the rainy season from September and October and also the time between
April to June the fish are breeding. At these times there are a lot of small animals in the
water the fish need for their growth."
Narrator: "In these periods there are not many fish that the fisher find in the Congo river.
Catches are then the lowest in the whole year. Overall, however, the Congo river has a
great diversity of fish such as the elephant fishes, cichlids and catfishes. Today, Rebecca is
fishing with a friend. They hope to have fish for dinner. When they fish more than they
can eat they sell their fish on the local market. The diet of the community is very varied
and balanced. People eat vegetables, meat and, of course, fish. Rebecca and her friend have
been successful. They are returning from fishing and are on their way to prepare dinner."
Woman: "We have five children who go to school. Three others are still at home. As
everybody in the village, they will depend on fish. My husband takes them with him in his
boat and teaches them how to fish. They learn how to locate the fish and how to throw the
net into the river."
Narrator: "A few kilometers from Isangi, there is the village called Yalosuna. The
woman, Adama is busy preparing food for her family. On today’s menu there is a variety
of fish that also come from the Congo river."
Woman: "I like to prepare catfish. It is cooked very fastly and it is very delicious,
very nutritious. It is the favorite meal of my husband and my children."
Narrator: "Adama and her family eat the catfish cooked; with some oil and bread.
It is a traditional meal in the village of Isangi due to the availability of catfish in the Congo
river. The fish presents a source of protein which is an important step towards a good
nutrition. The village of Isangi is governed by the grand traditional chief of the Kome
Chiefdom Joseph Ngwangwa Onobaiso."
Man: “I have been the grand traditional chief for many years. The fish in my chief-
dom are very important for the people. It presents a source of food and livelihood."
Narrator: "In Yalosuna people grow up with fishing. They learn it early on."
67
Man: "I am also from the village Yalosuna. I am living here over 10 years now. Before I
came here, I did not know how to fish. But since I learned it from the other men in the
villages I earn my living with it."
Narrator: "On the other bank of the Congo River, in the village of Bossokulu, the
inhabitants do not rely so much on fish, but instead on the soya bean, a legume that is
highly rich in protein. So soya bean can replace animal products. The crop grows especially
well in areas with a hot climate. Next to the soya bean, the diets in the village consists of
mainly cassava and banana."
Man: "All this helps us for a good diet. Here, Fally takes care of his field where he
has planted soya. He also sells the beans on the market."
Narrator: "After work, the village members meet to hear some radio or to talk about
everyday life. Today they are celebrating a birthday of a village member. Celebrations are
an important part of their culture."
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3 Community Aspirations and Cooperation: Pre-
scriptive vs. Descriptive Role Models1
1We are grateful for the helpful comments and suggestions received by Kacana Khadjavi, Holger A. Rau,
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Felix Betzenbichler for including the subtitles. We also thank Paul Malambo, Sarah Hanyama, Harriet
Chibuta, Naomi Munthali, Magdalene Trapp, Muyambo and Charity Sipangule for their research assistance
in the field as well as Maximilian Köster, Merindah Lössel and Henrike Sternberg for their data preparation
and data cleaning support.
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Chapter 3. Community Aspirations and Cooperation: Prescriptive vs. Descriptive Role
Models
3.1. Introduction
Cooperation among individuals in groups is essential for rural economic development,
especially in countries where the state has limited capacity to provide local public goods
(Cardenas & Carpenter, 2008). Collective organization at the village level then provides
an important substitute (Fafchamps, 2006). Villages characterized with high participation
in village organization have been found to have higher incomes per capita compared to
villages with low levels of participation (Narayan & Pritchett, 2019). Yet, despite the
potential benefits of collective action, there is considerable heterogeneity in the degree of
self-organization (Ostrom, 2000). Understanding the factors that facilitate and constrain
the evolution of collective action is thus of great importance.
In this paper we propose that collective action depends on the long term goals that
individuals set for the community. The long term goals on what the society can become
is what we call community aspirations. As discussed in Martini et al. (2020), we consider
that community aspirations are multi-dimensional and depend on five main dimensions:
political freedom, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and
protective security.
Our hypothesis is that there is an aspiration failure in that individuals lack reference
to successful cases of collective action that inspire them to set higher communal goals.
Based on this hypothesis, we test whether showing videos that depict living conditions
in other communities can foster community aspirations and hence promote cooperation
compared with a no video condition. We compare two types of videos. The first video
depicts villages in which people have been successful in organizing themselves into village
clubs. The characters talk about the positive outcomes of collective action, while the
narrator presents information on the advantages of social organization. The second video
does not include any messages that highlight the virtue of cooperation. It shows the
same villages, but the characters instead talk about their living conditions and therefore,
implicitly inform on why cooperation is advantageous. Our aim is to test which type of
video is more effective at eliciting cooperation in a public goods game: the one which
contains a descriptive and a prescriptive message promoting collective action (collective
action video) or the descriptive one (village life video).
Ample empirical evidence demonstrates that individuals are conditional cooperators and
contribute more to the public good when they expect others to contribute more (Keser
& Winden, 2000; Fischbacher et al., 2001; Kocher et al., 2008). Based on this premise,
our hypothesis is that communal aspirations increase cooperation only when there are
shared higher community aspirations. To test this hypothesis, we form groups with two
participants and allow either one or both members of the group to watch the videos. This
allows us to capture whether the videos are only successful in changing contributions if
there is common knowledge on having seen the video. We further test the effect of the
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video on norms of conditional cooperation.
To test our hypotheses, we implemented a lab in the field experiment in which we ran-
domly assigned 358 individuals in eight villages in Zambia into one of four treatment
conditions or into a control group and subsequently measured cooperative behavior with
a two-person one-shot linear public goods game. Similar to Fischbacher et al. (2001)
we used the strategy method to obtain unconditional as well as conditional contribution
decisions to the public good. After the experiment we obtained socio-economic information
and measures for aspirations and beliefs using the method developed in Martini et al. (2020).
We find that the village life video is effective at facilitating cooperation. Compared
to the no video group, unconditional contributions are higher in this treatment. If both
players were exposed to the village life video, we find that unconditional contributions are
even higher in magnitude and we also find a positive effect on conditional contributions.
This points to the importance of social norms in the evolution of collective action. Further,
there is a higher proportion of positive conditional cooperators and a higher proportion of
positive unconditional contributions in this treatment. While the collective action video
was not effective in increasing cooperative behavior, both videos have a positive effect
on perceived norms of cooperation. Controlling for beliefs and aspirations, we find that
our measure of individual aspirations, but not the measure of community aspirations, is
significantly correlated with contribution decisions.
Our paper contributes to the literature on aspirations and poverty (Appadurai, 2004;
Ray, 2006; Dalton et al., 2016). While there is extensive research on the role of indi-
vidual aspirations on educational choices and investment decisions (Pasquier-Doumer &
Risso Brandon, 2015; Goux et al., 2017; Janzen et al., 2017; Lybbert & Wydick, 2018;
Serneels & Dercon, 2020), there is no evidence on the role of aspirations in collective action.
We extend the concept of aspirations to consider that individuals hold long term goals for
the community. We propose that community aspirations affect cooperation. Martini et
al. (2020) conceptualize community aspirations and propose an empirical measure. In this
paper, we investigate the mechanism by which successful examples of collective action, in
the form of videos, affect community aspirations and increase cooperation.
Our study experimentally analyzes whether the videos increase conditional cooperation or
result in increased levels of unconditional contributions. In order to test the role of common
knowledge in the decision to cooperate, we vary the number of participants in the group
exposed to the videos. Other studies analyze the role of common knowledge in edutainment
interventions with respect to attitudes and behavior related to AIDS/HIV and violence
against women (Arias, 2019; Banerjee et al., 2019). We extend that notion given that in
the setting of collective action, beliefs on the behavior of other people play a crucial role in
cooperation (Fischbacher et al., 2001; La Ferrara, 2016).
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This paper also adds to the emerging experimental literature that aims at increasing
aspirations through role models in the form of short videos or documentaries. For ex-
ample, Bernard et al. (2014) randomly invited individuals in Ethiopia to either watch a
placebo video or a treatment video that shows individuals who climbed out of poverty by
setting up a business or being successful at farming. They find that six months after the
screening treated individuals had higher aspirations, savings, use of credit and investment
into education compared to the control group. In another study by Riley (2018) students
were randomly shown either a placebo movie or a movie about a Ugandan girl from a
poor neighborhood who aimed at becoming a chess master. Treated students in upper
secondary school performed better and treated students from lower secondary school had
higher math scores compared to untreated, which is driven by students failing math less
often. Batista & Seither (2019) combined random screenings of an aspirational video with
training on business skills and goal setting among vendors in Mozambique. One year after
the intervention they find that treated subjects had higher profits compared to the control
group. Participants who additionally received training increased their profits even more.
The study by Lubega et al. (2018) finds that HIV-positive women that were exposed to
four four-minute role model videos throughout one year were more likely to start a business
and increased their income compared to non-treated women. Lastly, Narciso et al. (2018)
do not find evidence that role models in videos change behavior among ethnic minorities in
Vietnam. Unlike those papers, we consider community role models, and screen examples of
successful communities that help to inspire individuals on what the community can achieve
by engaging in collective action. Further, we assess how a different framing of the video
affects cooperation.
We chose to compare a video that is narrative and explains the advantages of village
life to one that is salient on the value of cooperation. The empirical evidence shows that
educational entertainment (edutainment) – entertainment media that entails educational
messages with the intention to bring about desirable outcomes (Singhal & Rogers, 2003) –
can increase pro-social behavior (Paluck, 2009; La Ferrara, 2016; Blair et al., 2019). Edu-
tainment has been argued to be successful in changing individual behavior since the viewers
show less resistance to narrative content compared to more explicit persuasive formats
of communication (Moyer-Gusé, 2008). We test whether explicit appeals for collective
action reduce cooperation. Other studies suggest that messages that use prescriptive and
descriptive norms together are more successful Cialdini (2003). We test which type of
message is more effective in the context of collective action.
3.2. Experimental Design
The experiment has three stages. In the first stage we randomly select participants to one
of two conditions that vary whether the participants are exposed or not to one of two videos
as explained in more detail below. Participants in the control treatment started directly in
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the second stage, where they participated in a two person public goods game (PGG). In the
last stage participants completed an individual interview where we collected information
on community aspirations and socioeconomic characteristics. Our primary outcomes of
interest are contributions to PGG and community aspirations.
3.2.1 Treatments
Our experiment uses a between subject design to compare behavior in a control condition
without video with four treatments that vary (1) the kind of video that the participants see
and (2) whether or not the group member watched the same video. Table 3.1 presents the
treatment design with the number of participants per-treatment arm. The rows indicate
which type of video was screened in the groups: No video (Control), collective action video
(CA) or village life video (V) while the columns indicate whether the partner watched the
video.
Table 3.1: Number of Participants Per Treatment
The other person saw the video
No Yes
No video Control · ·
130 · ·
Collective action video · CA1 CA2
· 63 48
Village life video · V1 V2
· 69 48
Note: The numbers present the experimental observations.
The two videos have the same footage that is taken from a video series produced by the
Dimitra Project, a participatory information and communication project from the Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). The video series show the
success of this participatory communication approach that consists of the creation of village
clubs, named Dimitra Clubs. We used footage of two videos (Community Mobilization,
Food Security and Nutrition) that show village clubs in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC). The original videos can be accessed on YouTube.2 We edited the videos,
created a new script and translated the content into the local Zambian language (Tonga).3
In addition, videos included English subtitles. The videos were synchronized to have a total
length of 11 minutes. The footage of both videos is exactly the same. The only difference
between the two treatment videos is the spoken content, which we will elaborate in the
following.
2https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLzp5NgJ2-dK6OBbZpPuTMn_7wSrclUE0I
3The video scripts can be found in Martini et al. (2020).
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The collective action video shows four villages in the North-East of the DRC which
successfully established village clubs.4. These village clubs are people who formed groups
with the aim of improving their lives and actively bringing about positive changes in their
village. Together they meet regularly to discuss challenges they face, talk about solutions
and take measures to implement them. The video demonstrates the positive outcomes that
the village club generated. For example, the video shows how the villagers jointly built
and maintain a road, till a community field and share goods that they have collectively
acquired. The video also illustrates how through the discussion of villagers in the clubs,
people introduced new crops, abolished food taboos and resolved gender division in tasks.
The characters of the video talk about their motivation to engage in the clubs and how they
feel that the clubs positively affected their lives; whether it is a higher dietary diversity or
increases in households’ income. Next to the village club members, the video also portrays
a traditional chief and an agricultural inspector who report on increased trust and initiative
they have observed since the establishment of the clubs. A narrator guides the viewer
through the video, explains what village clubs are and that they increased collective action
and thereby social cohesion. However, the narrator does not provide specific information on
the steps that are necessary to build a village club and what makes them successful. Thus,
as in Bernard et al. (2014), the video provides a vicarious experience in which participants
were provided a different view on what is possible to achieve in their community by taking
actions collectively.
The village life video tells a different story. The narrator and characters talk about
life in four villages in the DRC: the villages’ location and climate, villagers’ source of
income, diet and their social activities. The video contains general information about
smallholders’ livelihoods that was mainly shown in the video (without reference to collective
action). The story of the video does not include reference to negative events and thus can
be considered to describe an ideal village life.5 This can be explained by the fact that we
used the same video footage of the collective action video that shows successful examples
of villages that took part in the FAO Dimitra Project. It can thus be argued that the
video also include role model villages without making the reason for their improved living
conditions (successful collective action) salient. However, there are some parts that mention
collective action activities that could not be rephrased since the pictures tell the story quite
clearly.6 Any effects that we could observe between the collective action and village life
video are thus on how explicitly the advantages of collective action are communicated.
4 Instead of Dimitra Club we used Village Clubs, since we wanted to focus on the outcomes of the clubs
and not talk about how and under which project they were formed.
5For instance, the video does not mention armed conflict and the resulting displacement that took place
the DRC in the last 25 years (World Food Programme, 2020). The villages depicted in the videos are
located in Tshopo Province, Northeast of DRC, and not in worst conflict affected provinces.
6The narrator mentions that the women of the village Lilanda meet to share goods that they have
bought for their households (mattresses, pots) which were acquired from a supplier that came to their
village. Also the narrator speaks about a meeting of a village, where the villagers discuss their last week’s
catches and experiences.
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3.2.2 Public Goods Game
In order to measure contribution to a public good we employ a two person one-shot lin-
ear public goods game. We form anonymous groups of two persons and give each an
endowment of 40 Kwacha (3.1 Euro at the time of the experiment7). Individuals make
two type of decisions. First, they make an unconditional contribution decision and decide
simultaneously how much money they would like to contribute to a group account. The
amount deposited in the group account is multiplied by 1.6 and equally shared among
group members. Participants could contribute any number multiple of 10 between zero and
40 Kwacha.
Second, participants made a conditional contribution decision. We provided them with
a contribution table (see Appendix) in which we asked for their contribution for every
possible contribution level of the other group member. To make the decision incentive-
compatible, we employed the strategy method (Fischbacher et al., 2001) and for one
participant in the group the unconditional decision was payment-relevant and for the other
the conditional decision. After the experiment, one of the participants was asked to draw
a card from a bag that determined for which of the two players the first decision was selected.
The payoff of each player i is the following:




where gi is the amount an individual contributes to the public account gj . The dominant
strategy is to contribute nothing to the group account (gi=0), whereas the Pareto-efficient
outcome would be that both players contribute all their endowment (gi=40). We elicited
beliefs on the contribution level of the other group member and incentivized correct answers
by paying five Kwacha when the stated belief was equal to the actual contribution.
Since we asked respondents for their contributions for each level of possible contribu-
tion decisions of the other player, we can use their decisions to categorize them into different
types of cooperation behavior. Following Fischbacher et al. (2001), we distinguish between
six different types. We classify Free-riding behaviour as contributing non-positive amounts
for all possible contribution levels of the other player. Unconditional cooperation is defined
as always contributing the same positive amount. Decisions that display a monotonic
function with at least one increase and that have a positive Spearman rank correlation that
is significant at the one percent level are classified as Positive Conditional Cooperation. On
the contrary, Negative Conditional Cooperation contains decisions that show a negative
7The exchange rate at the time of the experiment was around 12.81 Kwacha equivalent to one Euro. 40
Kwacha is a substantial amount of money for people living in rural Zambia. According to estimations of
Central Statistical Office (2016) the monthly per capita income in the rural area in 2015 was 810 Kwacha.
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Spearman rank correlation that is significant at the one percent level and a monotonic
decreasing function. Hump-shaped contributions are decisions that have monotonically
increasing contributions until a maximum and thereafter monotonically decreasing contri-
butions.8 All other remaining types of contributions are defined as Other.
The instructions for the PGG experiment were given in a group and then each participant
was asked to come to a research assistant one by one to make his or her decision. If they
had questions, each participant could ask the research assistant in private. To make sure
they understood the questions, we asked them three control questions. After making their
decisions, participants were asked to answer a survey. Only after the participants finished
the survey, we paid the money they have earned in the public goods game and the survey
fee of 5 Kwacha.
3.2.3 Survey
We randomly selected up to twenty participants to complete a survey after the experimental
session. The random sampling (instead of surveying all subjects) was done due to time
restrictions. The survey included questions on socio-economic information as well as on
aspirations and beliefs.
We measure aspirations using an approach similar to Bernard & Taffesse (2014) and
Beaman et al. (2012). First we ask respondents for the aspirations or goals they want
to achieve collectively and individually in different dimensions in ten years. As discussed
in Martini et al. (2020), we propose that community aspirations are the preferences for
goals that increase community well-being and have a public good nature. Following Sen
(2001)’s conceptualization of well-being, we consider that community aspirations depend
on five dimensions: 1) Political freedom, 2) Economic facilities, 3) Social opportunities, 4)
Transparency guarantees, and 5) Protective security. Table 3.2, summarizes the measures
used to proxy those dimension.
Table 3.2: Community Aspiration Dimensions
Community Aspiration Dimensions Description
1 Political freedom The number of times a month he/she would like villagers to join for a village meeting
2 Economic facilities The proportion of households in the village he/she would like to have very good housing conditions
3 Social opportunities The number of minutes he/she wants students from their village to walk to a primary school
4 Transparency warranties Number of security guards relative to the population
5 Protective security The proportion of households he/she would like to get supported in case of need
Amount they would like each villager to contribute to village projects on average in a year
To make the answers comparable across dimensions we took the following steps: First,
we divided the answers to the aspiration questions that entail an assumption on the number
of households in the village (questions of dimension 2, 4 and 5) with the participants’
estimate on the number of households living in the village in ten years. For dimension 3
8Since we have only five decisions, we are not able to calculate the Spearman rank correlation after the
maximum contribution and hence cannot use this criterion to define hump-shaped behavior.
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social opportunities, we inverted the measure so that higher values present higher aspired
levels. Second, as Beaman et al. (2012), we standardize each dimension by using the sample
mean and standard deviation of the control group. Afterwards we sum up the standardized









where σdc is the standard deviation and µdc the sample mean from the control group c for
each aspiration question from dimension d.
Similar to Bernard & Taffesse (2014), before asking for their aspired level, we included
questions on their current level of each dimension to facilitate finding answers. We use
those answers and estimated an index of current social well-being (current index). This
index is used in the regression analysis to control for the achieved level.
Further, we asked participants for their expected level, defined as what they believe
the community would actually achieve. We constructed a community expectation index
following the same approach as with the aspirations above.9 Besides community aspirations,
we collected information on individual aspirations by asking for (1) the size of the plot and
(2) the number of cows and goats as well as the (3) the level of education they would like
the youngest child in their family to have.
Since the treatment videos could also have an effect on participants’ beliefs, we collected
survey information on locus of control and village efficacy beliefs. We measured locus of
control by asking the following question taken from Bernard et al. (2014): Please tell me
with which of the two statements you agree more. Statement A: “To be successful, above
all one needs to work very hard.” Statement B: “To be successful, above all one needs to
be lucky.” This results in a binary variable that is one when the respondent agrees more
with A (internal locus of control) and 0 if he/she agrees more with B (external locus of
control). To obtain a measure of village efficacy beliefs, we asked the respondents whether
they think people like themselves have influence in making the village a better place to live.
We coded the variable with 0 if they answer "no", 1 if they state "yes".
Finally, we also use survey measures to capture participants’ level of trust and perceived
participation in the village to be able to analyze whether there is a shift in the answers
influenced by the provision of other reference points. We measure trust with the question:
9Bernard & Taffesse (2014) also ask for the maximum and minimum that can be achieved in their
neighborhood to make sure that they do not report general wishes. Our pilot revealed that respondents
had difficulties in answering these questions. Since our expectation index is significantly correlated with the
aspiration index (correlation of 51 percent, significant at the one percent level), we believe that this was
not detrimental to our measurement strategy.
78
Chapter 3. Community Aspirations and Cooperation: Prescriptive vs. Descriptive Role
Models
Do you think that most people in this village are basically honest and can be trusted? and
coded the variable with 1 if participants strongly disagree, 2 if they slightly disagree, 3
if they slightly agree and 4 if they strongly agree. The variable Perceived Participation
was coded with 1 if the respondent rates the spirit of participation in the village low, 2 if
average and 3 if high.
3.2.4 Experimental Procedures
Our sample consists of eight villages in Southern Province that were selected from a village
list which we obtained from the Zambian Central Statistical Office (CSO) in Lusaka. We
randomly selected villages that have more than 100 and less than 300 inhabitants and
that are located more than 2.5 km from each other. Several days before we conducted the
experiment, we visited the headman to inform him about our study and ask for permission
to collect data within his village. With his consent, we asked the village headman to assist
us in inviting at least 30 persons per session. We expressed the need to have as many
women as men participating in the sessions. Further, participants had to be at least sixteen
years old and members of that particular village. In total we have experimental data for
358 and survey data for 242 individuals.
In each of the villages we conducted two sessions: one that started in the morning and one
at midday. The procedure was the same for every session. When arriving in the village we
introduced ourselves and the project. We read out the general instructions (see Appendix)
which informed them about the confidentiality and anonymity of their decisions and answers
as well as the possibility to always drop out of the activity. Then our research team asked
the participants to draw a card from a bag that would determine their individual ID number
and assigned treatment condition.
The pairs in the PGG were anonymous and participants did not receive feedback on
the decision of the partner. There was no possibility for the partners to interact. Partici-
pants in the control treatment started with the PGG, while participants in the treatment
groups first watched the video (village life/collective action). We did not tell the participants
that the treatment group will watch a video. However, participants in the control group
could infer as the other group stayed at the screening site, while they had to go to another
place to start the PGG. When both participants watched the video, we did two screenings
of the video, one for the treatment and one for the control group. We screened the video
on two laptops at a common meeting place of a village.
3.2.5 Hypotheses
We would like to test the following. First, we are interested in the effect of the videos on
cooperation in the PGG. We hypothesize that the two videos change the reference point on
what is possible for their community to achieve, resulting in higher aspirations and thus
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higher contributions to the public good (Bernard et al., 2014).
Our hypothesis is that seeing people cooperating (village life video) or talking positively
about cooperation (collective action video), changes the expected level of cooperativeness of
their peers by generalizing from the behavior of people in the video to the behavior in their
village (Blair et al., 2019).10 Therefore, we expect that the collective action and village life
video increase conditional cooperation. Our first hypothesis is thus the following:
Hypothesis 1: The collective action and village life video lead to higher unconditional
and conditional cooperation in the public goods game compared to the control group.
We expect that an individual will increase its contribution to the public good even more,
if the other player has also watched the same video, since there is common knowledge.
Knowing that the other person has also watched the same video, and also knowing that the
other person knows that I know, can facilitate coordination (Arias, 2019). We thus compare
decisions V2 and CA2 where two persons in the group are exposed to the treatment videos
with the condition in which only one watched the video, V1 and CA1.
Hypothesis 2: Individuals who watched the collective action or village life video and
their partner did as well, have higher (positive) unconditional and conditional contributions
in the public goods game compared to individuals who saw the video and the partner did not.
Lastly, we believe that the content of the videos – the type of information provided –
matters. We thus compare the village life and the collective action videos. Studies reported
in Cialdini (2003) have found that communication campaigns that use prescriptive and
descriptive norms together are successful in facilitating pro-social behavior. We thus hy-
pothesize that the collective action video, which could be argued to include prescriptive as
well as descriptive norms11, leads to higher contributions to the public good compared to
the village life video, which only contains descriptive norms.
Hypothesis 3: The collective action video leads to higher unconditional and conditional
contributions in the public goods game compared to the village life video.
10Tankard & Paluck (2016) analyze how a change in perception of behavior of other people (norms)
can lead to social change. They argue that perceptions of norms are easier to change with role model
interventions than attitudes.
11The video shows how people cooperate (descriptive norms) and how they approve the cooperative
behavior (prescriptive norm).
80
Chapter 3. Community Aspirations and Cooperation: Prescriptive vs. Descriptive Role
Models
3.2.6 Empirical Strategy
To evaluate the effect of the treatments, we estimate the following model:




iγ + µv + εi (3.3)
where yi is one of the outcome variables: unconditional contribution decision, the community
or the individual aspiration index of individual i. V ′s is a vector consisting of four indicators
representing the different treatments: V1 (1) and V2 (2), CA1 (3), and CA2 (4). The
base is Control (0). X ′i is a vector including the following individual level control variables:
gender, age, relationship status, highest grade attained, number of cows owned, size of the
plot in hectares, children 6 to 18 in the family, daily mobile phone usage, daily listening to
the radio, group membership, participation in village work per year and knowledge of the
FAO. For the outcome Unconditional contributions we additionally include the belief in the
other player’s contribution. ε is the random error and µv village fixed effects to account for
differences in the villages. The coefficient of interest is β.
For the conditional decision we include the possible contribution of the other player,
Li, into our models in equation (2). Li is the categorical variable Level which takes on the
values 0, 10, 20, 30 and 40. We run separate regressions for each treatment group (each
indicator of the vector Vs) and employ a Wald test to test for differences in the coefficients
in each of the treatment equations. The specification is the following:
yik = β0 +X
′
ikβ1 + β2Lik + µv + εi (3.4)
where yik is the conditional decision of player i in treatment k. X ′i is a vector of individual
level controls - the same as in equation (2) above. ε is a random error and µv village fixed
effects. We employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for all outcome variables and
calculate heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.
3.3. Results
3.3.1 Descriptives
Table 4.1 reports the mean, standard errors as well as the p-value from a joint orthogonality
test of treatment arms (F-test) for the main variables of our experiment. We find that
there are only two variables which are significantly different from each other in the five
treatment groups: highest grade attained and number of cows owned. We will include these
as further controls in our analysis among other controls.
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Control V1 V2 CA1 CA2 p-value
Female (1=female, 0=male) 0.505 0.559 0.800 0.533 0.292 0.140
(0.048) (0.065) (0.200) (0.075) (0.095)
Age in years 36.954 36.678 43.200 38.356 40.125 0.740
(1.381) (1.679) (3.367) (2.508) (3.539)
Single 0.119 0.119 0.000 0.156 0.125 0.887
(0.031) (0.042) (0.000) (0.055) (0.069)
Highest grade 7.505 8.407 8.600 6.822 7.792 0.036
(0.252) (0.316) (0.510) (0.424) (0.565)
No. of goats 3.826 3.169 3.000 2.444 4.792 0.493
(0.655) (0.454) (1.265) (0.679) (1.273)
No. of cows 2.358 1.983 4.800 0.756 4.750 0.024
(0.474) (0.475) (2.059) (0.290) (2.049)
Size of plot(s) 2.099 1.900 0.450 1.879 3.527 0.255
(0.344) (0.285) (0.229) (0.462) (1.249)
Children (1=yes, 0=no) 0.807 0.746 1.000 0.778 0.583 0.124
(0.038) (0.057) (0.000) (0.063) (0.103)
Daily use of mobile phone 0.505 0.593 0.800 0.422 0.417 0.238
(0.048) (0.065) (0.200) (0.074) (0.103)
Listen to radio daily 0.688 0.729 0.800 0.600 0.583 0.517
(0.045) (0.058) (0.200) (0.074) (0.103)
Group member (1=yes, 0=no) 0.661 0.729 0.600 0.644 0.625 0.843
(0.046) (0.058) (0.245) (0.072) (0.101)
Participation in village work per year 3.147 2.780 1.400 3.822 1.583 0.233
(0.489) (0.375) (0.748) (0.600) (0.288)
Knows the FAO (1=yes, 0=no) 0.450 0.559 0.600 0.467 0.542 0.660
(0.048) (0.065) (0.245) (0.075) (0.104)
N 109 59 5 45 24
Note: Mean values are shown. Standard errors in parentheses. Column 6 shows the pvalues from a joint
orthogonality test of the treatments.
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3.3.2 Treatment Effects on Unconditional Cooperation
First, we are interested in the effect of the two videos on unconditional contribution de-
cisions. Figure 3.1 shows the fraction of participants in each of the treatment groups
who contributed positive amounts to the public good. The highest amount of positive
contributors with 89 percent can be found in the V1 treatment. In the control group
75 percent of the subjects have positive contributions. The difference in the proportion
of positive contributors between V1 and control is significant at the five percent level
(two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test p-value = 0.03). For treatments V2, CA1 and CA2
the graph bar suggests that the difference in the proportion of positive contributors is not
significantly different compared to the control group. Employing a two-sample Wilcoxon
rank-sum tests confirms the graphical inspection (p-values > 0.1).
Figure 3.1 shows the mean in unconditional contributions for each treatment group. The
bar graph indicates that participants in the V1 treatment make larger contributions to the
PGG compared to participants in the other treatments. Whereas participants in the control
group on average contributed 14.5 Kwacha, participants in the V1 treatment contributed
20.3 Kwacha. Using a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test we find that the difference is
significant at the one percent level (p-value = 0.002). Participants in the CA1 treatment
have a mean unconditional contribution of 13.8 Kwacha, which is not significantly different
from the contributions in the control group (two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test p-value =
0.917). For the treatments V2 and CA2 where the two group members saw the video the
bar graph suggest that there are no significant differences in the value contributed compared
to the control group. The results of a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test confirm that the
difference is insignificant (p-values = 0.198 & 0.263).
Figure 3.1: Proportion of Positive Contributors and Mean Unconditional Contributions
We estimate OLS regressions to control for important covariates and increase precision.
The results can be found in Table 3.4. Column 1 reports the results of regressing the
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treatments on the outcome Positive unconditional contribution, which is one if a subject sent
a positive amount and zero if not. Column 2 further controls for village fixed effects and
additional individual level covariates.12 In each specification we find that the V1 treatment
has a positive effect on the proportion of positive contributors. The likelihood of positive
contributors is 16 percentage points higher in the V1 treatment compared to the control.
For the other treatment arms, there are no significant differences in the amount of positive
contributors compared with the control. Thus, we find evidence for supporting Hypothesis
1 for the village life video and participants exposed to the village life video contribute
significantly more than participants in the control treatment. For the collective action video,
the results do not support Hypothesis 1, which suggest that the form of communication
plays an important role in promoting cooperation.
Our second hypothesis is that contributions to the public good increase more when both
participants watched the video than when only one did so. To test this hypothesis, we com-
pare the estimated coefficients for V1 and V2 treatments using our preferred specification
that includes controls. The results of the Wald test indicate that there are no significant
differences in the likelihood to contribute to the public good or the value contributed when
participants watched the village life video alone compared when they watched it with
the partner (p-values = 0.4045 and 0.3383) . Similarly, the comparison of the estimated
coefficients for CA1 and CA2 indicate that the estimated coefficient is not significantly
different (Wald test p-values = 0.1789 and 0.789). This evidence thus does not support
Hypothesis 2.
Lastly, the third hypothesis states that the video that combines a prescriptive and a
descriptive message (collective action) is more effective at eliciting cooperation than the
video that only has a descriptive message (village life). To test this hypothesis, we compare
the estimated coefficients for V1 and CA1 and V2 and CA2. The results of the Wald test
contradict Hypothesis 3 in that participants in V2 are significantly more likely to contribute
than participants in C2 (Wald test p-value = 0.0245), and participants in V1 contribute
significantly larger amounts (0.0548). This finding suggest that narratives can be more
effective at promoting collective action.13
12The number of observations for columns 2 is less than for the previous columns since we do not have
survey information for every smallholder who participated in our experiment.
13Wald test for likelihood to contribute in V1 vs. CA1 p-value = 0.6724 and for value of unconditional
contributions between V2 and CA2 p-value = 0.2035.
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Table 3.4: Treatment Effects on Unconditional Contributions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Positive uncond. contr. Positive uncond. contr. Unconditional contribution Unconditional contribution
V1 0.130∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 5.751∗∗∗ 5.109∗∗
(0.054) (0.070) (1.860) (2.113)
V2 -0.004 0.357 -3.080∗ 12.005∗
(0.074) (0.223) (1.796) (6.834)
CA1 0.087 0.117 -0.729 -0.949
(0.060) (0.090) (1.721) (2.374)
CA2 -0.046 0.069 -1.622 5.461
(0.076) (0.177) (2.213) (4.731)
Constant 0.754∗∗∗ 0.779∗∗∗ 14.538∗∗∗ 2.058
(0.038) (0.175) (1.096) (4.282)
Observations 358 242 358 242
R2 0.022 0.115 0.053 0.208
Fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Regressions include the following control variables: belief of the
other player’s contribution, gender, age, relationship status, highest grade attained, number of cows owned, size of the plot in hectares, children 6
to 18 in the family, daily mobile phone usage, daily listening to the radio, group membership, participation in village work (times/year), knows the
FAO and village fixed effects.
3.3.3 Treatment Effects on Conditional Cooperation
Table 3.5 presents the proportion of participants per types of cooperation behavior for
each treatment group. Unlike Fischbacher et al. (2001), we find that a large proportion of
participants (48 percent) are classified in the category Other. This is similar to Martinsson
et al. (2013) who find that in Vietnam 32 percent of the participants showed no standard
cooperation types.
We are interested in testing if the treatment videos change the cooperative types. Overall,
using a Pearson’s χ2 test we find a statistically significant difference in the proportion
of cooperation types across treatments (p-value = 0.034). Comparing the proportion of
subjects who show free-riding behavior in each treatment group, we do not find significant
differences using Pearson’s χ2 test (p-value = 0.679). For unconditional cooperation and
positive conditional cooperation, however, we find that the difference is significant (p-value
= 0.019 and 0.008). For the other types, no significant differences are found.
Analyzing each treatment separately, we find that compared with the control group there is
a significantly higher share of conditional cooperators in V2 (Proportion test p-value =
0.001) and a lower share of hump-shaped cooperators (Proportion test p-value = 0.081).
In addition, for CA2 the share of unconditional positive cooperators is significantly higher
than in the control group (Proportion test p-value = 0.004), while the share of negative
conditional cooperators is significantly lower compared to C1 (Proportion test p-value 0 =
0.007). This suggests that the treatment videos have an effect on conditional cooperation,
but only when there is shared knowledge. Indeed, the fraction of conditional cooperators is
also significantly larger in V2 than in V1 (Proportion test p-value= 0.025). The results
therefore provide some support for Hypothesis 2 for the village video, but not for the
collective action video.
Contrary to Hypothesis 3, we find that the village video is more effective at increasing
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coonditional cooperation than the collective action video.
Table 3.5: Percentage of Participants Per Cooperation Behaviour in Each Treatment
Types of cooperation behaviour Control V1 V2 CA1 CA2 Total Pearson’s χ2
% % % % % % p-value
Free-riding 6.9 2.9 6.3 3.2 4.2 5.0 0.679
Unconditional cooperation 4.6 8.7 4.2 3.2 18.8 7.0 0.019
Positive conditional cooperation 15.4 18.8 37.5 15.9 20.8 19.8 0.008
Negative conditional cooperation 6.9 4.3 4.2 3.2 2.1 4.7 0.641
Hump-shaped 19.2 17.4 8.3 25.4 12.5 17.6 0.160
Other 46.9 47.8 39.6 49.2 41.7 45.8 0.817
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
N 545 295 25 225 120 1210
Pearson’s χ2 p-value = 0.034
Next, we perform regression analysis on the outcome variable Conditional Contributions
and include the variable Level, which denotes the possible contribution of the other player.
The results are presented in Table 3.6. We find participants in all treatments, except for
treatments V2 and CA2, to contribute significantly non-zero amounts. Further, for all
treatments we find that conditional contributions increase significantly with increases in
the level of possible contributions by the other player.
To test whether the coefficients are significantly different for participants in each treatment,
we use a Wald test. The results can be found in Table 3.6 below the regression results. Out
of the four treatments we only find significant differences in the level of the V2 treatment
compared to the control and compared to the V1 treatment. V2-treated participants give
on average 0.46 Kwacha for every contribution level of the other player, while untreated
subjects contribute on average 0.11 Kwacha. We thus conclude that there is evidence in
favor of Hypothesis 1 for the V2 treatment, while the videos have no significant effect on
conditional contributions for the other treatment arms compared with the control.
The results also support Hypothesis 2 for V2 as conditional contributions are signifi-
cantly higher compared with V1 where subjects contributed on average 0.13 Kwacha for
one Kwacha contributed by the partner. Comparing village life and collective action video,
the results suggest that there is no significant difference between those treatment arms in
the degree of conditional cooperation neither in terms of changes in the intercept or of the
slope. We find no support for Hypothesis 3.
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Table 3.6: Treatment Effects on Conditional Contributions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control V1 V2 CA1 CA2
Level 0.108∗∗ 0.131∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.054) (0.137) (0.062) (0.082)
Constant 17.369∗∗∗ 18.953∗∗∗ -6.854 18.941∗∗∗ 16.905
(4.596) (6.533) (19.554) (6.349) (10.832)
Observations 545 295 25 225 120
R2 0.050 0.096 0.589 0.172 0.208
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Level Control - Treat 0.763 0.013** 0.498 0.153
Const. Control - Treat 0.825 0.116 0.838 0.969
Level V1 - V2 0.023**
Constant V1 - V2 0.105
Level CA1 - CA2 0.444
Constant CA1 - CA2 0.874
Level V1 - CA1 0.713
Constant V1 - CA1 0.999
Level V2 - CA2 0.162
Constant V2 - CA2 0.200
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Regressions
include the following control variables: gender, age, relationship status, highest grade attained,
number of cows owned, size of the plot in hectares, children 6 to 18 in the family, daily mobile
phone usage, daily listening to the radio, group membership, participation in village work
(times/year), knows the FAO and village fixed effects.
3.3.4 Treatment Effects on Aspirations, Expectations and Beliefs
We propose that the videos can help to expand participants cognitive window by displaying
successful examples of cooperation. We expect that the videos would therefore result in a
change in community aspirations.
In this section we analyze the effect of the collective action and village life video on
our measure of aspirations, expectations and beliefs. The results of estimating Equation 1
for those outcome variables can be found in Table 3.7. The first and second row report the
results of regressing the community aspiration index and the community expectation index
on the treatment vector, the current index as well as on further covariates. We find that
there is no treatment effect on community aspirations and expectations. For individual
aspirations we find that the V2 treatment has a negative effect, while the CA1 treatment
has a positive effect on individual expectations.
Concerning our belief measures we do not find evidence that the treatment videos in-
crease locus of control beliefs. We do, however, find that treatments V1 and CA1 have a
positive effect on village efficacy. The probability of reporting to have village efficacy belief
increases by 13.4 (V1) and by 17.5 (CA1) percentage points. Further, treatments CA1 and
CA2 have a positive effect on subjects’ perceived participation in the village. Compared
to untreated subjects, participants are 42 percentage points more likely to perceive the
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participation high if they have seen the collective action video alone and 60 percentage
points if they have seen the collective action video and their partner watched it as well.
Lastly, we find that all treatments, but V2, have a positive effect on the level of trust
participants report to have towards their fellow villagers. If they watched the CA1 (V1)
video subjects are 41 (31) percentage points more likely to report a higher level of trust.
Participants in the CA2 treatment even report 79 percentage points higher levels of trust
compared to the control group.
Table 3.7: Treatment Effects on Aspirations, Expectations, Beliefs and Trust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Commun. Commun. Indiv. Indiv. Locus of Village Perc. Trust
aspiratiom expectation aspiration expectation control efficacy particip.
V1 -0.709 -0.878 0.955 0.098 -0.019 0.134∗∗ -0.001 0.306∗
(0.523) (0.576) (0.857) (0.413) (0.045) (0.063) (0.126) (0.174)
V2 -0.365 -0.091 -1.685∗ -1.721 -0.217 0.099 0.638 0.669
(1.233) (1.796) (0.984) (1.433) (0.211) (0.279) (0.422) (0.716)
CA1 -0.553 0.464 -0.017 1.712∗ 0.071 0.175∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗ 0.406∗
(0.396) (0.796) (0.844) (0.888) (0.044) (0.069) (0.134) (0.218)
CA2 -1.155 0.418 -0.745 -0.243 0.017 0.137 0.601∗∗∗ 0.789∗
(0.971) (1.046) (0.824) (0.856) (0.089) (0.169) (0.224) (0.433)
Constant 1.782** -0.017 -1.336 -1.693 0.953∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗ 1.888∗∗∗ 2.805∗∗∗
(0.872) (1.374) (1.572) (1.228) (0.093) (0.132) (0.237) (0.393)
Observations 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242
R2 0.236 0.303 0.161 0.323 0.113 0.181 0.198 0.222
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Regressions include the following control variables:
gender, age, relationship status, highest grade attained, number of cows owned, size of the plot in hectares, children 6 to 18 in
the family, daily mobile phone usage, daily listening to the radio, group membership, participation in village work (times/year),
knows the FAO and village fixed effects. Columns 1 and 2 additionally control for the current community index and columns 3
and 4 for the current individual index.
3.4. Mechanism
In this section we analyze whether the positive effect of the V1 and V2 treatment on
unconditional contribution decisions to the public good can be explained by a shift in
aspirations and/or beliefs. Table 3.8 reports the results for regressing unconditional
contributions on aspirations, expectations and beliefs variables. Columns 9 and 10 include all
variables in one model. Column 9 includes community and individual aspirations and column
10 community and individual expectations separately, since aspirations and expectations
are strongly correlated. Controlling for the above mentioned variables we find that the
treatment effects of the village video treatments remain in all specifications. Individual
Aspiration Index is the only variable that is (negatively) correlated with unconditional
contributions. This suggests that community aspirations and community expectations as
well as beliefs and trust do not seem to play a role in participants’ unconditional contribution
decision, but that individual aspirations can partly explain cooperative preferences.
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Table 3.8: Mechanism: Unconditional Contributions
Unconditional contribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
V1 5.108∗∗ 5.113∗∗ 5.554∗∗∗ 5.092∗∗ 5.101∗∗ 5.076∗∗ 5.114∗∗ 5.148∗∗ 5.528∗∗∗ 5.105∗∗
(2.117) (2.122) (2.076) (2.124) (2.124) (2.112) (2.124) (2.122) (2.106) (2.165)
V2 12.003∗ 12.024∗ 11.220∗ 12.322∗ 11.921∗ 11.983∗ 12.394∗ 12.093∗ 11.640∗ 12.772∗
(6.849) (6.869) (6.777) (6.811) (6.968) (6.852) (6.868) (6.810) (6.902) (6.967)
CA1 -0.951 -0.834 -0.965 -1.255 -0.922 -0.991 -0.688 -0.896 -0.658 -0.838
(2.387) (2.357) (2.386) (2.449) (2.420) (2.445) (2.425) (2.428) (2.591) (2.639)
CA2 5.458 5.630 5.104 5.507 5.467 5.427 5.858 5.564 5.614 6.239
(4.741) (4.738) (4.604) (4.756) (4.739) (4.760) (4.759) (4.756) (4.690) (4.840)
Commun. aspiration -0.007 0.010
(0.277) (0.302)
Commun. expectation -0.107 -0.167
(0.202) (0.215)
Indiv. aspiration -0.471∗∗∗ -0.488∗∗∗
(0.174) (0.176)
Indiv. expectation 0.183 0.217
(0.209) (0.225)
Locus of c. -0.387 -0.345 -0.367
(4.671) (4.634) (4.729)
V. efficacy 0.244 0.561 0.210
(2.011) (2.090) (2.105)
Perc. particip. -0.644 -0.825 -0.618
(1.167) (1.185) (1.193)
Trust -0.130 -0.106 -0.127
(0.802) (0.847) (0.840)
Constant 2.071 2.127 1.362 2.454 2.430 1.946 3.184 2.427 3.134 4.331
(4.358) (4.274) (4.349) (4.355) (5.984) (4.349) (4.740) (5.144) (6.909) (6.985)
Observations 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242
R2 0.208 0.209 0.222 0.210 0.208 0.208 0.209 0.208 0.224 0.213
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Regressions include the following control variables: belief of the other
player’s contribution, gender, age, relationship status, highest grade attained, number of cows owned, size of the plot in hectares, children 6 to 18 in
the family, daily mobile phone usage, daily listening to the radio, group membership, participation in village work (times/year), knows the FAO and
village fixed effects. Columns 1 and 2 additionally control for the current community index and columns 3 and 4 for the current individual index.
3.5. Robustness
In the following we perform a robustness check by limiting the analysis to observations who
correctly state whether the partner has also watched the video. This leads to a reduced
sample of 209 survey observations. The results for the outcomes Unconditional Contribution
and Positive Unconditional Contribution are reported in Appendix Table 3.9. The results
are similar to the ones for the whole sample except that the treatment effects increase in
magnitude and the significance of the V1 treatment changes from the five percent to the
one percent level.
The regression results for conditional decisions with the reduced sample can be found
in Appendix Table 3.10. Column 1 presents the results for the control, column 2 for
treatment V1 and column 3 for treatment CA1. In the other treatments there have not
been any false answers. Compared to the results for the whole sample we find that in V1
participants do not follow a strong norm of conditional cooperation as the variable Level is




Our results show that the village life video is successful in increasing unconditional contribu-
tions and promoting conditional cooperation compared to the control group. This seems to
be explained by a change in perceived village self-efficacy and not by changes in community
aspirations as we expected. This finding suggest that community aspirations are not easily
changeable and that a short term intervention as the one that we implemented in the study is
not sufficient to expand the cognitive window of what participants think is possible for their
community to achieve. Further work should therefore explore whether longer exposition
to positive examples of cooperation can affect cooperation (e.g. using soap operas) and
whether those interventions have an effect on alternative measures of cooperation. The
results suggest that the treatments increase self-reported level of generalized trust. Future
work could explore the effect of the videos on incentivized measures of trust and altruism.
As discussed in Martini et al. (2020), we propose that a larger window of imagination
of what the community can achieve could motivate individuals to cooperate. Yet, the
window of imagination is only the first step. Thereafter, individuals engage in an evaluation
stage where they consider whether their effort would result in higher community welfare.
To act pro-socially, individuals need to perceive that others would do the same and that
the collective effort would result in improved social welfare. Future work should explore
how community aspirations, perceived norms of cooperation and self-efficacy interact in
promoting cooperation.
We further find that the collective action video that presented successful examples of
cooperation descriptively and prescriptively changed participants’ perception of community
self-efficacy, participation in their village and increased generalized trust. Yet, this treat-
ment did not promote higher contributions to the public good or increase in conditional
cooperation. How can this be explained? In the following we provide some possible reasons.
The village life video includes reference to positive outcomes of collective action, while it
does not explicitly stress that the outcomes are attributed to successful cooperation. The
village life video is thus descriptive in its content, whereas the collective action video can
be considered to be more prescriptive since the collective action benefits are made salient
throughout the video. Mentioning this explicitly could have crowded out intrinsic motiva-
tion for pro-social behavior. As discussed in Bowles & Polanía-Reyes (2012), participants
who are confronted with specific incentives – prescriptive messages in videos in our case –
could feel constrained in their autonomy by feeling they have to comply to the cooperative
behavior mentioned in the videos. Moyer-Gusé (2008) proposes that persuasive messages
can create the feeling of arousal that occurs when individuals perceive that their freedom is
being threatened. This can lead to reactance, a motivation to reassert one’s freedom in
response to attempted influence (J. W. Brehm, 1966; S. S. Brehm & Brehm, 1981). This
hypothesis could be tested in future work by including measures of perceived intention to
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change behavior after the video.
It can also be the case that the information in the video is not new to the participants.
Perhaps because they value cooperation already or because other actors have stressed the
importance and benefits of cooperation and the participant can recall that information. It
has been found that awareness raising of a charity decreases charitable giving among people
who already know about the cause (Smith & Schwarz, 2012). The information provided in
the videos could also run against their own perception about the success of collective action
endeavours (Tankard & Paluck, 2016). We do not have baseline data on how participants
value cooperation. Yet, we know that 66 percent of our subjects are members of some
type of group (savings group, agricultural cooperative, health group, etc.). This could
suggest that there is already awareness on the benefits (and costs) of collective action and
thus providing them information about the benefits of social organization does not change
behaviour. However, these conjectures cannot explain the success of the village life video.
Another reason why the collective action video did not increase unconditional contri-
butions could lie in the fact that they do not consider the villages part of their reference
group (Tankard & Paluck, 2016). Aspirations are determined by the observation of similar
individuals (Ray, 2006). In this case it could be that the screened villagers did not enter their
cognitive window, because their behavior did not seem relevant to them. Participants could
consider the level of cooperation in the video too far away compared to the experiences they
have made. The answers that are stated most often by participants for why they think the
characters are not similar to them is that they are more cooperative and more hard-working,
which supports this hypothesis. However, 63 percent of the participants in the collective
action video treatment state that the characters in the video are similar to them. Similarity
can be defined on various dimensions like language, culture, income-generating activities,
as well as village collaboration. This could reflect that for the majority of the dimensions
they are perceived similar, for some not - which could be the dimension of social organization.
In order to shed light into this question, future research could collect baseline data on
participants’ knowledge about and perceived benefits of collective action and their rating of
characters’ success in terms of village level organization.
One potential limitation of our experimental design is that in the conditions where only one
participant of the group watched the video (V1 and CA1) the partner took the decision on
contributions to the PGG earlier. While we treat those participants as our control group,
having to take the decision at a different moment could have affected their contribution
decisions. For example, they could have felt anxious about waiting for a more entertaining
activity or could have felt unfairly treated. While we cannot be sure if that is the case, we
recommend that this group is allocated to watch a placebo video.
The measure of community aspirations that we use in the study is new, therefore more work
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is required to validate the understanding of the questions and the reliability of the questions
to capture aspirations for communal well-being. We suggest that before implementing this
measure, the researchers do focus sessions in the villages to identify which are the main
dimension of community welfare that participants care for and how they interpret success
in those indicators.
3.7. Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the assumption that for cooperation to be successful, individuals
need to have goals for the community – so-called community aspirations. Poor communities
might lack examples of successful collective action from which they could draw inspiration
to set higher goals. We experimentally test whether two videos can affect the level of
aspirations and increase collective action among individuals in rural Zambia. In one video
we show villages that experienced positive outcomes through collective action, while in
the other video we portray the same villages without the reference that their welfare has
improved due to social organization. We randomly assigned individuals to either watch
the collective action, the village life or no video and then measured cooperation with a
two-person one-shot linear public goods game and assessed their aspirations and beliefs
with survey questions.
We find that in the village life video treatment– and not in the collective action video
treatment – unconditional contributions are higher compared to the no video condition.
Also, there are more positive conditional cooperators and less humpshaped cooperators.
Reciprocity is highest and the treatment effect on unconditional contribution increases when
both players saw the village life video. This points to the importance of common knowledge
in the decision to cooperate. Further, both videos have a positive effect on perceived norms
of cooperation. Yet, the village life video has a negative effect on reported individual
aspirations. We do not find that community aspirations explain higher contributions, but
find that individual aspirations are negatively related to unconditional contributions.
The results are partly unexpected, since we have hypothesized that the collective ac-
tion video would lead to higher cooperation compared to the village life video. We provide
some possible explanations, which are (1) crowding out of intrinsic motivation due to the
prescriptive content, (2) role models’ level of cooperation is too far away from that of
the participants’ village, and (3) role model video does not provide new information. To
be able to answer these conjectures reliably, future research should incorporate baseline
data on perceived benefits of cooperation and on subjects’ rating of the characters level
of cooperation. Further, it would be interesting to see whether the results replicate using
role models from the same context and who have only slightly better (perceived) levels of
cooperation.
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Since we find that providing role models in terms of better living conditions in videos
is successful in increasing contributions to the public good, this could lead to the policy
recommendation of increasing visibility of success cases of collective action by presenting
more information on the impacts that it has on community welfare rather than by explicitly
promoting self-organization. Our study provides evidence on the effects of a one-time
screening of videos with customized normative and descriptive content and not for television
exposure in general.
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3.8. Appendix A – Tables
Table 3.9: Treatment Effects on Unconditional and Positive Unconditional Decisions
Reduced Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unconditional contr. Unconditional contr. Positive uncond. contr. Positive uncond. contr.
V1 6.646∗∗∗ 6.661∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗
(2.032) (2.387) (0.057) (0.075)
V2 -2.839 13.387∗ -0.002 0.402∗
(1.821) (6.948) (0.074) (0.232)
CA1 -0.147 0.323 0.097 0.145
(1.868) (2.501) (0.063) (0.096)
CA2 -1.381 6.997 -0.044 0.105
(2.233) (4.748) (0.077) (0.182)
Constant 14.298∗∗∗ 2.012 0.752∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗
(1.135) (4.912) (0.040) (0.194)
Observations 323 209 323 209
R2 0.057 0.210 0.027 0.132
Fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Regressions include the following control variables:
belief of the other player’s contribution, gender, age, relationship status, highest grade attained, number of cows owned, size of
the plot in hectares, children 6 to 18 in the family, daily mobile phone usage, daily listening to the radio, group membership,
participation in village work (times/year), knows the FAO and village fixed effects.
Table 3.10: Treatment Effects on Conditional Contributions Reduced Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Control V1 C1
Conditional decisions Conditional decisions Conditional decisions
Level 0.114∗∗ 0.102 0.131∗
(0.046) (0.063) (0.070)
Constant 18.872∗∗∗ 20.088∗∗ 39.701∗∗∗
(3.952) (9.195) (12.251)
Observations 500 225 175
R2 0.056 0.079 0.247
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
P: Level Control - Treatment 0.884 0.843
P: Constant Control - Treatment 0.899 0.089*
P: Level V1 - CA1 0.766
P: Constant V1 - CA1 0.178
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Regressions include the following control
variables: gender, age, relationship status, highest grade attained, number of cows owned, size of the plot in hectares,
children 6 to 18 in the family, daily mobile phone usage, daily listening to the radio, group membership, participation in
village work (times/year), knows the FAO and village fixed effects.
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3.9. Appendix B – Experimental Instructions and Surveys
3.9.1 General Instructions
Good morning/afternoon. Thank you for taking the time to come to this study today.
We are a group of researchers from the University of Göttingen and the University of
Kiel in Germany and from Zambia. We are conducting a study on socio-economic condi-
tions in Zambia. In this study, we will ask you to make decisions and to complete a survey.
You will have the opportunity to earn money. The amount you earn will depend on your
decisions. The activities of this study are financed by the German Research Foundation.
Before we start, we would like to tell you some important points.
Today’s activities may take three hours. Before we begin we would like to make some gen-
eral comments about what we are doing here today and explain the rules that we must follow.
Participation in this study is completely voluntary. If at any time you feel not com-
fortable, you are free to leave whether the activities have begun or not. In this case you
will not receive the payment, though.
All decisions will be made in private. That means no one of the other participants
will know how you have decided and what answers you have given. You will also receive the
money in private at the end of the activities. Nobody but the researchers will know how
much money you have received. The information we collect will be saved in an anonymized
manner. We will treat the information confidentially.
You might have heard about these types of activities before. However, what we will
do can be different so please pay attention to what I am going to explain you.
Please do not ask questions or talk while you are here in the group. This is very im-
portant. Please be sure that you follow this rule, because it is possible for one person to
spoil the activities for everyone. Do not worry if you do not completely understand the
rules as we go through them here in the group. Each of you will have a chance to ask
questions in private to be sure that you understand how the activities work.
Before we explain the activities, we divide you into two groups, the Circle Group and
the Triangle Group. For this purpose, each of you will draw a card from the bag. The
symbol of your card will determine your group and the number is your ID number. The
people who are in the Triangle Group will leave to another place, where they cannot see or
hear the people in the Circle Group. In the meantime the Circle Group will stay at this place.
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In two hours we will do a similar activity with another group. Please do not interact
with them, as this can spoil our study.
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3.9.2 Experimental Instructions
We will first describe the basic decision situation in this activity. Then we will provide you
with examples.
At the beginning of the activity, we will form groups with two people. The group will consist
of one person from the Triangle Group and one person from the Circle Group. Neither you,
nor the other person will know who is in the group.
Both You and the Other Person will receive 40 Kwacha each [point to Poster1 ]. The
task for each person is the same: Both, You and the Other Person have to decide indepen-
dently how much money you want to put in the group account.
How are your earnings calculated?
Your income in this activity will be the sum of the amount you earn in the private
and in the group account.
Your income from the Private Account [point to private account on Poster1 ]
Everything that you leave in the private account will be yours. Nobody else will benefit
from the money you leave in the private account. If you have 10 Kwacha in the private
account, you receive 10 Kwacha from the private account.
Your income from the Group Account [point to private account on Poster1 ]
The amount of money that You and the Other Person put in the group account will
be summed up [point to arrows “passed”]. This value will be multiplied by 1.6 [point to 1.6
in group account ] and then will be equally divided among the two persons in the group
[point to “group account divided by 2 ]. Therefore each one will receive 0.8 of the total value
in the group account.
Both you and the Other Person will get the same money from the group account, in-
dependent of how much each of you has put in this account. Your income from the group
account will thus not only consist in what you put yourself into the group account, but you
will also earn money from what the Other Person has put into the group account. Also the
Other Person will earn money from what you have put into the group account. The income
from the group account will correspond to [group account and income from group account
on Poster 1 ]:
Individual income from the group account = [1.6 * (amount You passed + Amount the
Other Person passed)] /2
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Your Total Income
In the end, the total income of each person will be the sum of the income of the pri-
vate account and the income of the group account [point to the box next to total income]:
Total individual income = Income from the private account + Income from the group account
We will provide you with some examples to show you how the total income is calcu-
lated.
Example 1[Poster 1, example]:
In this example, assume you keep 10 Kwacha in the private account and put 30 Kwacha
in the group account. The Other Person puts 10 Kwacha in the group account and keeps
30 Kwacha in the private account. You now have 10 Kwacha in the private account. The
Other Person now has 30 Kwacha in the private account. The total amount of money in
the group account amounts to 40 Kwacha [point to “total deposits group account”].
In the next step, the money that is in the group account will be multiplied by 1.6. In
our example: 40 Kwacha*1.6 = 64 Kwacha. The total amount in the group account is 64
Kwacha [point to “value of the group account”]. Next, independently of what each person
has put in the group account, the total amount will be equally divided among the two
persons. In the example we have, the total amount was 64 Kwacha. Divided by 2 this makes
32 Kwacha. [Point to each cell in the row “Individual income from the group account”] So
you and the Other Person will both get 32 Kwacha from the group account.
The total income is the sum of the income from the private account and the group
account [Point to the respective cells of individual income of the private and the group
account ]. Your total income is 10 Kwacha from the private account plus 32 Kwacha from
the group account, equal to 42 Kwacha. The Income for the Other Person is 30 Kwacha
from the private account plus 32 Kwacha from the group account equal to 62 Kwacha [point
to the respective cells].
On this poster [Show Poster2 ] we have already calculated the total income for you and
the Other Person for every possible value put in the group account. Let me show you how
to read this: On this poster, you can see “You” and five arrows with different numbers.
This symbolizes the possible values you can put in the group account: Either 0 Kwacha,
10 Kwacha, 20 Kwacha, 30 Kwacha or 40 Kwacha [point to the arrows]. In the boxes
you see the possible values that the Other Person can put, also shown by arrows with
numbers. The Other Person can also put either 0 Kwacha, 10 Kwacha, 20 Kwacha, 30
Kwacha or 40 Kwacha in the group account. The numbers display the possible income
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you and the Other Person get [point to the payoffs]. The first numbers indicate your
income for every possible value of the Other Person [show in every box ]. And the second
numbers indicate the income of the Other Person, given the value you put[show in every box ].
In the example above, where “You” put 30 Kwacha and the “Other Person” 10 Kwacha, you
can find the payoffs for both You and other Other Person here [show arrows of 30 Kwacha,
10 Kwacha and then the payoff of each person]: You put 30 Kwacha and the Other Person
puts 10 Kwacha. You will earn a total income of 42 Kwacha and the Other Person will
have a total income of 62 Kwacha.
Example 2
Let us look at other examples. Let us assume, you decide to put 0 Kwacha [point to
arrows with the 0 ] and the Other Person also decides to put 0 Kwacha in the group account
[point to arrows with the 0 ]. How much is your total income? Your total income will
be [point to the payoffs of “You” at 40 ] 40 Kwacha and that of the Other Person also 40
Kwacha [point to the payoff of “Other” at 40 ].
Example 3
Assume you instead decide to put 20 Kwacha [point to arrows with the 20/20 ] and the
Other Person also decides to put 20 Kwacha, you will both receive 52 Kwacha [point to the
payoffs of “You” and “Other” at 20/20 ].
Example 4
Let us assume, you put 40 Kwacha and the Other Person also puts 40 Kwacha, you and the
Other Person both will earn 64 Kwacha [point to the payoffs of “You” and “Other” at 40/40 ].
The total income increases for both of you the more You and Other Person put in the group
account. Let us look how your total income behaves if one person puts more than the other.
Example 5
Assume you put 0 Kwacha in the group account and the Other Person puts 40 Kwacha
[show the respective arrows]. Then you will receive 72 Kwacha and the Other Person 32
Kwacha [point to the payoffs of each participant ].
What this shows is that if the Other Person puts more to the group account than you, he
or she will have a lower total income in the end and you will benefit when the Other Person
puts all the 40 Kwachas in the group account.
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Example 6
This holds for the other direction as well. Assume that you put all your endowment
of 40 Kwacha in the group account and that the Other Person puts 0 Kwacha. Then the
Poster will tell us that [point to the arrows and the payoffs] you will earn 32 Kwacha and
the Other Person will have a total income of 72 Kwacha.
We will ask you later to decide for yourself how much of the 40 Kwacha you want to
put in the group account. How much you put in the group account can be chosen freely, as
long as it is in ten Kwacha units. Every amount that is not put into the group account will
remain in the private account.
Elicitation of decisions
After having explained the general set-up of the decision-making situation and the re-
sulting income, we will now explain how you will make your decisions in detail. We will call
you one by one to a place far away enough so that you can give your decision in private.
Nobody of you will know and get to know the identity of the person you are in a group
with and you will also not know how he or she decided.
Once we call your ID number, we will ask you to come to our colleague. We will then ask
you two types of decisions. In each decision, you have to choose how much of the 40 Kwacha
you want to put in the group account. We ask you to mark your decision on the decision
sheet that our research assistant will give to you. This decision sheet will look like the Poster
we have showed you before [point to Poster2 ]. Here you will mark one of the possible value
by making a cross at the respective box [show how to mark it with a non-permanent marker ].
We have already described the first decision above. In the second type of decision, we
will ask you to indicate how much money you want to put in the group account for every
possible decision of the person in your group. Let us explain this in more detail with the
following picture [show Poster3 ]. Here we provide you with a table that shows each possible
value of the Other Person to the group account [point to the first column].
This time you will base your decision on every possible decision of the Other Person:
We would like to know how much you want to put in the group account if the Other Person
has put 0 Kwacha in the group account [point to cell next to 0 Kwacha and pretend to write
a number ]. We also want to know how much you will put in the group account if the other
person puts in the group account 10 Kwacha [point to cell next to 10 Kwacha and pretend
to write a number ], 20 Kwacha [point to cell next to 20 Kwacha and mark it with an x ],
30 Kwacha [point to cell next to 30 Kwacha and pretend to write a number ] or 40 Kwacha
[point to cell next to 40 Kwacha and pretend to write a number ] to the group account. Thus
this time we would like to have five answers from you: one for each possible value that
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the Other Person could put in the group account. You can condition the value you put in
the group account on the value the other group member puts. Please fill each cell in this table.
After you have given an answer to each possible decision of the Other Person, we will ask
you about your belief in how much the Other Person from your group has put in the group
account [point to the part on the Poster3 ]. Please write down how much you think the
Other Person has actually put in the account. If your belief is correct, you will receive 5
Kwacha more.
Each one of you made two decisions. First you selected one of the arrows and then
you wrote a number in the table. For one participant in the group the first decision will
determine earnings and for the other the second decision.
To determine which decision counts for whom, we will select either a Triangle or a Circle by
asking one of you to draw a card of a bag. If this person selects a Triangle, the first decision
will count for participants in the Group Triangle and in this case, the second decision will
count for the Circle Group.
If the person selects a Circle, instead, then it will be the opposite, in this case for those
in the Circle Group the first decision will count and for the Triangle Group the second
decision. When you make the decisions both can count for the final payment. Therefore
you will have to think carefully about each type of decision.
After you have written down your belief, you will have a break. Afterwards, we will
ask you to complete a survey.
Control Questions
Please ask the following questions to each respondent and mark the answer
with the respective ID on a piece of paper:
1. How much money can you put in the group account? 0,10,20,30,40 Kwacha
2. What is your total income if You put 30 Kwacha in the group account and the Other
Person puts 20 Kwacha? 50 Kwacha
3. What is the Other Person’s total income? 60 Kwacha
101










 40 Kwacha 
Other person 









  You    Other person 
Individual contribution to the group 
account 
30 Kwacha 10 Kwacha 
Total deposit group account 40 Kwacha 
Value of the group account 1.6 x 40 Kwacha = 64 Kwacha 
Individual income from the group 
account 
64 ÷ 2 = 32 Kwacha 64 ÷ 2 = 32 Kwacha 
 
                                                                Total income 
Individual income from the group 
account 
32 Kwacha 32 Kwacha 
Income private account 10 Kwacha 30 Kwacha 






0, 10, 20, 30 
or 40 
Kwacha? 
= Income from group account  
+ income from private account 
= Income from group account  
+ income from private account 
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Figure 3.3: Poster 2
20 
 40                 40 
YOU 
 48                 38 
 56                 36 
 64                 34 
 72                 32 
 32                   72 
 40                   70 
 48                   68 
 56                   66 
 64                   64 
 38                   48 
 46                   46 
 54                   44 
 62                   42 
 70                   40 
 36                   56 
 44                   54 
 52                   52 
 60                   50 
 68                   48 
 34                   64 
 42                   62 
 50                   60 
 58                   58 
 66                   56 






Payoff      Payoff 
You           Other 
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Figure 3.4: Poster 3
Contribution of the Other 
Person to the group 
account: 
Your contribution to the 






How much do you think did the person in the other 
group contribute? If you guess right, you will earn 5 
Kwacha. 
 
                        
             ____________ Kwacha 
ID # _________ 
YOUR BELIEF 
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3.9.3 Smallholder Survey
1. Name of the research assistant (First, Last)








10. Date of Birth (dd/mm/yr)
11. Marital Status
12. Relation to household head
13. What tribe are you?
14. How long have you lived in this village? (years)
15. What is the highest grade of schooling that you have completed? (Insert grade, e.g.
grade 12=12)
16. What kind of change would you like to bring about in your village? Please tell me any
desire/goal you want to achieve in your village in the future. [RECORD ANSWER]
___ Education:
___ Health:




(Please list the order in which the goals were mentioned)






18. Of all of these goals, which one is the most important one for you to change?
(Specify goal)
19. How many households in your village have very good housing conditions, i.e.
houses with walls made out of red brick, burnt brick or asbestos and/or with iron
sheets on the roof?
20. For how many households in your village would you like to have very good
housing conditions in the future? (desire/goal)
21. How many households do you expect to actually have very good housing
conditions in your village in ten years? (expectation)
22. How many minutes do students from your village have to walk to get to a primary
school?
23. How many minutes would you like students to walk to get to a primary school in
the future? (desire/goal)
24. How many minutes do you expect students will actually have to walk to primary
school in ten years? (expectation)
25. How many policemen/-women or voluntary guards does your village have?
26. How many policemen/-women or voluntary guards would you like your village to
have in the future? (desire/goal)
27. How many policemen/-women or voluntary guards do you expect your village will
actually have in ten years? (expectation)
28. How much money do households in this village contribute to finance village
projects in a year?
29. How much money would you like that households in your village contribute
annually to finance village projects in the future? (desire/goal)
30. How much money do you expect households actually contribute annually to
finance village projects in ten years? (expectation)
31. How many books does a household have in your village?
32. How many books would you like a household to have in the future? (desire/goal)
33. How many books do you expect a household will actually have in ten years?
(expectation)
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34. How many households in your village get support in case of need, such as
suffering from economic loss due to crop failure?
35. How many households would you like to get support in case of need in the future?
(desire/goal)
36. How many households do you expect to actually get support in case of need in ten
years? (expectation)
37. How many times do people in your village meet each other (for example for
celebrations or village discussions) in a month?
38. How many times a month would you like people in your village to meet in the
future? (desire/goal)
39. How many times a month do you expect people to actually meet in ten years?
(expectation)
40. Are there children in the age of 6 to 18 in your family?
 Yes
 No (Go to question 44)
41. What is the education level that the youngest child achieved until now?
42. What is the level of education you would like this child to achieve in his/her life?
(goal/desire)
43. What is the level of education you expect this child will to achieve in his/her life?
(what they will probably achieve)
44. Do you own land, cows and goats? How big is the size of your plot and how many




45. What is the size of your plot and number of cows and goats you would like to have










47. How many households live in this village?
48. Please tell me with which of the two statements you agree more:
Statement A: "To be successful, above all one needs to work very hard."
Statement B: "To be successful, above all one needs to be lucky."
 I agree more with A
 I agree more with B









50. How often in the past year have you joined together with others in the village to
address a common issue?
___ times
51. Are you a member of any clubs, groups, organizations, committees or associations?
 Yes
 No (if no, go to question 54)
52. If yes, in which one(s):













53. Do you consider yourself to be active in the group(s), such as by attending meetings




54. How many times a year do you participate in village work (such as road clearing,
village clean up, insaka maintenance)?
___ days per month
55. How much money do you spent on average for village activities or village problems in
a year?
___ Kwacha/year
56. How much money do you spend on schooling on average per month?
___ Kwacha/month













 Yes, a lot
 Yes, a little bit
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 No




60. How often do you use a mobile phone?
 Every day
 Once a week
 Once a month
 Once a year
 Never
61. How often do you listen to a radio?
 Every day
 Once a week
 Once a month
 Once a year
 Never
62. Did you watch a video today?
 Yes
 No









64. Do you think that the people in the video are similar to you?
 Yes
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if no: why do you think that they are not similar?



















1. Name of the research assistant (First, Last)
2. Date of interview (dd/mm/yr)
3. Name of the interviewee (First, Last)
4. Role of the interviewee (e.g. headwoman/-man)
5. Village
6. How many households in your village have access to safe drinking water (i.e.
protected wells, boreholes, pumped water)?
7. On average how many minutes does it take a household to get access to safe drinking
water?
8. What is the main market where villagers sell their products? (specify the name of the
city where the main market is located)
9. How many kilometers away is the main market?
10. How many minutes does it take to reach the main market?






12. How many children in the village go to primary school?
13. How many children in the village are in the age to go to primary school?
14. How far is the nearest health facility?
______ distance (in walking minutes)
15. Does the facility have medicine?
 Yes
if yes:
 Very good access
 Average access
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16. Does the village have police or a neighborhood security committee?
 Yes we have police
 Yes we have neighborhood security committee
 No








18. Do you have a resource that is used jointly such as a well or a village field/garden?
 Yes
 No (go to question 20)
19. If yes, which one(s)? (specify)
20. How often do the people come together for a village meeting?
 More than once a month
 Once a month
 Twice a year
 Never happens
21. Which regular activities do the people in the village do together (such as the
improvement of insaka, cleaning of roads and paths, maintenance of borehole)?
(specify)
22. Do you document your village meetings and/or the regular activities (when they take
part, what was done/spoken and how many people participate?)
23. In the last three years, has the village organized to address a need or a problem?
 Yes
 No (go to question 26)
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24. Around which issue(s) did the village organize?
a) ___________
b) ___________









26. Are there any specific assistance programs to this community?
 Yes
 No
27. What are the two main programs and the institutions that support them?
a) Program/institution: ___________
b) Program/institution: ___________
28. Which of the following organizations, clubs, committees, or groups exist in this
village?









29. Do any persons or organizations (such as for example government, religious
organizations, and businesses) help or support these village-based organizations?
 Yes
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 No (go to question XX)
30. If yes, who/which one(s)? (specify)
31. Does this village have a village treasury?
 Yes
 No (go to question XX)
32. Who is in charge of the accounting of the village treasury? (specify)
33. Do you have accounting records?
 Yes
 No
34. How much money is in the village treasury at present?
________ Kwacha
35. How much money is in the village treasury on average in a year?
________ Kwacha/year
36. How much money do people contribute to the village treasury on average per year?
________ Kwacha/year
37. Does the village treasury have other sources of money than financial contribution of
people living in this village? (specify)
38. For what has the money in the village treasury spent in the last year? (specify)
39. How often do village members on average give money to a village member who is in
need?
 More than once a month
 Once a month
 Twice a year
 Once a year
 Never happens
40. What kinds of crimes (such as robberies, violent disputes, etc.) exist in this village?
(specify)
41. How often do crimes happen in a year?
________ times/year
42. Are there members of this village who go to other places to work during certain
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4.1. Introduction
Compared to men, women are underrepresented in developing countries’ formal labor
markets. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO) indicators2, 60 percent
of women in low-income countries are employed in the labor market compared to 75 percent
of men. In addition, only 22 percent of corporate managers in these countries are female.
The shortage of women participation in the formal labor market and the lack of women in
leading positions – especially from those with higher education and ability –, generates an
economic loss as there is a valuable share of labor force which is not being efficiently used
(Niederle & Vesterlund, 2011; Flory et al., 2015). Explanations for the gender difference
in labor market outcomes are still being explored (Blau & Kahn, 2017). Understanding
the roots of the gender-gap and exploring solutions to close it is particularly relevant for
achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), especially for low income countries,
where an important share of human capital could contribute to economic growth and
long-term poverty reduction (Kolev & Sirven, 2010). Further, gains in females’ incomes
can contribute to increases in bargaining power in the household and improvements in
children’s welfare (Duflo, 2003; Qian, 2008).
One reason for female’s under-representation in the labor market could be the lack of
successful examples of similar individuals that can serve as reference points they can learn
from and form aspirations for a different future. The literature in psychology on social
learning theory posits that individual’s beliefs and behavior are shaped by the observation of
experiences of other people (Bandura, 1977, 1986). Further, it is argued that an individual’s
aspirations are determined by the lives and achievements of other people in the individual’s
cognitive window (Ray, 2006). Poor people, however, often lack successful examples which
prevent them to build aspirations and thus invest into a better future (Appadurai, 2004;
Ray, 2006). As few women in developing countries are employed in the formal labor market,
and even fewer are in leadership positions, women in these countries likely lack successful
examples from which they can draw inspiration. Under these conditions, females can find
themselves in a behavioral poverty trap, in which low aspirations produce low economic
investments (Ray, 2006; Dalton et al., 2016; Genicot & Ray, 2017). A possible route out
of the behavioral trap is to provide successful examples of what similar individuals have
achieved (Ray, 2006).
In this paper we experimentally test whether exposure to role model videos can moti-
vate female high-school students to apply to competitive jobs. Observing how a similar
person succeeds can lead individuals to revise their beliefs in the ability to achieve the
same outcome – so called self-efficacy beliefs (Stout et al., 2011). Further, by observing
how investments are connected to desired results can also increase individual’s (internal)
locus of control beliefs, i.e. the beliefs of how actions and outcomes are connected (Rotter,
2Data obtained from ILOSTAT Data explorer. Data reported corresponds to 2019 results.
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1966). Role models can also raise individuals’ aspirations by changing their perceptions
on the opportunities they have and thereby induce future-oriented behavior (Beaman
et al., 2012; Bernard et al., 2014). Lastly, role models can also increase confidence and
reduce negative effects in stereotype threat situations and thereby increase performance
and willingness to enter into competition (Marx & Roman, 2002; Meier et al., 2020). Based
on this evidence we suggest that role models, who come from the same background, can
lead female students to raise their aspirations, revise their beliefs about themselves and
also on women’s performance in competitive environments in general. Our study aims to
answer the following research questions: Do female role models shown in videos increase
the propensity of females to apply and choose a high responsibility position? Does the
gender of the role model matter in female’s decision to apply?
To shed light on our research questions, we conducted a field experiment in four sec-
ondary schools in Madagascar in 2018. Our study region is a relevant context to study,
since Madagascar is one of the poorest nations in the world (World Bank, 2019), where paid
jobs are scarce (Nordman et al., 2010), and where labor market participation of women,
especially young women, is a real challenge (Herrera et al., 2019). We randomly assigned
336 female and male students to watch either a Female Role Model, a Male Role
Model or a Placebo video. The treatment videos depict a female or male character who
set a goal (becoming a teacher at a University) and shows how they achieved it despite the
different challenges they encountered. These characters provide an example of successful
individuals and come from a similar background as the participants. The Placebo video
includes the same two characters, but discusses the differences of lifestyles between rural
and urban areas. After video exposure, we measured students’ aspirations, self-efficacy and
locus of control beliefs. In addition, we conducted a lab-in-the-field experiment to measure
participant’s performance in a real-effort task and their preference to enter into competition.
At the end of the session, we informed the students about the possibility to apply to one of
two jobs in the research project of one of the principal investigators: assistant or coordinator.
The main difference among the two real jobs is that the coordinator’s position involves
more responsibilities and thus has a higher remuneration. A week after the experiment we
gave the students their earnings from the lab-in-the-field experiment and collected their job
applications.
Our results show that the Female Role Model video, compared to the Placebo,
encourages female participants as well as male participants to apply to one of the positions.
We find a gender gap in applications to the coordinator position in the Placebo group, but
find that it almost disappears in the Male Role Model group. Our results suggest that
this is driven by an increase in the number of females applying compared to the Placebo.
We test for four possible channels and find that competitive preferences, measured in our
lab-in-the-field, can explain the increase in applications for the coordinator position in the
Male Role Model treatment. We suggest that the Male Role Model character might
credibly exhibit competitive traits that encourage competitive behavior among females.
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This result provides evidence that not only successful people from an in-group can be role
models. In addition, we tests for a potential mechanism driving applications to any of
the positions. We find that aspirations and the current level of achievements can partially
explain the decision to apply. The latter is positively correlated with the decision to apply
to one of the positions.
To our knowledge, our study is the first that investigates the effect of role model videos on
the willingness to apply for a job. Previous studies have shown that female role models
are effective in closing the gender gap and encouraging women to select into competitive
environments (Stout et al., 2011; Breda et al., 2020; Ginther et al., 2020; Meier et al., 2020;
Porter & Serra, 2020; Schier, 2020). The study that is closest to ours is by Meier et al.
(2020), which assesses whether role models in videos affect competitive preferences in an
online experiment. Compared to their study, we focus on the decision to apply to a job
in a development context. Also, there is empirical evidence that role models shown in
media or videos are effective in altering the opportunities people perceive, the goals they
set for themselves as well as the investments they make (Chong & La Ferrara, 2009; Jensen
& Oster, 2009; Beaman et al., 2012; La Ferrara et al., 2012; Bernard et al., 2014; Riley,
2018). For example, Lubega et al. (2018) conducted a randomized controlled trial (RCT)
in which they screened role model videos to woman with HIV in Uganda and find that
treated females were more likely to start a business, have higher income and savings as well
as improved health outcomes. Yet, the above studies have not investigated the effect of
exposure to role models in videos on female’s decision to apply to a job.
We contribute to three other important strands of literature. First, as we show a positive
effect of role models on job applications, our paper is related to the literature that explores
different strategies to incentivize women to participate in the labor market. For example,
Jensen (2012) finds that providing recruiting services to young women in India is an effective
tool to increase labor market participation. Further, Ibañez & Riener (2018) show how
affirmative action in a field experiment attracts women to apply to jobs in Colombia. In
similar lines, McKelway (2020) conducts a RCT in India, where she offered women a psycho
social program, followed by a job promotion video from the hiring company screened to par-
ticipants and family members. The intervention increased women’s generalized self-efficacy
(GSE) and their labor market participation.
Second, by showing that information on role models mitigates the gap in the willing-
ness to select into competition found by Niederle & Vesterlund (2007), we extend the
experimental knowledge on incentives that close the gender difference in competition (Woz-
niak et al., 2014; Meier et al., 2020). The study of Meier et al. (2020) also provides evidence
that the gender gap in competition decreases when females receive information from role
models. However, the kind of information and the type of role models are different to
our study: Our intervention shows successful individuals, from a similar background to
those of the participants, who talk about their aspirations and the way how they achieved
119
them, while Meier et al. (2020) chose public figures who highlight the important role of
competition in their careers.
Third, our paper contributes to the rich literature on competitive preferences by bridging lab
evidence and field outcomes. Even though there is a large share of experimental literature
on gender differences in the selection into competition and its potential effects on labor
market outcomes (Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2011), to our knowledge,
the link between selection into competition in the lab and experimental measures on job
selection in the field has not yet been studied.3
4.2. Conceptual Framework
4.2.1 Role Models and Female Labor Market Outcomes
The link between exposure to the role model videos and the decision to enter the labor
market can be through several channels. We test for four channels: aspirations, competitive
preferences, self-efficacy and locus of control beliefs.4
First, role models can increase female’s aspirations. Aspirations are defined as distant goals
that motivate individuals to provide investments in order to attain them (Bernard et al.,
2011; Lybbert & Wydick, 2018). Experiences of successful individuals can help women
to imagine a different future and expand the opportunities they perceive for themselves.
Further, observing a woman or a man succeeding by setting high goals and following them,
females might feel inspired by the outcomes they have achieved and also set high goals for
themselves. Aspirations have been found to correlate with educational and employment
attainment of female adolescents (Roy et al., 2018) and with outcomes of peers with higher
status (Janzen et al., 2017). Several experimental studies have shown that aspirations
can be increased by role models (Beaman et al., 2012; Jensen, 2012; Bernard et al., 2014;
Riley, 2018). Having higher aspirations can lead females to apply to one of the advertised
positions and even apply to more competitive jobs, as they can imagine a different future
for themselves.
Second, role models can also have an effect on labor market outcomes through competitive
preferences. The gender difference in competition has been largely studied through labora-
tory and field experiments (Gneezy et al., 2003; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007; Carpenter et
al., 2018). The common finding is that women are less willing to enter into competition
in comparison to men (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2011). A lower preference for competition
3Buser et al. (2020) show how competitiveness relates to survey measures on achieved education, choice of
study and occupation, and income. Buser et al. (2014, 2017) investigate the relationship of competitiveness
and choice of academic track with data from secondary schools.
4We do not test for other potential mechanisms such as mitigation of stereotype threats and discrimina-
tion.
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has been related to gender segregation in career choices (Kleinjans, 2009), women’s lower
presence in leadership positions (Gneezy et al., 2003; Booth, 2009; Niederle & Vesterlund,
2011) and women’s lower willingness to engage in more competitive compensation schemes
(Flory et al., 2015; Kamas & Preston, 2015). By observing a successful and similar example,
women can become more ambitious and thus compete more (Schier, 2020). Role models
can also lead women to update their priors that in turn could weaken gender stereotype
threats (Meier et al., 2020; Schier, 2020). Exposing female students to a successful female
of a similar background, who set a goal and achieved it, can make them more competitive
and thus willing to apply for the coordinator position.
Third, the mechanism could also run through changes in self-efficacy beliefs, which refer
to an individual’s belief in his/her capacity to achieve an outcome (Bandura, 1977, 1997).
Self-efficacy is a key predictor of female educational and employment aspirations (Roy et
al., 2018) and, as aspirations, can also be increased through social comparison with role
models and peers. Individuals, who observe how similar people succeed, can come to trust
their own abilities more (Bandura, 1977, 2004). For instance, Stout et al. (2011) find that
exposing female experts in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) to
female students increased their self-efficacy in STEM and made them more willing to pursue
a career path in that field. We assume that individuals, who believe more in their abilities
due to the role model intervention, are more willing to complete an application and apply
to the coordinator position.
Lastly, role models can also lead to a change in locus of control beliefs. Locus of control
refers to the beliefs an individual has regarding the control she or he has over own life
outcomes. Individuals are said to have an internal locus of control if they believe that the
outcomes are determined by their action, whereas individuals with external locus of control
beliefs attribute outcomes to external forces (luck, fate, powerful others) (Rotter, 1966).
Having an internal locus of control belief has been associated with several labor market
outcomes (Cobb-Clark, 2015). There is also evidence that locus of control is malleable.
Gottschalk (2005) analyzed a project in which long-term welfare recipients were randomly
offered earnings subsidies once they took up work (reduce external constraints). The author
finds that the longer recipients were employed the more likely they reported an internal
locus of control belief. In our case, we suggest that seeing similar individuals succeed can
also lead to a change in locus of control beliefs. The information provided in the videos
could lead students to revise their beliefs on how behavior and outcomes are connected and
thus on what is possible to achieve in their context, making them more willing to exert
effort and apply to a (competitive) job.
4.2.2 Hypotheses
Based on the above empirical evidence, we argue that being exposed to either of the role
model increases applications of the participants. Our first hypothesis thus is:
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Hypothesis 1. Participants will be more likely to apply to the job positions in the Female
Role Model video and Male Role Model video treatment compared to participants in
the Placebo group.
In addition, we believe that showing a successful female character will encourage female
students to apply for the more competitive job – the coordinator position. Our second
hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 2. Female students will be more willing to apply to the coordinator posi-
tion when they are exposed to the female role model.
As other studies have shown, we believe that a female role model can close the gen-
der gap that has been found in competitive environments (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2011).
Our third hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 3. There is no gender gap in the selection to the coordinator position in
the female treatment.
4.3. Context, Experimental Design and Procedures
4.3.1 Field Context
To study the effects of a role model intervention on the decision to apply to a job, we
chose Madagascar as our study region. Madagascar is one of the poorest nations in the
world with around 77.6 percent of its population living under USD 1.90 per day (2011
Purchasing Power Parity) (World Bank, 2019). As a large share of the population is
involved in agriculture, most of Madagascar’s labor force is working in unpaid jobs or in the
informal sector (Nordman et al., 2010). Paid jobs are scarce, which makes the formal labor
market very competitive and difficult to access (Stifel & Rakotomanana, 2007). In 2018,
83.3 percent of females were estimated to be in the labor force compared to 89 percent of
the males (ILO, 2020). However, the largest share of the female workforce is involved in
agricultural activities or is employed in the informal sector and thus receives lower wages
compared to men (Nordman et al., 2010). Similar to other countries in the world, women
are not only underrepresented in the formal labor market, but also in private and public
leadership positions compared to men (Kolev & Sirven, 2010). For instance, according
to the data reported by World Economic Forum (2019), 28 percent of top managers in
Madagascar are women and 19 percent of seats in parliament are held by women.
Madagascar has an increasing and large share of youth population, representing 21 percent
of the total population (UNESCO, 2020), who are in the process of forming their aspirations.
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However, the youth in Madagascar face high barriers to access tertiary education (World
Bank, 2019) and are more likely to enter the informal labor market compared to older
cohorts (Stifel & Rakotomanana, 2007). This goes hand-in-hand with information gaps
regarding the returns of higher education, which disincentives students to apply and to
continue on building up a career (Nguyen, 2008). We focus our interest on the student
population finishing their last year of high school because these young men and women
are at the stage to decide what to do next. On average, only 5 percent of the high school
graduates decide to continue their education (UNESCO, 2020), and the rest is likely to
enter the informal labor market. Because our study region is located at north-east part
of the country where most of the vanilla production and commercialization takes place,
the incentive to opt for informal jobs is high. Therefore, it is relevant to provide students
with successful examples that allow them to aspire higher and encourage them to enter the
formal market.
There is also a gender-gap in the formal labor market for young cohorts (Stifel & Rako-
tomanana, 2007) and, although less prominent, in tertiary education enrollment rates
(UNESCO, 2020). While there is no evidence of cognitive ability differences between female
and male students (Herrera Almanza et al., 2017), one reason that explains the presence
of these gaps is the prevalence of child marriage and early pregnancies (Glick et al., 2015;
UNFPA, 2015; Herrera et al., 2019). 41 percent of women aged 20-24 years are married
or in union before the age of 18 (UNICEF Madagascar, 2018) and 35.6 percent gave birth
before that age (UNICEF, 2020). Postponing marriage and child bearing to pursue higher
education or a professional career usually goes against family norms, which expect young
women to marry and continue with the hereditary line (Skjortnes & Zachariassen, 2010).
In addition, given that a minority of the Malagasy population have access to wage jobs and
pursued secondary or tertiary education, there is a lack of financial but also moral support
from parents and family members to encourage young girls to pursue higher education
(Skjortnes & Zachariassen, 2010).
In addition to the difficult economic conditions that are present in Madagascar, social
norms – and the gender-gaps they generate – result in the exclusion of women from politics
and economic development. As a consequence most female students who are currently in
secondary school, lack successful examples of women who continued with their education,
accessed the formal labor market, and achieved top and competitive jobs. Because of these
reasons, we suggest that Madagascar is an example of a country where women are likely to
experience a behavioral poverty trap where low aspirations produce low investments. An
intervention that provides examples of similar successful individuals could help women to
imagine a different future, form higher aspirations and be more willing to enter a competitive
formal labor market.
Female labor market participation can increase female’s and her household’s welfare in
different dimensions. Todd (2013) analyzed programs directed at improving women’s access
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to employment and quality of work, such as providing training and job search services to
unemployed, and finds evidence that programs can increase female’s wages and incomes. Ac-
cording to the theory of change proposed in Ibañez et al. (2017) (found in Balasubramanian
et al. (2019)) increases in household’s income through female’s participation in the labor
market can also influence household’s welfare indirectly through increases in bargaining
power and decreases in fertility. In the meta-analysis undertaken by the authors, they find
that interventions aimed at increasing female economic empowerment at the community
level, which considers interventions that increase female’s access to employment, among
others, lead to a moderate increase in household’s economic situation and educational
outcomes for the children (Ibañez et al., 2017). However, they find no significant effect on
health and no changes in attitudes towards women.
4.3.2 Experimental Design
We conducted our study in north-eastern Madagascar with female and male students from
the main public high-schools. Our experimental design comprised six stages (see Fig.
4.1). In the first two stages, we screened one of the treatment videos (Female Role
Model, Male Role Model) or a Placebo video, followed by a short survey about
the perceptions of participants regarding the main character(s) of the videos. In addition,
we measured student’s aspirations using a similar approach as in Bernard et al. (2014)
and Bernard & Taffesse (2014). In the third stage we measured inter- and intrapersonal
competition preferences by following the experimental design of Niederle & Vesterlund
(2007) and Carpenter et al. (2018). In stage 4 we collected attitudinal and socioeconomic
information. Stages 5 and 6 assessed the willingness of students to enter the labor market.
In stage 5, we advertised two different job offers and students could express their interest
in the positions. Stages 1 to 5 took place on the same day. One week after, we met the
students again to distribute the experimental earnings and collect the job applications. This
corresponds to stage 6 of our experimental design. In the following sections, we explain
each of the stages in detail.
Figure 4.1: Structure Experimental Session
Stage 1: Video and control survey
In the first stage, we introduced our treatments by showing students one of three 10 minute
videos in their local language. Students could either watch: a Female Role Model, a
Male Role Model or a Placebo. In the first two videos, each role model introduces
him/herself and narrates how he/she succeeded in achieving an important goal they set for
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themselves (becoming a teacher at a University) despite the hardships they faced (lack of
financial resources, lack of confidence and lack of successful examples). They describe the
steps they went through in order to achieve their goal and how they felt once they achieved
it. In addition, the video narrates how some people from their network admire them for
imagining and achieving a different future, but also how they face criticism from others in
their village, who hold a more traditional view on life and on what people should aspire
and achieve.
To increase the connection with the students’ background, each role model shows the
place they were raised (rural areas) and the school they attended. At the end, a family
member, a friend and a colleague of each of the role models expresses how they perceive
him or her and the image they have in the community they live in. The role model
videos end with each of the characters achieving their goal and the videos close with the
following sentence from the narrator: “The story of Marie-Rolande (Fulgence) shows that if
one aims at doing something and works towards it, it is possible to achieve it. She (He)
imagined a different life than most of her (his) friends and family have, and even though
the journey was long and with many obstacles, she (he) was able to make that imagination
a reality.” The main factor changing between the two videos is gender. We chose both role
models coming from a poor background, similar to our participants, as there is evidence
that the role model’s background matters to increase the identification with the charac-
ter. None of the treatment videos provide information to the students on how to behave
in the subsequent experimental stages and the role models do not refer to competition
or the decision to enter the labor market. This allows us to exclude potential demand effects.
In the Placebo video both characters appear, present themselves (similar to the other
two videos) and talk about the differences between the life in rural and urban areas. We
consider this topic neutral as we refer to differences in lifestyles, clothing, climate, ethnicity,
traditional ceremonies and types of schools that exist. We chose this topic because it is easy
to understand and it is known by students. In this video we do not provide new information
to students or a different perspective of their life. Furthermore, we did not present the
characters as role models nor mentioned their achievements. The video just compares two
different lifestyles and thus should not have an effect on our outcome variables. Different to
Meier et al. (2020), we decided not to use a video with nature as Placebo, but to have an
additional video with the same characters to make the results comparable and avoid potential
noise coming from foreign music, images, etc. The Placebo video closes with the following
sentence from the narrator: “Living in the city has advantages and disadvantages, same
as in the rural area. However, this diversity makes the SAVA region a beautiful place to live.”
Following the screening, students had to report their perceptions towards the charac-
ter(s) of the video. In particular, we asked them if they liked the character, the degree to
which they identify with him or her, and their perceptions of the role models’ success and
risk-taking. In the survey we also asked participants whether they knew the character.
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Stage 2: Measure of aspirations
Our measurement of aspirations is taken from Bernard et al. (2014) and Bernard & Taffesse
(2014). Each of our participants had to answer a set of questions on four specific dimensions:
education, income, social status and assets. In each of the dimensions, students had to
report the level they currently possess, the level they would like to achieve (aspirations)
and the level they think they will be able to reach (expectations). Furthermore, we include
questions on the maximum and the minimum levels students think an average person from
the place they come from can achieve in each dimension. This is important as it assists them
in finding answers and to make sure they do not report mere wishes (Bernard & Taffesse,
2014). After the students have completed the survey, they had to distribute 20 points
according to the importance they attach to each dimension. Based on these indicators we








where σd is the standard deviation of the Placebo group, µd the mean of the Placebo
group for each aspiration question from dimension d and wd is the average weight students
in the Placebo group attached to each dimension.
To control for differences in students’ achievements, we constructed a current index using
the above procedure. Instead of aspirations, we use the level of each dimension that the
participants have already achieved.
Stage 3: Measure of competitive preferences
To measure interpersonal competitive preferences, we used a laboratory experiment and
followed the design by Niederle & Vesterlund (2007) with small variations. In addition
to the four tasks that are included in their study, we introduce a fifth task to measure
intrapersonal competition preferences. We included this task following a similar structure
as in Carpenter et al. (2018).
In the laboratory, participants were seated in rows of four people and were informed
that they were forming a group with the people sitting in the same row. To avoid negative
externalities from gender imbalances in each group, we sat two female and two male students
in each row when possible. During the experiment we did not make the gender of the group
participants salient. Since they could see the other group members, they could as well
determine their gender. As students were allocated in each classroom randomly, we expect
to reduce noise created by previous beliefs about the group’s ability. Yet, we acknowledge
that knowing other people in the group could have potential effects on the behavior. To
control for this we asked students how many people of the group they are friends with in
the post-experimental survey.
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Before starting with the real-effort task, participants received an explanation from the
instructor, who by using a poster showed an example on how the task should be performed,
the time for performing the task, and what would be taken as a correct and incorrect
answer. The instructor did not continue with the explanation until the task was clear
for all students. Instead of using a math task as in Niederle & Vesterlund (2007), our
real-effort task consisted in counting and reporting the number of 1’s that are in a 8x8
matrix (see example Fig. 4.2). The task is solved correctly when the participant reports
the correct number of 1’s. We chose a gender neutral task, as tasks that are associated
with stereotypes impact the decision to select into competition (Grosse et al., 2014). At
this point participants were told that they would be asked to complete five tasks but that
one of them would be relevant for payment, if this stage would randomly be chosen for
payment at the end of the experiment.
This stage consisted of five tasks in which the compensation varies. In the following,
we describe each of the tasks in detail. In Task-1 each participant received an individ-
ual payment of 500 Ariary (≈ 0.13 Euro) for each correct answer in the real-effort task
(piece-rate payment). The amount earned is independent of the performance of others. In
Task-2, participants entered into a ‘winner takes it all’ tournament, where they competed
against the other group members. The task was the same as before with the difference that
their earnings depend on their performance in comparison to the performance of others in
the group. The winner earns 2,000 Ariary (0.512 Euro) per correct matrix solved and the
losers earn nothing. In case of ties, the winner was chosen randomly.
In Task-3, participants had the opportunity to choose the compensation scheme they
would like to have in case this task is randomly selected for payment. They could decide to
have the individual pay rate of 500 Ariary for each matrix they solve correctly, or to enter
into the ‘winner takes it all’ tournament against the people in their group. If the participant
chose to enter into tournament, he or she competed with the performance in task 3 with
the performance of the other group members in Task-2. All participants had to perform
Task-3, therefore if the participant decided not to compete, he or she received the earnings
according to their performance in this Task-3 (piece-rate payment). The payment scheme
associated to the tournament is the same as in Task-2. This means that if a participant
chose to compete and solved more matrices in this Task-3 compared to the performance
his or her group partners had in Task-2, the participant received 2.000 Ariary per correct
matrix. If the participant solved less number of matrices then he or she received nothing.
In case of a tie, the decision whether the participant wins or not was chosen randomly. In
this Task-3, the decision each student made on whether to compete or not, did not affect
the earnings of other group members or their decisions to compete or not.
In Task-4, participants did not have to solve matrices. Instead of performing the real-
effort task, participants in Task-4 were asked to choose which compensation scheme they
would like to apply for their past performance in Task-1: piece-rate vs. ‘winner takes it
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all’ tournament pay. If the participant chose to enter into tournament, then he or she
was competing against the performance of other group members in Task-1. If his or her
performance is the highest in comparison to others in the group, then he/she was declared
winner and earned 2,000 Ariary per correct matrix solved (0.512 Euro) in Task-1. As in
Tasks-2 and 3, in case of ties, the winner was chosen randomly. If the participant chose
the piece-rate scheme, then the earnings would be the same as in Task-1. Before making
their choice, we reminded each participant about the number of matrices they believed to
have solved correctly in Task-1 . Furthermore, like in the previous tasks, the decision each
student made is individual and thus does not affect the earnings of other group members
or their decision on whether to compete or not. Since we do not condition participants’
earnings on a future performance, Task-4 allows doing a comparison with the decision
taken in Task-3 on whether to compete or not. In particular, we can observe whether fac-
tors such as risk aversion play a role in participant’ preferences for interpersonal competition.
In addition to the design by Niederle & Vesterlund (2007), we included an extra task
to measure intrapersonal competitive preferences. In Task-5, we observed whether partic-
ipants rather opt for piece-rate or in a ‘winner takes it all’ tournament with themselves.
If they decided to compete, they had to outperform the number of matrices that they
solved correctly in Task-2. We use Task-2 as comparison because students were framed in
a competitive environment and thus more likely to exert a higher effort. If participants
decided not to compete, they performed this Task-5 and were paid with the piece-rate
compensation scheme. Before performing the task, participants were informed about the
beliefs they had about their performance in Task-2. We provided this information to
participants in order to avoid random decisions due to information gaps.
In each of the tasks where participants had to solve matrices, they had a total of three
minutes time to solve up to ten matrices. The difficulty of the matrices remained constant
for all tasks. In contrast to Niederle & Vesterlund (2007), we did not provide participants
with information on their absolute performance after each task to avoid possible differences
in feedback aversion across gender. Instead we use an incentivized question to ask subjects
for their belief on their absolute performance after every task. In addition, at the end of
Task-5 participants were asked to provide their beliefs regarding their relative rank within
their group for Tasks-1 and 2, the average performance of all participants in the session,
and the number of people from the group that decided to compete in Task-3. For each
correct answer, participants received an additional 1,000 Ariary (0.25 Euro).
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Figure 4.2: Example Task
Stage 4: Post-experimental questionnaire
Before starting with the post-experimental questionnaire, one participant per session –
randomly chosen – came to the front to select the activity that will be relevant for payment.
After the activity was selected, students started to fill the questionnaire. At this point
participants did not know their experimental earnings and this information was provided
only when students came to collect their earnings, a week after the experimental session.
In the questionnaire, participants were asked about their socioeconomic situation, if they
have any role models, time and risk preferences and about the education of their parents.
Lastly, we included a set of questions to measure our additional outcome variables: locus of
control, academic self-efficacy and generalized self-efficacy. We explain below the measure-
ment of these outcome variables. The post-experimental questionnaire can be found in the
Appendix.
• Locus of control: To measure this variable, a subset of six statements pairs were
selected from the twenty-nine pairs that comprise the ‘Internal versus External Scale’
from (Rotter, 1966). The selection was done by taking into account students’ context
to enhance comprehension and reduce noise in the answers. In this part of the
questionnaire, each student is provided with pairs of two statements, A and B. The
task of the students is to mark the pair to which statement they agree the most on a
1-4 scale (from “I agree much more with A” to “I agree much more with B”). A and
B-statements present situations where people reflect an external or internal control
of the corresponding outcomes. The final score is calculated according to the total
number of internal control choices the student answered. This means, that the higher
the score, the higher the locus of control beliefs.
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• Academic self-efficacy: Students had to rate their degree of confidence in learning
different subjects, for instance mathematics, biology or a foreign language, by writing
down a number from 1 to 10, where 1 means “Cannot do at all” and 10 means “Highly
certain can do”. This question comprised seven different subjects and to obtain the
measure we sum up the answers in each subject. The measurement of this variable is
similar to the one described by Bandura (2006), with the difference that we do not
take a scale from 1 to 100 but from 1 to 10 to increase comprehension.
• Generalized self-efficacy (GSE): It is calculated by taking the sum of 10 state-
ments where students had to decide whether the statement says something that is
“Not true of myself”, which takes the value of (1), or whether it is “True of myself”
which takes the value of (5). Higher values reflect larger GSE. Examples of the
statements are the following: “I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I
try hard enough”; “I can solve most problems if I invest the necessary effort’; “If I
am in trouble, I can usually think of a solution”. This measure is the Jerusalem &
Schwarzer (1995) scale with two slight modifications. First, we rephrased the scale
in first person, meaning that instead of having the option of “Not true at all”, the
participant read “Not true of myself”. Second, instead of having a 1-4 scale, we used
a 1-5, to add a category in the middle representing “Half true of myself”.
Stage 5: Real job announcement5
After the students finished the questionnaire, the experimenter casually entered the room to
tell the students about a job opportunity. The students could apply for a job as an assistant
or as a coordinator in a research project in Madagascar of one of the principal investigators.
We only gave them the opportunity to apply to one job to mimic a situation where they
have to decide between a more or less competitive environment.6 The experimenter told
the students that the research project works with vanilla farmers in the SAVA region and
that she is looking for assistants and a coordinator to help her with the organization of the
workshops with vanilla farmers. Independent of the treatment group, all students who took
part in the experiment received the exact same information. After the job was announced,
each participant received a paper sheet with more information about the positions. The
information provided include that the job of the assistant consists in helping with the
organization of the workshops and to fill in questionnaires with different farmers, while the
job of the coordinator is to visit the villages and plan workshops in advance with the village
chief. The main difference between the two job offers was that the coordinator position
5We introduced two further treatments in this stage: Public and private sub-treatments to test whether
social norms or social stigma may discourage female students to apply for the jobs. In each session, one
group of students had to express their interest in the job privately and in the other publicly. This was
known by the students before they made the decisions. Different to the private treatment, in the public
treatment the participants in the room knew to which positions other participants have applied to. Due to
power issues, the paper does not focus on these treatments and to report the results we pooled the decisions
taken in the two sub-treatments.
6The job was to take place during the months of October to December 2018 for the experimental sessions
conducted in July, or during the months of May to June 2019 for the experimental sessions conducted in
November. The dates were chosen according to the school calendar.
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had more responsibilities and hence a higher salary (13 percent higher) compared to the
assistant position. In addition, we required that candidates for each position should be
motivated to work in rural areas, be good team members and have good communications
skills.
In this stage, students first had to decide whether they are interested in applying for
a position or not. If they were interested, they had to select which one of the two positions
they are interested in applying to, assistant or coordinator. After students have made their
decisions and gave the corresponding decision sheet to the experimenter, they were told
that to be considered as a potential candidate for any position, they must bring a recent
photograph in one week time. We added this requirement to make the application process
somewhat demanding for the students. Once students received the information they were
told to leave one by one and at the door each of them received a participation fee of 2,000
Ariary from the experimenter. This bonus payment was independent of their experimental
earnings, which was given one week after each session.
Stage 6: Payment and job application
A week after the experiment, we met the students again at each of the schools to distribute
their earnings from the experiment and hand the application forms to interested students.
The use of this type of forms, which provides the same information as a curriculum vitae
(CV), is a standard format that companies in Madagascar and in other developing countries
receive and accept for their hiring process. Hence, we also adopted this standard procedure
for our hiring process.
One of our main outcome variables is the number of complete applications received. To be
considered as a complete application, each student should have filled the form with their
personal information and included a recent photograph. We will thus consider students
who have applied as those who have handed in a complete application form. Participants
were informed about the photo requirement during stage 5 of the experiment, and each of
them received one private call or message with a reminder during the week in between the
experimental session and the earnings distribution. The application is valid for the position
students expressed interest in stage 5.7
4.3.3 Experimental Procedures
We conducted our study in the four biggest public high-schools of the Sambava-Antalaha-
Vohemar-Andapa (SAVA) region in north-eastern Madagascar between July and November
2018 (See Figure 4.3). We selected only public schools because students in those schools are
more likely to face income constraints and thus experience an aspiration failure.8 To conduct
7We chose this procedure since it reduces potential spillover effects in the decision to apply to a position.
8While in private schools fees reach on average 240,000 Ariary (approx. 61.5 Euro) for a complete school
year, in public schools the fees are on average 50,000 Ariary (approx. 12.8 Euro).
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our experimental sessions, we invited students who were in their last year of secondary
education. We consider this group particularly relevant to study as students are at the
point of life to decide what to do after graduation.
To select the participants, we visited the public high-schools several days before the
experiments were taking place and invited students to take part in a workshop. During the
lunch break we registered interested students and gave further information about the venue.
With the students’ information we could allocate each of them in one of the treatment
groups, making sure that we have the same number of females and males in each treatment
(stratified random sampling). However, due to a school strike that started right before we
scheduled our data collection, we could not effectively use this previous allocation in two of
the schools.9 Thus, there are groups of four where we do not have the same number of male
and female participants. To control for this, we included the variable Gender imbalance
group in our analysis, which takes the value of one if the group of four is not balanced and
zero otherwise.
In total, 336 students took part in our 3x2 between-subject experiment. During each
experimental session communication between students was not allowed. The sessions lasted
on average two and a half hours including the post-experimental survey and the job an-
nouncement. On average students earned 7,700 Ariary (2 Euro10) plus a bonus payment
for participation of 2,000 Ariary (0.51 Euro). The potential earnings are similar to the
average wage for a working day in a farm (approx. 3 Euro). Participants had the possibility
to earn money in Stage 3 and additionally in two activities that are not included in the
present study, yet only one was randomly selected for payment. In cases were Stage 3 was
randomly selected for payment, the earnings of only one of the five tasks –chosen randomly–
were paid out.
9In these schools very few participants and more males than females came to the meeting point. We
therefore used the following procedure: We divided the students by gender and told them to make a line.
One by one we sent each student to one of the three rooms (one room for each treatment and control
group), being careful to keep a similar share of female and male participants.
10Exchange rate at the time of the experiments was around 3.900 Ariary equivalent to 1 Euro.
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Figure 4.3: Study Region
4.4. Empirical Strategy
To study the effects of our role model intervention on the decision to apply to one of the
advertised position, we estimate the following model:
Li = α+ δTi + λFi + β(Ti · Fi) +X ′iγ + µs + εi (4.2)
where Li represents one of our two main outcome variables: (1) Complete Application
that takes the values: 0 = Not applied, 1 = Applied to one of the advertised positions,
(2) Coordinator Position that takes the values: 0 = Applied to Assistant Position, 1 =
Applied to Coordinator Position. Ti denotes the treatment variable that takes the values:
0 = Placebo video, 1 = Female Role Model video and 2 = Male Role Model
video. Fi is an indicator variable equal to one when the participant is female and zero if
male. X ′i is a vector of individual characteristics, such as number of brothers, whether their
family cultivates vanilla, the frequency individuals meet outsiders, the frequency they used
their smartphone and their mother’s highest degree. µs are school fixed effects and εi is
the random error. We estimate an ordinary least squares model (OLS) to facilitate the
interpretation of the interactions and calculate robust standard errors.11
11See Gomila (2020) for why using linear regression analysis should be preferred over logistic regression
analysis in experimental studies.
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4.5. Results
In this section we outline the results from our field experiment. Section 5.1 includes
descriptive statistics and randomization checks. In section 5.2 we show participants’ rating
of the role models and in section 5.3 we present the results of the role model intervention
on job applications.
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Randomization Checks
Table 4.1 presents the means and p-values of balance tests for individual variables in the
three treatment groups. There are no significant differences in the proportion of females, the
age of the participants, their chosen focus in secondary school, the economic status, their
job situation, whether their family is involved in the vanilla business, whether they were
raised in the city or in the rural area and the highest degree achieved by the mother. We
find significant differences in the frequency of smartphone usage, the frequency of meeting
people who are not from their school or their family as well as whether there were any
friends in their group of four. To account for these differences, we will control for these
variables in the analysis.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Placebo Woman video Man video p-value
Female 0.400 0.450 0.455 0.655
(0.046) (0.047) (0.048)
Age in years 19.192 18.968 18.884 0.420
(0.180) (0.160) (0.175)
Science focus 0.557 0.577 0.509 0.587
(0.047) (0.047) (0.048)
Number of brothers 2.339 2.180 1.973 0.156
(0.134) (0.149) (0.119)
Economic status 2.652 2.748 2.609 0.429
(0.070) (0.082) (0.078)
Job at present 0.061 0.117 0.109 0.297
(0.022) (0.031) (0.030)
Vanilla family 0.713 0.658 0.700 0.646
(0.042) (0.045) (0.044)
Friends group 0.835 1.090 1.418 0.000
(0.088) (0.102) (0.088)
Frequency meeting outsiders 4.200 4.667 4.600 0.000
(0.097) (0.083) (0.071)
Frequency smartphone usage 2.670 4.135 3.855 0.000
(0.164) (0.137) (0.156)
Raised in city 0.513 0.545 0.545 0.854
(0.047) (0.048) (0.048)
Highest degree mother 1.545 1.640 1.736 0.126
(0.074) (0.052) (0.070)
N 115 111 110
Notes: Column 4 reports the p-value from joint orthogonality test of treatment arms. Mean values are
shown. Standard errors in parentheses. Variable description: Female: 1 if the student is female and 0
otherwise; Age in years: Age of participant calculated from the year participants were born; Science
focus: 1 if the student chose the science focus and 0 if he/she instead chose the language focus; Number
of brothers: Number of brothers (not siblings) participants reported; Economic status: Takes the values
from 1 (poor) to 5 (wealthy) according to the economic situation reported by the student; Job at present :
1 if the participant has a job at the moment of the experiment, 0 otherwise; Vanilla family : 1 if the
participant comes from a family that is in the vanilla business, 0 otherwise; Friends group: Number of
friends the participant reported to be in his/her group of four, takes the values from 1 to 3; Frequency
meeting outsiders: takes values from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates that students never meet outsiders and 5
indicates they meet every day with outsiders; Frequency smartphone usage: takes values from 1 to 5,
where 1 indicates students never have used an smartphone and 5 indicates they use it every day; Raised
in city : 1 if the participant was raised in an urban area, 0 otherwise; Highest degree mother : 0=no
education, 1=primary education, 2=secondary education, 3=university degree.
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4.5.2 Role Model Assessment
After the video screening, we asked the students about their perceptions on the video and
the main character(s).12 Table 4.2 shows the means and the two-sided t-tests p-values from
the answers reported by female and male participants to five questions. Each question
could be answered with the following scale: strongly disagree (1), disagree (2), neither agree
nor disagree (3), agree (4), strongly agree (5).
Both female and male participants agree quite strongly that the main characters in the
Female Role Model video and in the Male Role Model video are not afraid of taking
risks. The ratings are significantly different compared to the ratings of participants who
watched the Placebo video. Further, we find that females and males identify with the role
models. However, male students report to equally identify with the Female Role Model
and the Male Role Model, while female students identify much more with the Female
Role Model. Participants also agree quite strongly to the question whether they like the
characters. Females and males significantly like the Female Role Model character more
compared to the Placebo. Interestingly, females in the Female Role Model treatment
report to be quite certain to be as successful as the main character (4.3 out of 5), whereas
in the Male Role Model treatment females report lower scores (3.96 out of 5; p-value =
0.099).
The analysis shows that the selection of role models in terms of their similarity to fe-
male participants has been successful, as females identify with the main character of the
Female Role Model video and even with the main character of the Male Role Model
video. However, we find that the character’s success is not rated significantly different across
females in the different treatment groups. This can be explained by the fact that both role
model characters were also the main characters of the Placebo video and their profession
was mentioned. This implies that a potential treatment effect could be underestimated. Yet,
both female and male students in the two treatment video groups agree more strongly to
the question whether they have been motivated by the video compared to female and male
students in the Placebo group (two-sided t-test p-values≤0.026), such that the characters
may serve as role models in showing how they achieved a goal.
12One limitation of our study design is that we have both characters of the Female Role Model and
the Male Role Model video in the Placebo video. The ratings of the Placebo video thus refer to
both characters.
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Table 4.2: Rating of the Role Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)






Panel A - Female participants
Character is not afraid of risks 3.935 4.740 4.740 0.000 0.000 1.000
(0.160) (0.069) (0.063)
Character is successful 4.457 4.640 4.620 0.207 0.241 0.886
(0.102) (0.102) (0.094)
Participant likes character 4.326 4.700 4.520 0.002 0.142 0.101
(0.099) (0.065) (0.087)
Identifies with character 3.565 4.700 4.280 0.000 0.002 0.005
(0.186) (0.077) (0.125)
Can be as successful as character 4.283 4.260 3.960 0.893 0.065 0.099
(0.111) (0.124) (0.131)
N 46 50 50
Panel B - Male participants
Character is not afraid of risks 4.101 4.787 4.700 0.000 0.000 0.277
(0.124) (0.053) (0.060)
Character is successful 4.377 4.574 4.467 0.141 0.492 0.400
(0.095) (0.092) (0.087)
Participant likes character 4.333 4.754 4.467 0.000 0.241 0.005
(0.076) (0.056) (0.084)
Identifies with character 3.913 4.426 4.433 0.001 0.001 0.958
(0.113) (0.098) (0.093)
Can be as successful as character 4.188 4.377 4.100 0.152 0.539 0.062
(0.091) (0.094) (0.113)
N 69 61 60
4.5.3 Treatment Effects on Applications
In total we received complete applications from more than half of the participants (186
out of 336 students). In the Female Role Model group 63 percent of the students
applied, while in the Placebo group 48 percent completed an application. A two-sample
Fisher’s exact test reveals that the difference is significant at the five percent level (p-value
= 0.023). In the Male Role Model group 55 percent of the students applied, which
is not significantly different from the Placebo group (A two-sample Fisher’s exact test
p-value = 0.287). Using a two-sided Fisher’s exact test we find no gender differences in
each of the treatments for the outcome Complete Application (all test p-values ≥ 0.846).
Figure 4.4 displays the percentage of applications for the assistant and figure 4.4 for
the coordinator position by gender in each treatment group (shares conditional on all
participants who applied). The highest percentage of applications for the assistant position
among both female and male students can be found in the Female Role Model group.
44 percent of the females applied in the Female Role Model group compared to 28
percent in the Placebo group (two-sample Fisher’s exact test p-value = 0.139). In the
Female Role Model treatment 31 percent of the males applied to the assistant position,
whereas only 16 percent of the male students applied in the Placebo group. The difference
is significant at the ten percent level (two-sample Fisher’s exact test p-value = 0.060). For
the coordinator position we find that the proportion of applications by female students
is highest in the Male Role Model video. 28 percent of the females applied in this
treatment, compared to 17 percent in the Placebo and 18 percent in the Female Role
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Model group. Yet, female applications are not significantly different across treatment
groups (all Fisher’s exact tests p-values ≥ 236). Applications to the coordinator position
among males are equally high in each of the treatments: 33 percent of the males applied
in the Placebo and in the Female Role Model group, and 30 percent in the Male
Role Model group (all Fisher’s exact tests p-values ≥ 845). We find a gender difference
in the proportion of applicants for the coordinator position in the Placebo and in the
Female Role Model (two-sided Fisher’s exact test p-values = 0.085 & 0.087), but not
in the Male Role Model group (two-sided Fisher’s exact test p-value = 0.836).
Figure 4.4: Applications to Assistant and Coordinator Position by Gender
In the following we use regression analysis to control for the effects of subject het-
erogeneity. In table 4.3 column 1 we regress Completed Application on the treatments
and include school fixed effects. The model in column 2 contains further controls. The
above results remain: The Female Role Model video treatment has a positive effect on
participants’ decision to apply to one of the jobs, while the Male Role Model video
has no effect. Also, as can be seen from column 3, we find no gender difference in the
propensity to apply to the positions. We find a significant difference in the probability
of females to apply in the Female Role Model video group compared to females in
the Placebo group. We also find that male students are more likely to apply for one of
the positions in the Female Role Model treatment compared to male students in the
Placebo group. Thus, our results provide evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1 for the
Female Role Model treatment and lack evidence for the Male Role Model treatment.
Columns 4 to 6 in table 4.3 include the results on the outcome Coordinator Position.
Controlling for further covariates in column 5, we find that there is no average treatment
effect of the Female Role Model or Male Role Model video on the choice of position.
However, we find that female participants are less likely to apply to the coordinator position
than males in the Placebo condition. In the model in column 6, we find that there is no
gender difference in applications to the coordinator position in the Male Role Model
video treatment. Our results suggest that this is driven by an increase in females applying
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to the competitive position compared to the Placebo. Further, compared to the Placebo
condition, we find that the treatments do not have an effect on males’ decision to apply to
the coordinator position. Our results thus do not provide evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2.
In column 6 we again include an interaction term to assess whether the treatment had
differential effects on female and male students. We find that the gender gap, which is found
in the Placebo group, is not prevalent in the Male Role Model but in the Female
Role Model treatment group. Thus, we do not find support in favor of Hypothesis 3.
In summary, we find that the Female Role Model was successful in encouraging
female as well as male students to apply for one of the advertised positions. In addition, we
find that the Male Role Model almost closes the gender gap in the coordinator position
that is present in the Placebo group, whereas it still exists in the Female Role Model
treatment. These results indicate that only a Male Role Model encourages applications
among females to more competitive jobs. These results hold if we instead estimate a probit
model and after controlling for multiple hypothesis testing (See Table 4.10 and 4.11 in the
Appendix).
Table 4.3: Treatment Effects on Applications
Complete application Coordinator position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Woman video 0.155∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗ -0.149∗ -0.102 -0.108
(0.065) (0.068) (0.085) (0.089) (0.102) (0.126)
Man video 0.077 0.096 0.086 -0.021 0.047 -0.087
(0.064) (0.070) (0.086) (0.095) (0.107) (0.130)
Female 0.068 0.036 -0.240∗∗∗ -0.363∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.100) (0.082) (0.139)
Woman video × Female 0.075 0.043
(0.132) (0.182)
Man video × Female 0.025 0.327∗
(0.134) (0.198)
Constant 0.630∗∗∗ -0.380 -0.392 0.490∗∗∗ 1.223∗∗ 1.160∗∗
(0.057) (0.437) (0.438) (0.079) (0.595) (0.578)
Observations 336 336 336 186 186 186
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Control variables:
Age in years: Age of participant calculated from the year participants were born; Science focus: 1 if the
student chose the science focus and 0 if he/she instead chose the language focus; Number of brothers:
Number of brothers (not siblings) participants reported; Economic status: Takes the values from 1
(poor) to 5 (wealthy) according to the economic situation reported by the student; Job at present : 1
if the participant has a job at the moment of the experiment, 0 otherwise; Vanilla family : 1 if the
participant comes from a family that is in the vanilla business, 0 otherwise; Friends group: Number of
friends the participant reported to be in his/her group of four, takes the values from 1 to 3; Frequency
meeting outsiders: takes values from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates that students never meet outsiders and 5
indicates they meet every day with outsiders; Frequency smartphone usage: takes values from 1 to 5,
where 1 indicates students never have used an smartphone and 5 indicates they use it every day; Gender
imbalance group: 1 if there is an uneven number of female and males in the group of four, 0 if there




In this chapter we perform an exploratory analysis to assess whether the treatment effects
can be explained by changes in the measures obtained from the lab experiment. As a first
step we report descriptive statistics on the variables that we obtained in the lab-in-the-field
experiment for the Placebo group. We then analyze whether our role model intervention
affects behavior in the lab, before we control for the lab measures in our main outcome
regression.
4.6.1 Descriptive Statistics of Mechanism Variables
Table 4.4 shows the descriptive statistics for each of our mechanism variables in the Placebo
group. On average students solve 4.42 mazes in task 1 and 5.69 in task 2. Only about a
third of the students (31 percent) chose tournament pay in task 3 and 24 percent chose
intra-competition in task 5. Concerning our aspiration measures, we find that our sample
includes observations with very high levels of income and asset aspirations, as can be seen
from the maximum levels reported and the difference in the mean and median. The median
aspired income is 2,000,000 Ariary (about 464 Euro) and the median aspired level of assets
is 150,000,000 Ariary (about 34,780 Euro). Given that the minimum wage per month in
Madagascar is of about 34 Euro (“Caisse Nationale de Prévoyance Sociale Madagascar”,
2015), students’ aspire quite high. Also student’s education and social status aspirations
are high with students on average aspiring to achieve 19.43 years of schooling and a social
status of 9.16. We also test for differences in aspirations across gender reported in table 4.9
in the Appendix, but find that there are no significant differences. Further, students in
the Placebo group on average report a general self-efficacy score of 36.47 (out of 55) and
an academic self-efficacy score of 41.08, which is quite low given that the highest score is
70. Lastly, students in the Placebo group on average report to have 3.92 locus of control
beliefs (out of 6).
Table 4.4: Mechanism Variables in the Placebo Group
Mean Median SD Min Max N
Performance task 1 4.42 5.00 1.65 0.00 8.00 115.00
Performance task 2 5.69 6.00 1.68 0.00 9.00 115.00
Compete in task 3 0.31 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 115.00
Compete in task 5 0.24 0.00 0.43 0.00 1.00 115.00
Income goal (in 1000 Ariary) 966,752.57 2,000.00 9,353,898.46 10.00 100,000,000.00 115.00
Asset goal (in 1000 Ariary) 3,292,051.96 150,000.00 15,604,268.64 25.00 100,000,000.00 115.00
Education goal 19.43 22.00 2.80 12.50 22.00 115.00
Social status goal 9.16 8.00 11.00 1.00 100.00 115.00
Locus of control 3.92 4.00 0.99 0.00 6.00 115.00
General self-efficacy 36.47 37.00 6.38 21.00 48.00 115.00
Academic self-efficacy 41.08 40.97 9.29 11.00 61.00 115.00
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4.6.2 Treatment Effects on Mechanism Variables
In table 4.5 we present the results of estimating ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions on
performance and competitive preferences. First, we assess whether the treatments have an
effect on performance in the real-effort task as it might influence the decision to compete.
In Columns 1 to 4 we regress the number of correctly solved mazes in task 1 and task 2 on
the treatment variable, gender, an interaction of treatment and gender, school fixed effects
and further controls specified in the table notes. We find that female students perform
better in task 1 and task 2 compared to males in all but one case (performance in task 1 in
the Male Role Model video treatment). Female students on average solve 4.8 mazes
out of 10 in the Placebo group, 5.7 mazes in the Female Role Model group and 6.5 in
the Male Role Model group. Overall, we find that the Female Role Model and the
Male Role Model video have a positive effect on female and male students’ task 1 and
task 2 performance. If we look at the performance increases in the two treatment groups
compared to the Placebo, we find that especially the Male Role Model drove effort
provision, not only among male, but also among female students. Females in the Male
Role Model group solve 1.6 (1.8) mazes more in task 1 (task 2) compared to females in
the Placebo group, whereas males in the Male Role Model group solve 1.8 (1.9) more
mazes correctly in task 1 (task 2) compared to males in the Placebo condition.
In a next step we assess the effects the role model videos on students’ decision to en-
ter into competition with other students in their group of four people. We find that only 17
percent of the female students in the Placebo group chose tournament pay, 24 percent
in the Female Role Model video and 28 percent in the Male Role Model video
treatment. We employ OLS regressions to control for differences in performance in the
previous tasks and other covariates that could potentially effect the decision to compete.
The estimations are shown in table 4.5 in columns 5 and 6. The dependent variable takes
on the value of 1 if the student chose tournament compensation or 0 if he or she decided
for piece rate.
Our results show that female students in the Placebo condition are 26 percentage points
less likely to enter into competition compared to male students. However, we find no gender
difference in the choice to compete in the two treatment groups. This can be explained by a
decrease in the propensity of male students to enter into competition in the two treatment
groups compared to the Placebo condition. Only 25 percent of the male students decide
for tournament compensation in the Female Role Model video group and 28 percent
in the Male Role Model group compared to 41 percent in the Placebo condition.
Compared to Meier et al. (2020), we used a placebo video that we also produced in Mada-
gascar and that showed the same characters and surroundings as the treatment videos.
In retrospective we assumed that this placebo video was neutral, but our results suggest
that it could have encouraged competitive behavior due to the mentioning of decreasing
land availability in the rural areas and that many young people search for income in the cities.
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Next, we analyze whether the role model intervention has an effect on the propensity
of students to enter into intra-competition with their past performance in task 2. The
results can also be found in table 4.5 in columns 7 and 8. Compared to inter-competition
we find no gender differences in the Placebo group. Also, we find that there are no
treatment effects on the propensity to enter into intra-competition among female and male
students. On average 22 percent of the females in the Placebo group competed against
their own past performance, 36 percent in the Female Role Model and 38 percent in
the Male Role Model treatment. For the male sample we find that 26 percent chose
intra-competition in the Placebo group, 25 percent in the Female Role Model and 52
percent in the Male Role Model treatment.
The results of the OLS regressions on the aspiration index, locus of control and self-
efficacy beliefs are reported in table 4.6. In columns 1 and 2 we regress the aspiration index
on the treatmment variable, gender, an interaction of treatment and gender, school fixed
effects, the current index and further individual level controls.13 We find that the female
students in the Female Role Model video treatment report an aspiration index that 20
percent of a standard deviation higher compared to females in the Placebo group. The
Male Role Model also has a positive effect on females’ aspiration index. Treated female
students have a 21 percent of a standard deviation higher index compared to females in the
Placebo group. We find that the treatments have no effects on males.
In columns 3 and 4 we regress the same controls on the outcome Locus of control (except
for the current index). We find no treatment effect for each of the role model treatments.
While our role model treatments did not increase General self-efficacy beliefs (columns
5 and 6), we find that the Female Role Model video has a positive effect on females’
Academic self-efficacy beliefs(columns 7 and 8). Treated female students report a 3.85
higher score compared to females in the Placebo condition.
13For the analysis on aspirations we drop observations that have extreme high aspiration index values
by trimming the sample to the 95 percentile, which results in 17 observations less compared to the whole
sample. We find no treatment effects without dropping the outliers.
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Table 4.5: Treatment Effects on Performance and Competitive Preferences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Perf. 1 Perf. 1 Perf. 2 Perf. 2 Compete 3 Compete 3 Compete 5 Compete 5
Woman video 0.965∗∗∗ 0.827∗∗∗ 1.219∗∗∗ 0.980∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ -0.027 -0.039
(0.283) (0.306) (0.279) (0.282) (0.075) (0.074) (0.072) (0.081)
Man video 1.977∗∗∗ 1.881∗∗∗ 2.204∗∗∗ 2.014∗∗∗ -0.129 -0.234∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.171
(0.285) (0.301) (0.308) (0.271) (0.086) (0.089) (0.087) (0.104)
Female 0.635∗∗ 0.546∗ 0.554∗ 0.471∗ -0.208∗∗∗ -0.260∗∗∗ -0.025 -0.044
(0.291) (0.305) (0.295) (0.272) (0.079) (0.074) (0.080) (0.078)
Woman video × Female -0.168 -0.060 0.400 0.177 0.230∗∗ 0.215∗∗ 0.162 0.154
(0.396) (0.407) (0.376) (0.345) (0.107) (0.102) (0.113) (0.112)
Man video × Female -0.300 -0.317 -0.175 -0.320 0.235∗∗ 0.220∗∗ -0.085 -0.094
(0.425) (0.431) (0.437) (0.365) (0.117) (0.107) (0.125) (0.123)
Constant 4.037∗∗∗ 5.135∗∗∗ 5.661∗∗∗ 7.519∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.990∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.249
(0.246) (1.445) (0.240) (1.136) (0.067) (0.395) (0.065) (0.387)
Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336
R2 0.281 0.325 0.304 0.524 0.127 0.280 0.109 0.191
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Control variables: Age in years: Age of participant
calculated from the year participants were born; Science focus: 1 if the student chose the science focus and 0 if he/she instead chose the
language focus; Number of brothers: Number of brothers (not siblings) participants reported; Economic status: Takes the values from 1 (poor)
to 5 (wealthy) according to the economic situation reported by the student; Vanilla family : 1 if the participant comes from a family that is in
the vanilla business, 0 otherwise; Friends group: Number of friends the participant reported to be in his/her group of four, takes the values
from 1 to 3; Frequency meeting outsiders: takes values from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates that students never meet outsiders and 5 indicates
they meet every day with outsiders; Frequency smartphone usage: takes values from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates students never have used an
smartphone and 5 indicates they use it every day; Gender imbalance group: 1 if there is an uneven number of female and males in the group
of four, 0 if there is a balance. Column 4 further includes Performance difference 2-1 : the difference in performance between task 1 and task
2; column 6 additional controls for Belief rank 2 : Participant’s belief in his rank (1=highest, 4=lowest) in the group and column 8 instead of
Belief rank 2 controls for Belief performance task 2.
Table 4.6: Treatment Effects on Aspirations and Beliefs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Asp. index Asp. index Locus of c. Locus of c. General SE General SE Academic SE Academic SE
Woman video 0.044 0.016 -0.104 -0.067 0.662 0.270 4.061∗∗ 2.528
(0.078) (0.081) (0.169) (0.192) (1.032) (1.120) (1.657) (1.722)
Man video 0.072 0.073 -0.091 -0.039 1.309 1.197 1.897 0.868
(0.070) (0.073) (0.172) (0.187) (0.918) (1.004) (1.824) (1.836)
Female -0.092 -0.086 -0.220 -0.218 -1.540 -1.602 -2.719 -2.654
(0.073) (0.074) (0.188) (0.181) (1.249) (1.295) (1.720) (1.797)
Woman video × Female 0.205∗ 0.186∗ 0.437∗ 0.354 1.256 1.493 0.423 1.319
(0.110) (0.110) (0.264) (0.264) (1.703) (1.747) (2.568) (2.603)
Man video × Female 0.200 0.155 0.202 0.145 1.863 1.823 1.410 1.402
(0.124) (0.121) (0.240) (0.243) (1.558) (1.635) (2.734) (2.844)
Constant -0.051 0.113 3.898∗∗∗ 5.247∗∗∗ 36.949∗∗∗ 33.043∗∗∗ 43.091∗∗∗ 32.869∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.392) (0.136) (0.942) (0.747) (5.028) (1.342) (9.107)
Observations 319 319 336 336 336 336 336 336
R2 0.117 0.194 0.031 0.048 0.062 0.087 0.048 0.092
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Control variables: Age in years: Age of participant calculated from the year
participants were born; Science focus: 1 if the student chose the science focus and 0 if he/she instead chose the language focus; Economic status: Takes the values
from 1 (poor) to 5 (wealthy) according to the economic situation reported by the student; Job at present : 1 if the participant has a job at the moment of the
experiment, 0 otherwise; Vanilla family : 1 if the participant comes from a family that is in the vanilla business, 0 otherwise; Friends group: Number of friends the
participant reported to be in his/her group of four, takes the values from 1 to 3; Frequency meeting outsiders: takes values from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates that
students never meet outsiders and 5 indicates they meet every day with outsiders; Frequency smartphone usage: takes values from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates
students never have used an smartphone and 5 indicates they use it every day; Gender imbalance group: 1 if there is an uneven number of female and males in the
group of four, 0 if there is a balance; Highest degree mother : 0=no education, 1=primary education, 2=secondary education, 3=university degree, Current index.
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4.6.3 Can the Mechanism Variables Explain Behavior in the Field Ex-
periment?
The above analysis revealed that the treatment videos have an effect on some of our mecha-
nism variables. In the following section we include these variables into our main outcome
regressions to assess whether any of these variables can explain the treatment effects on
completed applications and the choice of position. In table 4.7 we present the results of
the OLS estimation for our outcome Complete Application controlling for performance in
task 1 and in task 2, decision to compete in task 3, the aspiration and current index, and
academic self-efficacy beliefs. Controlling for the mechanism variables we find that the
significance level of the Female Role Model treatment effect reduces to the 10 percent
level when we control for the aspiration and current index (columns 4 and 6). Further, we
find that the current index is significantly and positively related to the outcome variable
(yet very small in magnitude).
Table 4.8 presents the results for the outcome Coordinator Position including the same
mechanism variables as above. We find that by controlling for the variables, except for
performance in task 1, the interaction Man video x Female becomes insignificant. Further,
we find that the decision to compete is significantly and positively related to the decision to
apply to the coordinator position. The results remain if all mechanism variables are included
into one model (column 6). This suggests that the willingness to enter into competition
can partly explain the decision to apply to the more competitive job. All other variables do
not correlate with the outcome variable.
Table 4.7: Relation of Mechanism Variables to Complete Application
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Commplete application Complete application Complete application Complete application Complete application Complete application
Woman video 0.182∗∗ 0.189∗∗ 0.171∗∗ 0.149∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.164∗
(0.085) (0.086) (0.087) (0.086) (0.085) (0.091)
Man video 0.105 0.115 0.084 0.072 0.087 0.093
(0.092) (0.090) (0.087) (0.091) (0.086) (0.098)
Female 0.042 0.043 0.033 0.032 0.033 0.034
(0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.103)
Woman video × Female 0.074 0.080 0.077 0.096 0.076 0.099
(0.132) (0.132) (0.134) (0.133) (0.132) (0.137)
Man video × Female 0.022 0.021 0.028 0.030 0.027 0.029
(0.134) (0.134) (0.135) (0.139) (0.135) (0.141)
Perf. 1 -0.010 -0.002
(0.017) (0.022)
Perf. 2 -0.014 -0.007
(0.017) (0.021)
Compete 3 -0.013 0.007
(0.064) (0.070)
Asp. index 0.082 0.087
(0.064) (0.065)
Current index 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Academic SE -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Constant -0.329 -0.246 -0.378 -0.406 -0.356 -0.278
(0.448) (0.476) (0.440) (0.440) (0.452) (0.495)
Observations 336 336 336 319 336 319
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Control variables: Age in years: Age of participant calculated from the year participants were born; Science focus:
1 if the student chose the science focus and 0 if he/she instead chose the language focus; Number of brothers: Number of brothers (not siblings) participants reported; Economic status: Takes the values
from 1 (poor) to 5 (wealthy) according to the economic situation reported by the student; Job at present : 1 if the participant has a job at the moment of the experiment, 0 otherwise; Vanilla family : 1
if the participant comes from a family that is in the vanilla business, 0 otherwise; Friends group: Number of friends the participant reported to be in his/her group of four, takes the values from 1 to 3;
Frequency meeting outsiders: takes values from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates that students never meet outsiders and 5 indicates they meet every day with outsiders; Frequency smartphone usage: takes
values from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates students never have used an smartphone and 5 indicates they use it every day; Gender imbalance group: 1 if there is an uneven number of female and males in the
group of four, 0 if there is a balance; Highest degree mother : 0=no education, 1=primary education, 2=secondary education, 3=university degree.
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Table 4.8: Relation of Mechanism Variables to Applications to the Coordinator Position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coordinator position Coordinator position Coordinator position Coordinator position Coordinator position Coordinator position
Woman video -0.107 -0.113 -0.061 -0.114 -0.115 -0.062
(0.127) (0.127) (0.127) (0.129) (0.125) (0.133)
Man video -0.082 -0.104 -0.051 -0.113 -0.090 -0.059
(0.134) (0.138) (0.131) (0.134) (0.129) (0.143)
Female -0.364∗∗∗ -0.363∗∗ -0.331∗∗ -0.338∗∗ -0.354∗∗ -0.290∗∗
(0.138) (0.141) (0.140) (0.142) (0.142) (0.147)
Woman video × Female 0.048 0.029 -0.012 0.007 0.031 -0.064
(0.182) (0.183) (0.179) (0.191) (0.186) (0.193)
Man video × Female 0.333∗ 0.325 0.268 0.326 0.318 0.256
(0.196) (0.199) (0.200) (0.206) (0.200) (0.208)
Perf. 1 -0.005 -0.005
(0.025) (0.034)
Perf. 2 0.012 -0.007
(0.026) (0.036)
Compete 3 0.186∗∗ 0.213∗∗
(0.085) (0.091)
Asp. index 0.030 0.042
(0.094) (0.091)
Current index 0.002 0.004
(0.003) (0.004)
Academic SE 0.002 0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
Constant 1.197∗ 1.024 1.107∗∗ 1.262∗∗ 1.067∗ 1.175∗
(0.618) (0.646) (0.558) (0.592) (0.605) (0.640)
Observations 186 186 186 180 186 180
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Control variables: Age in years: Age of participant calculated from the year participants were born; Science
focus: 1 if the student chose the science focus and 0 if he/she instead chose the language focus; Number of brothers: Number of brothers (not siblings) participants reported; Economic status:
Takes the values from 1 (poor) to 5 (wealthy) according to the economic situation reported by the student; Job at present : 1 if the participant has a job at the moment of the experiment, 0
otherwise; Vanilla family : 1 if the participant comes from a family that is in the vanilla business, 0 otherwise; Friends group: Number of friends the participant reported to be in his/her group of
four, takes the values from 1 to 3; Frequency meeting outsiders: takes values from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates that students never meet outsiders and 5 indicates they meet every day with outsiders;
Frequency smartphone usage: takes values from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates students never have used an smartphone and 5 indicates they use it every day; Gender imbalance group: 1 if there is an
uneven number of female and males in the group of four, 0 if there is a balance; Highest degree mother : 0=no education, 1=primary education, 2=secondary education, 3=university degree.
4.7. Discussion
Our research finds that providing information of a role model through a video has a positive
impact on their willingness to apply for the jobs we advertised (assistant and coordinator).
In particular, Female Role Model increases applications to one of the two positions
offered; while the Male Role Model increases the chances that female students apply to
the coordinator position compared to the Placebo condition. The proportion of females
applying to the coordinator position increases by 10 percentage points in the Male Role
Model video compared to the Female Role Model and Placebo group. As a conse-
quence, the gender-gap in applications to the coordinator position that is present in the
Placebo group shrinks.
Our exploratory analysis suggests that the mechanism could run through competitive
preferences, as we find that the decision to apply to the coordinator position is positively
correlated with the decision to enter into competition in Task-3 and the treatment effect of
the Male Role Model disappears. This suggests that our Male Role Model is more
successful in encouraging competitive behavior which translates into real world decisions
such as applying for more competitive and better paid jobs. The literature studying the
effects of role models on social behavior has been suggesting that same-sex interactions
are successful (Stout et al., 2011; Beaman et al., 2012; Meier et al., 2020). However, the
results of our study suggest that it is important to consider the traits that the different
genders represent. In general, males are perceived to be more competitive than females
(Blau & Kahn, 2017). Hence, one way to explain our results is, that videos with a male
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character could nudge females towards more competitive behavior since males could appear
more competitive compared to females. Compared to previous studies, which find that
this competitive image of males discourages females to enter into competition, our role
models come from similar backgrounds and have goals that are attainable for them as well.
One could also argue that females’ decision to apply for a competitive job after seeing a
Male Role Model, could be driven by a ‘defiance’ response of females to stop replicating
stereotypes that are embedded in social norms (Schier, 2020). Interestingly the Male Role
Model did not encourage competitive behavior among male participants. A potential
reason why males did not react to the Male Role Model compared to the Placebo
could lie in the content of the Placebo video. Future research could use different Placebo
videos as well as different characters to test this conjecture.
Our results also show that exposing individuals to role models, that talk about aspi-
rations and the way to achieve them, is effective in driving students to apply without the
need to make competition salient as done in other studies (Meier et al., 2020). We can
also rule out that our observed treatment effects are driven by demand effects, since our
videos do not refer to the labor market or gave information about the announced positions.
Further, the experimenter advertised the positions at the end of the session in a casual
way and provided the same information to all groups without raising hopes about future
outcomes.
We also find treatment effects on aspirations. Female students in the Female Role
Model and the Male Role Model video report higher aspirations compared to females
in the Placebo group. Yet, important to consider is also the effect of unsuccessful appli-
cations on the level of aspirations and beliefs (McKelway, 2020). Unfortunately, we were
not able to hire any of the applicants due to low communication skills.14 If aspirations are
not realized this can lead to frustration and to a decrease in investments (Genicot & Ray,
2017). A possible remedy could be to increase exposure to successful experiences of others
(role models) or to decrease the barriers of attaining a job.
Our paper does not address other potential mechanisms that could play a role in de-
termining females’ willingness to participate in the labor market such as discrimination
or stereotype threats, which could have been affected by the video. Also, we have not
collected information on the ability of the students at school (such as the grade point
14After receiving the job applications we went through the screening process. We checked each application
taking into account the following points: 1) Check names in database to make sure applicants participated
in the sessions; 2) Check for the position applied; 3) Check the English and French level reported. At least
one has to be rated as “good”. After the screening, we selected 33 candidates for the personal interviews.
Since we collected all personal information of candidates it was possible to reach all of them after the
sessions. The interviews took place in November 2018 and July 2019 in each of the different cities the
experiments took place. Unfortunately, none of the candidates we interviewed was eligible for the assistant
or coordinator positions as they were very shy towards the researcher and translator and hence it was
difficult to communicate with them. Thus, even though they had the formal requirements they lacked the
confidence that probably develops through previous work experiences.
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average (GPA)). Thus, we cannot tell which one of the females applied more to one of the
positions in terms of their ability which is also important to consider when exposed to
competitive environments.
4.8. Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the effect of a role model intervention on female’s as well as male’s
decision to participate in the labor market. We implemented a field and lab-in-the-field
experiment with secondary school students in Madagascar in which we either screened a
Female Role Model, a Male Role Model or a Placebo video to the students. The
female and the male video told the story of two individuals who succeeded in becoming a
teacher at a University, while the placebo video was about life in rural and urban Mada-
gascar. After video exposure we measured competitive preferences using a lab-in-the-field
experiment adapted from Niederle & Vesterlund (2007) and obtained students’ aspirations
and beliefs through survey questions. At the end of the session, we offered students the
opportunity to apply for two jobs in our research team. They could either apply to be an
assistant or a coordinator. The coordinator involves task with more responsibility and thus
has a higher compensation.
We find that the Female Role Model video, compared to the Placebo, has a positive
effect on the decision to apply to any of the two positions for both female and male students.
There is a gender gap in applications to the coordinator position in the Placebo group.
However, the gap almost disappears in the Male Role Model video treatment group as
almost an equal share of females and males apply to the coordinator position. Our results
suggest that is driven by more females applying to the more competitive position compared
to the Placebo. We use the measures obtained in the lab-in-the-field experiment and
the post-experimental survey to analyze possible mechanism and find that the decision to
apply to any of the two positions can partly be explained by participant’s aspirations and
current level of achievements. Further, we find that the decision to enter into competition
in the lab can explain the decision to apply for the coordinator position in the Male Role
Model treatment group.
Hence, our study provides evidence that for role models to be successful, they do not
have to be of the same sex, but suggest that the character’s traits matter. Further, the
novelty of our study lies in relating the decisions from the lab experiment with the decisions
students took in the field experiment. Therefore, unlike other studies that assume a link
between competitive preferences and labor market outcomes, we are able to show that
competitive preferences can explain the decision to apply for the coordinator position in
the Male Role Model treatment.
It is likely that the results obtained in Madagascar can be similar to other contexts,
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in which female students experience a behavioral poverty trap. Our study shows that video
interventions about successful individuals provide a low-cost alternative in contexts where
there is a lack of role models that are similar and geographically close. Other examples of
policy measures that could be implemented are to increase the share of female role models
through affirmative action such as quotas (Beaman et al., 2012; Niederle et al., 2013; Ibañez
& Riener, 2018). These measures should go hand in hand with lifting external constraints
such as discrimination and barriers to tertiary enrollment.
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4.9. Appendix A – Tables
Table 4.9: Aspirations in the Placebo Group by Gender
(1) (2) (3)
Male Female p-value
Education 19.196 19.135 0.911
(0.349) (0.408)
Income 23685.652 11196.563 0.457
(13566.069) (4675.124)
Status 9.304 9.063 0.907
(1.055) (1.966)
Assets 687011.123 431542.188 0.353
(177387.262) (207055.172)
N 69 48
Notes: Column 3 reports the p-value from joint orthogonality test of treatment
arms. Standard errors in parentheses. Comparisons of income and asset goals
are based on a 95% reduced sample.
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Table 4.10: Treatment Effects on Applications: Probit Model
Complete application Coordinator position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Woman video 0.155∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗ -0.149∗ -0.107 -0.105
(0.063) (0.065) (0.084) (0.088) (0.096) (0.116)
Man video 0.077 0.096 0.090 -0.021 0.041 -0.092
(0.063) (0.067) (0.083) (0.093) (0.095) (0.117)
Female 0.064 0.065 -0.242∗∗∗ -0.240∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.055) (0.076) (0.074)
Woman video × Female 0.059 0.033
(0.121) (0.161)
Man video × Female 0.015 0.321∗
(0.126) (0.177)
Observations 336 336 336 186 186 186
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficient present marginal effects evaluated at a man.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Control variables: Age in years: Age of participant calculated
from the year participants were born; Science focus: 1 if the student chose the science focus and 0
if he/she instead chose the language focus; Number of brothers: Number of brothers (not siblings)
participants reported; Economic status: Takes the values from 1 (poor) to 5 (wealthy) according to
the economic situation reported by the student; Job at present : 1 if the participant has a job at the
moment of the experiment, 0 otherwise; Vanilla family : 1 if the participant comes from a family that
is in the vanilla business, 0 otherwise; Friends group: Number of friends the participant reported to
be in his/her group of four, takes the values from 1 to 3; Frequency meeting outsiders: takes values
from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates that students never meet outsiders and 5 indicates they meet everyday
with outsiders; Frequency smartphone usage: takes values from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates students
never have used an smartphone and 5 indicates they use it everyday; Gender imbalance group: 1 if
there is an uneven number of female and males in the group of four, 0 if there is a balance; Highest
degree mother : 0=no education, 1=primary education, 2=secondary education, 3=university degree.
Table 4.11: Multiple Hypothesis Testing
Outcome variable Treatment Subgroup Difference p-value not adjusted p-value adjusted (B-H)
Complete Application Female Video vs. Control Female 0.248 0.020 0.070
Complete Application Male Video vs. Control Female 0.111 0.308 0.451
Complete Application Female Video vs. Control Male 0.173 0.041 0.096
Complete Application Male Video vs. Control Male 0.086 0.322 0.451
Coordinator Position Female Video vs. Control Female -0.065 0.659 0.769
Coordinator Position Female Video Female vs. Male -0.320 0.010 0.070
Coordinator Position Male Video Female vs. Male -0.036 0.799 0.799
Notes: For the multiple hypothesis testing we use the Benjamini–Hochberg method as it has been shown to be less conservative,
especially with low power samples, than the Bonferroni correction.
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4.10. Appendix B – Experimental Instructions and Survey
4.10.1 General Instructions
Dear participant, welcome to our workshop!
We are part of a research group called Diversity Turn. This is a project from the University
of Göttingen. The objective of our project is to study vanilla production and the decisions
students make under different incentive schemes in the SAVA region.
What are you doing today?
Today you will be participating in a workshop in which you will have the opportunity to
earn money. Just for your participation you will receive a bonus of 2,000 Ariary at the
end of the workshop. In addition, you can increase that amount by earning money in the
different activities of the workshop. The amount of money that you earn will depend on
your decisions and the decisions taken by people from other communities in the SAVA region.
To calculate your earnings, we first need to finish the workshops in the other communities.
Therefore, we will pay you in the next week once we have finished the workshops in the region.
This workshop has two parts. The first part will last approximately 1 hour and con-
sist of four different activities. Thereafter, there will be a survey. Once you have finished
both parts you will receive the 2,000 Ariary as a bonus of your participation and you will
receive the additional earnings next week.
If at any time you feel uncomfortable, you are free to leave the room whether we have
started the workshop or not. However, in that case you will not earn money.
Maybe you might have heard about this workshop before, yet what we will be doing
today might be different. In order to do the activities correctly, please read carefully and
pay attention when I explain them.
I would like to thank you for taking the time to come to this workshop. The results
of each of the activities that we will be doing today will be very helpful for the research
project. We appreciate your help very much.
I would also like to clarify that your identity will be kept anonymous along the work-
shop. This means that except from my colleagues and me, nobody will know your identity.
We are only interested in the decisions that you take today and not in your identity. We
will identify your decisions with the number that is on your table.
From now on, if you have questions, please quietly raise your hand and one of my colleagues
will come to you to clarify your questions. Please do not talk to other participants in the
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workshop. This is very important.
How is this workshop organized?15
Now we will start the first part of the workshop. As I explained before in this part of the
workshop you will have the opportunity to earn money. We will do four activities, which we
will refer to as Activity Triangle, Activity Circle, Activity Square, and Activity Rhombus.
In each of these activities, except of Activity Square, you have the possibility to earn money.
Yet, only one of the activities would be selected for the final payment.
At the end of the session one of the activities will be chosen randomly for payment
and your earnings will be calculated according to the results of this activity. This means
that each activity can get potentially relevant for your payoff, so please make careful
decisions in each activity. Some of the activities that we will be doing today are very
similar that is why we ask you to read carefully each of them and follow the instructions
accordingly.
15The instructions included omit the first two activities (Activity Triangle, Activity Circle) as they are
part of another study. The activities were the same for all treatment and control groups.
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4.10.2 Lab-in-the-Field Instructions
Instructor: Now we will prepare our next activity. In the meantime we will show you a
video. Please remain in your seat and be quiet. Please pay attention, after the video has
finished you we will be asked some questions about the video and yourself.
[Individuals were randomly allocated into 3 different rooms, in each room they either watched
a video of a female, male role model or a placebo video about the life in rural vs. urban areas]
Please answer the following questions. Circle the answer that best applies to what you
think or feel:
1. Do you know the person in the video?  Yes  No
If your answer is “YES” please continue with question 2
If your answer is “NO” please continue with question 3
2. On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is not close at all and 5 is very close, how you rate
the relationship you have with the main character[s] shown in the video?
1




3. On a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means “I strongly disagree” and 5 means “I strongly
agree”, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Please circle
your answer.





































































Instructor: Now, we will start with a new activity. We will ask you some questions on the
categories: education, income, social status and assets. For every category we will provide
you with a scale to help you answer the questions. You can also report higher levels than
those that we suggest in the scales. Please be careful in answering the questions. Consider
that when we ask you for what you would like to achieve, we aim to understand your
desires, your goals; and with the question on what do you expect to achieve we would
like to know the level that you think you will probably achieve.
The answers you will provide here are completely anonymous and will only be used
for academic purposes. This means that neither your name, nor any other names, will be
mentioned at any time. Nobody will be able to identify that you gave this information.
This is not a test; therefore there are no right or wrong answers. You should answer the
questions according to your opinion and current situation.
If you still do not understand the difference between what would you like to achieve
and what do you expect to achieve please mark the “I still don’t understand the
difference” box below. If you have understood the difference please mark the “I understand
the difference” box below.
 I still do not understand the differences
 I understand the difference
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1. To answer the following questions, please consider the scale below. You are free to
report higher levels than those suggested. If you have questions please raise your
hand.
Figure 4.5: Education Scale
(a) What is the maximum level of education an average person in the city or village
that you come from can have?
(b) What is the minimum level of education that an average person in the city or
village that you come from can have?
(c) What is the education level that you have achieved until now?
(d) What is the level of education you would like to achieve in your life? (goal/desire)
(e) What is the level of education you expect to achieve in your life? (what you will
probably achieve)
Category 2. Income:
1. To answer the following questions, please consider the scale below. You are free to
report higher levels than those suggested. If you have questions please raise your
hand.
Figure 4.6: Income Scale
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(a) What is the maximum level of average income per month that an average person
in the city or village that you come from can have? (Ariary/month)
(b) What is the minimum level of average income per month that an average person
in the city or village that you come from can have? (Ariary/month)
(c) What is your average income per month at the present? (Ariary/month)
(d) What is the level of average income per month you would like to achieve in your
life? (goal/desire) (Ariary/month)
(e) What is the level of average income per month you expect to achieve in your
life? (what you will probably achieve) (Ariary/month)
Category 3. Social Status:
1. To answer the following questions, please consider the ladder below. High social
status means that your friends ask you regularly for your advice. No social status
means that none of your friends asks you for your advice. You are free to report
higher levels than those suggested. If you have questions please raise your hand.
Figure 4.7: Social Status Ladder
(a) What is the maximum level of social status that an average person in the city
or village that you come from can have?
(b) What is the minimum level of social status that an average person in the city or
village that you come from can have?
(c) What is the level of your social status at present?
(d) What is the level of social status you would like to achieve in your life?
(goal/desire)
(e) What is the level of social status you expect to achieve in your life? (what you
will probably achieve)
Category 4. Assets:
1. To answer the following questions, please consider the scale below. You are free to
report higher levels than those suggested. If you have questions please raise your
hand.
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Figure 4.8: Asset Scale
(a) What is the maximum level of assets (house and furniture, no other assets) an
average person in the city or village that you come from can have? (Ariary)
(b) What is the minimum level of assets (house and furniture, no other assets) that
an average person in the city or village that you come from can have? (Ariary)
(c) What is the level of assets (house and furniture, no other assets) you have at
present? (Ariary)
(d) What is the level of assets (house and furniture, no other assets) you would like
to achieve in your life? (goal/desire) (Ariary)
(e) What is the level of assets (house and furniture, no other assets) you expect to
achieve in your life? (what you will probably achieve) (Ariary)
Now we would like you to tell us which of these four categories are the most important
for you and to weight them accordingly. A small weight attributed to a category means
that you do not attach any importance to it. A large weight in a category means that you
attach a high importance to it.
You have 20 points that you can distribute among the categories according to the importance
you attach to them.








Instructor: Now we will start activity Rhombus. This activity has a total of 5 TASKs.
What TASK will you be doing today?
The TASK consists in circling and counting the 1’s in matrices for 3 minutes. After you
have finished counting the 1’s in each matrix, you will have to write down the number of
1’s that you found. You can see this in the example.
Each one of you will receive the same pile of matrices. We will provide you with enough
number of matrices so you will have the chance to solve as many as you can in the 3 minutes
time, one after the other. To perform the TASK you have to start with Matrix 1 and
continue with Matrix 2, 3, etc. Please follow the given order.
You will be paid according to your performance in correctly counting the 1’s in the
matrices. However, only one of your performances of the five TASKs will determine your
earnings of this activity and it will be randomly chosen at the end of the workshop. If you
still do not understand the task please raise your hand.
TASK 1
Instructor: Now, we will start TASK 1. If TASK 1 is randomly selected for payment at the
end of the workshop, you will be paid 500 Ariary for each matrix that you solve correctly,
meaning circling and finding the correct number of 1’s in the matrix, during the 3 minutes
time limit.
As you can see there are many matrices, and you have the chance to solve as many
as you can, one after the other. Please start with Matrix 1 and continue with Matrix 2, 3,
etc. Please follow the given order.
Once everybody has received the papers we will blow a whistle so you know that you can
turn around the papers with the matrices and start the TASK. We will blow a whistle
again for you to know that the time is up. Once the whistle sounds after the three minutes
please put your pen aside. Please remain quiet and in your seat. Our enumerators will be
collecting the papers. Do not discuss your performance with anyone else.
—–MATRICES—–
Instructor: Please stop counting and writing. Our enumerators will collect the TASK 1
now. Before continuing with TASK 2, please answer the question that our enumerators are
distributing at the moment.
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TASK 1-a
Now please answer the following question. If your guess is correct you will be paid 1,000
Ariary.
How many matrices do think you have solved correctly during the 3 minutes time in this
TASK 1?
TASK 2
Instructor: Now, we will start TASK 2. In this TASK you will be competing against the 3
persons who are sitting in the same row as you. This means that you will be in a group of
4 people. The person who solves more matrices correctly, meaning circling and finding the
correct amount of 1’s in the matrix, during the 3 minutes time will win the tournament. If
TASK 2 is randomly selected for payment at the end of the workshop, the person who wins
the tournament will be paid 2,000 Ariary per correct solved matrix. The persons who lose
the tournament will receive nothing. If there is a tie for the first place, the winner will be
selected randomly.
You will not know how many matrices your competitors have solved correctly. There-
fore, you will not know whether you have won the tournament or not.
As you can see there are many matrices and you have the chance to solve as many
as you can, one after the other. Please start with Matrix 1 and continue with Matrix 2, 3,
etc. Please follow the given order.
Once everybody has received the papers we will blow a whistle so you know that you can
turn around the papers with the matrices and start the TASK. We will blow a whistle
again for you to know that the time is up. Once the whistle sounds after the three minutes
please put your pen aside. Please remain quiet and in your seat. Our enumerators will be
collecting the papers. Do not discuss your performance with anyone else.
—–MATRICES—–
Instructor: Please stop counting and writing. Our enumerators will collect the TASK 2
now. Before continuing with TASK 3, please answer the question that our enumerators are
distributing at the moment.
TASK 2-a
Now please answer the following questions. If your guess is correct you will be paid 1,000
Ariary.
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How many matrices do think you have solved correctly during the 3 minutes time in this
TASK 2?
TASK 3
Instructor: Now, will start TASK 3. In this TASK you will have the opportunity to choose
the payment that you would like to have in case TASK 3 is randomly selected for payment
at the end of the workshop. You can either decide to have an individual pay rate of 500
Ariary for each matrix that you solve correctly, or to enter into tournament against the
persons in your group, the 3 persons sitting in the same row as you.
If you choose to enter into tournament and compete against the persons in your group,
your performance in this TASK 3 will be compared with the number of matrices that each
of the members of your group had solved correctly in TASK 2.
We will not provide you with the information of the scores that you have to beat. Before
you make a decision, we will explain how each of the payment choices work:
Individual Pay: You will be paid 500 Ariary for each matrix that you solve correctly in
TASK 3, meaning circling and finding the correct number of 1’s in the matrix, during the 3
minutes time limit.
Tournament against the TASK 2 performances of the persons in your group:
You will be competing against the performance the persons in your group had in TASK 2.
If in this TASK 3 you solve more matrices correctly than the persons in your group
had in TASK 2, you will win the tournament and you will be paid 2,000 Ariary for each
matrix that you solve correctly in this TASK. If you solve fewer matrices correctly than the
persons in your group had in TASK 2, you will receive nothing.
You will not know how many matrices your competitors have solved correctly in TASK 2.
Therefore, you will not know whether you have won the tournament or not. If there is a tie
for the first place, the winner will be selected randomly.
Before performing the TASK you first have to decide which of the two payment choices you
would prefer to have for this TASK. Please mark an X only in one of the options. Your
decision will not influence the payoff of the other participants as you will compete against
their past performance. Now, our enumerators will start distributing the decision sheet for
the TASK 3.
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Decision sheet TASK 3
Now you will have the opportunity to choose the payment that you would like to have for
this TASK 3. You can either decide to have an individual pay rate of 500 Ariary for each
matrix that you solve correctly, or to enter into tournament against the persons in your
group, the 3 persons sitting in the same row as you.
If you choose to enter into tournament and compete against the persons in your group,
your performance in this TASK 3 will be compared with the number of matrices that each
of the members of your group had solved correctly in TASK 2. We will not provide you
with the information of the scores that you have to beat.
The payment choices are the following:
Individual Pay: You will be paid 500 Ariary for each matrix that you solve correctly in
TASK 3, meaning circling and finding the correct number of 1’s in the matrix, during the 3
minutes time limit.
Tournament against the TASK 2 performances of the persons in your group:
You will be competing against the performance the persons in your group had in TASK 2.
If in this TASK 3 you solve correctly more matrices than the persons in your group
had in TASK 2, you will win the tournament and you will be paid 2,000 Ariary for each
matrix that you solve correctly in this TASK 3. If you solve fewer matrices correctly than
the persons in your group had in TASK 2, you will receive nothing.
You will not know how many matrices your competitors have solved correctly in TASK 2.
Therefore, you will not know whether you have won the tournament or not. If there is a tie
for the first place, the winner will be selected randomly.
Which payment do you prefer for TASK 3? Please mark an X only in one of the op-
tions below. Your decision will not influence the payoff of the other participants as you will
compete against their past performance.
Option Payment
Your decision
(mark an X in one option)
Individual Pay
500 Ariary for each correctly
solved matrix
Tournament against the
performance of the people in
your group in TASK 2
If you win: 2,000 Ariary for each
correctly solved matrix
If you do not win: 0 Ariary
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Instructor: Now, our enumerators will start distributing the papers for TASK 3. In this
TASK you chose already which payment option you would like to have for your performance
in this TASK in case it is randomly selected for payment at the end of the workshop. As
you can see there are many matrices [show pile of papers] and you have the chance to solve
as many as you can, one after the other. Please start with Matrix 1 and continue with
Matrix 2, 3, etc. Please follow the given order. Once everybody has received the papers we
will blow a whistle so you know that you can turn around the papers with the matrices
and start the TASK. We will blow a whistle again for you to know that the time is up.
Once the whistle sounds after the three minutes please put your pen aside. Please remain
quiet and in your seat. Our enumerators will be collecting the papers. Do not discuss your
performance with anyone else.
—–MATRICES—–
Instructor: Please stop counting and writing. Our enumerators will collect the TASK 3
now. Before continuing with TASK 4, please answer the question that our enumerators are
distributing at the moment.
TASK 3-a
Now please answer the following question. If your guess is correct you will be paid 1,000
Ariary.
How many matrices do think you have solved correctly during the 3 minutes time in this
TASK 3?
TASK 4
Instructor: Now we will start TASK 4. In this TASK 4 you do not have to solve matrices.
You only have to decide which payment you would like to receive for your performance
in TASK 1. You can either decide to have an individual pay rate of 500 Ariary for each
matrix that you solve correctly or to enter into tournament against the persons in your
group, the 3 persons sitting in the same row as you.
If you choose to enter into tournament and compete against the persons in your group,
your performance in this round will be compared with the number of matrices that each of
the members of your group had solved correctly in TASK 1.
We will not provide you with the information of the scores that you have to beat. We will
just remind you about the number of matrices that you believed you solved correctly in
TASK 1.
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Before you make a decision, we will explain how each of the payment choices work:
Individual Pay: You will be paid 500 Ariary for each matrix that you solve correctly in
TASK 1.
Tournament against the TASK 1 performances of the persons in your group:
You will be competing against the performance the persons in your group had in TASK 1.
If in TASK 1 you solved more matrices correctly than the persons in your group had
in TASK 1, you will win the tournament and you will be paid 2,000 Ariary for each matrix
that you solved correctly in TASK 1. If you solved fewer matrices correctly than the persons
in your group had in TASK 1, you will receive nothing.
You will not know how many matrices your competitors have solved correctly in TASK 1.
Therefore, you will not know whether you have won the tournament or not. If there is a tie
for the first place, the winner will be selected randomly.
Now our enumerators will give back the paper where you stated your beliefs for TASK 1 in
order to help you to make the decision for this TASK.
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Decision sheet TASK 4
In the paper you have just received, you will find your belief of the correct matrices that
you have solved in TASK 1. Please have a look at it before answering the question below.
In this TASK 4 you will have the opportunity to choose the payment that you would
like to have for TASK 1. You can either decide to have an individual pay rate of 500 Ariary
per correctly solved matrix or to enter into tournament against the persons in your group,
the 3 persons sitting in the same row as you.
If you choose to enter into tournament and compete against the persons in your group,
your performance in TASK 1 will be compared with the number of matrices that each of
the members of your group had solved correctly in TASK 1.
We will not provide you with the information of the scores that you have to beat. The
payment choices are the following:
Individual Pay: You will be paid 500 Ariary for each matrix that you solved correctly in
TASK 1 during the 3 minutes time limit.
Tournament against the TASK 1 performances of the persons in group: You
will be competing against the performance the persons in your group had in TASK 1.
If in TASK 1 you solved more matrices correctly than the persons in your group had
in TASK 1, you will win the tournament and you will be paid 2,000 Ariary for each matrix
that you solved correctly in TASK 1.
You will not know how many matrices your competitors have solved correctly in TASK 1.
Therefore, you will not know whether you have won the tournament or not. If there is a tie
for the first place, the winner will be selected randomly.
Which payment would you like to receive for your performance in TASK 1?
Please mark an X only in one of the options below. Your decision will not influence
the payoff of the other participants as you will compete against their past performance.
Option Payment
Your decision
(mark an X in one option)
Individual Pay
500 Ariary for each correctly
solved matrix
Tournament against the
performance of the people in
your group in TASK 1
If you win: 2,000 Ariary for each
correctly solved matrix
If you do not win: 0 Ariary
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TASK 5
Instructor: Now, will start TASK 5. In this TASK you will have the opportunity to choose
the payment that you would like to have in case TASK 5 is randomly selected for payment
at the end of the workshop. You can either decide to have an individual pay rate of 500
Ariary for each matrix that you solve correctly or to enter into tournament against yourself.
If you choose to enter into tournament against yourself, your performance in this TASK 5
will be compared with the number of matrices that you solved correctly in TASK 2.
We will not provide you with the information of the score that you have to beat. We will
just remind you about the number of matrices that you believed you solved correctly in
TASK 2.
Before you make a decision, we will explain how each of the payment choices work:
Individual Pay: You will be paid 500 Ariary for each matrix that you solve correctly in
this TASK 5, meaning circling and finding the correct number of 1’s in the matrix, during
the 3 minutes time limit.
Tournament against your TASK 2 performance: You will be competing against
yourself in a tournament. In TASK 2 you might have solved certain number of matrices
correctly and in this tournament against yourself you will have the possibility to improve
your score.
If you solve more correct matrices in TASK 5 than in TASK 2 you will win the tour-
nament against yourself and therefore you will be paid 2,000 Ariary for each matrix that
you solve correctly in this TASK 5. If you have the same or less correct matrices in TASK
5 than in TASK 2 you will not win the tournament against yourself and therefore you will
receive nothing. Like in the tasks before, you will not know whether you have won the
tournament or not.
Before performing the TASK you first have to decide which of the two payment choices you
would prefer to have for this TASK. Please mark an X only in one of the options. Now, our
enumerators will start distributing the decision sheet for the TASK 5.
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Decision sheet TASK 5
In the paper you have just received, you will find your belief of the correct matrices that
you have solved in TASK 2. Please have a look at it before answering the question below.
Now you will have the opportunity to choose the payment that you would like to have
for this TASK 5. You can either decide to have an individual pay rate of 500 Ariary for
each matrix that you solve correctly in this task, or to enter into tournament against yourself.
If you choose to enter into tournament and compete against yourself, your performance in
this TASK 5 will be compared with the number of matrices that you solved correctly in
TASK 2.
We will not provide you with the information of the score that you have to beat. The
payment choices are the following:
Individual Pay: You will be paid 500 Ariary for each matrix that you solve correctly in
TASK 5, meaning circling and finding the correct number of 1’s in the matrix, during the 3
minutes time limit.
Tournament against your TASK 2 performance: You will be competing against
yourself in a tournament. In TASK 2 you might have solved certain number of matrices
correctly and in this tournament against yourself you will have the possibility to improve
your score.
If you solve more correct matrices in TASK 5 than in TASK 2 you will win the tour-
nament against yourself and therefore you will be paid 2,000 Ariary for each matrix that
you solve correctly in this TASK 5. If you have the same or less correct matrices in TASK
5 than in TASK 2 you will not win the tournament against yourself and therefore you will
receive nothing. Like in the tasks before, you will not know whether you have won the
tournament or not.




(mark an X in one option)
Individual Pay
500 Ariary for each correctly
solved matrix
Tournament against yourself
If you win: 2,000 Ariary for each
correctly solved matrix
If you do not win: 0 Ariary
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Instructor: Now, our enumerators will start distributing the papers for TASK 5. In this
TASK you chose already which payment option you would like to have for your performance
in this TASK in case it is randomly selected for payment at the end of the workshop.
As you can see there are many matrices and you have the chance to solve as many
as you can, one after the other. Please start with Matrix 1 and continue with Matrix 2, 3,
etc. Please follow the given order.
Once everybody has received the papers we will blow a whistle so you know that you can
turn around the papers with the matrices and start the TASK.
We will blow a whistle again for you to know that the time is up. Once the whistle
sounds after the three minutes please put your pen aside. Please remain quiet and in your
seat. Our enumerators will be collecting the papers. Do not discuss your performance with
anyone else.
—–MATRICES—–
Instructor: Please stop counting and writing. Our enumerators will collect the TASK 5
now. Before continuing, please answer the question that our enumerators are distributing
at the moment.
TASK 5-a
Now please answer the following question. If your guess is correct you will be paid 1,000
Ariary.
How many matrices do think you have solved correctly during the 3 minutes time in
this TASK 5?
—–END OF TASKS—–
Instructor: Before finishing this activity, we will distribute some question to you now.
With each question that you solve correctly you will earn 1,000 Ariary.
Please answer the following questions. For each correct answer you are go-
ing to be paid 1,000 Ariary.
1. When you think of TASK 1 where you were payed for each correctly solved ma-
trix 500 Ariary. Which rank do you believe you had in comparison to the other 3 people in
your group? 1 is the best performing student in your group of 4 people and 4 is the worst
performing student in the same group of people.
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I ranked ——— out of 4
2. When you think of TASK 2 where you competed against the other persons in your group.
Which rank do you believe you had in comparison to the other 3 people in your group?
1 is the best performing student in your group of 4 people and 4 is the worst performing
student in the same group of people.
I ranked ——— out of 4
3. On average, how many matrices do you think that the others in your session (all
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Instructor: Now, in order to select which activity will be used as your payment, one of you
will take out one card of this non-transparent bag. According to the name written on the
card we will pay each of you the earnings of that activity according to the decisions you
made. For example if the name “Activity Triangle” comes up, we will pay you what you
earned in that activity, if the name “Activity Rhombus” comes up, then we will pay what
you earned in that activity. Same with “Activity Circle”. As mentioned before, Activity
Square will not be paid and thus will not be included in the bag.
If the result of the bag is Activity Rhombus, then we will use an extra bag to decide
which TASK will be used to calculate the earnings of that activity. Remember that in
Activity Rhombus we had 5 different TASKs; however, only one of them will be paid.
Therefore, the same person that comes to the front will randomly select the TASK that
we will be using to calculate your earnings. In this other bag there are 5 small and equal
papers. Each paper has a number from 1 to 5 written on it. This will guarantee that only
one TASK will be picked for the payment calculation of Activity Rhombus in case it is
selected. Please remember that you can receive also nothing, for example, if the TASK
selected is TASK 2 and you lost the competition in this TASK.
In addition to the amount you earn from the Activity selected, each of you will receive
2,000 Ariary as a bonus for your participation today. As we mentioned in the beginning,
today you will receive the 2,000 Ariary and in one week we will come back to give you the
money that you possibly earned in the Activity selected.
In the name of Diversity Turn, I want to thank you very much for your time and collabora-
tion today.
While we prepare the bonus payment, please fill the questionnaire my colleagues are
giving to you at the moment. Once you have finished you will receive the bonus payment




Hello! We are researchers from the University of Goettingen and we are investigating about
vanilla production and the decisions students make under different incentive schemes in the
SAVA region. Today, we kindly ask for your cooperation by filling this questionnaire. The
answers you will provide here are completely anonymous and will only be used for academic
purposes. This means that neither your name, nor any other names, will be mentioned at
any time. Nobody will be able to identify that you gave this information. This is not a
test; therefore there are no right or wrong answers. The answers should only correspond to
your reality or your opinion. In name of the University we thank you very much for your
time and collaboration.
1. Did you have difficulties in answering one or more of the activities you did today?
Please mark your answer with an X.
 Yes
 No
If yes, in which one(s)?
2. Did you understand the instructions of the activity?
Please mark your answer with an X.
 Yes
 No
3. Did you get exhausted as time in the experiment went by, so that you could concentrate
less?
Please mark your answer with an X.
 Yes
 Yes, a little
 No
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4. Which track are you studying?





5. Which occupation do you want to have in the future? Please indicate:
6. In how many years do you expect you will achieve to work in your desired occupation?
YEARS
7. How likely is it that you will work in your desired occupation?











8. How likely is it that you go to University?











9. How likely is it that destiny, good or bad luck or other people affect your chances to
work in your desired occupation?











10. What is the highest school degree your mother has?






11. What is the highest school degree your father has?





12. At which age would you like to get married? YEARS
13. How often do you meet other people who are not at your school and who are not
from your family?











14. How often do you use a smartphone?











15. Do you have a person you look up to?
Please mark your answer with an X.
 Yes
 No
(a) If yes, specify the gender:  Female  Male
(b) If yes, specify the location where she/he lives:
(c) If no, go to question 16.
16. On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly agree, how much
you agree or disagree with the following sentences. Please mark your answer with an
X.
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(f) How do you like to be in competition with somebody else? Please tick a box on
the scale, where the value 1 means: ‘I do not like this’ and the value 5 means: ‘I
like it very much’:
1
I do not like this
2 3 4 5
I like it very much
17. Are you generally willing to take risks, or do you try to avoid risks? Please mark your
answer with an X. In the scale the value 1 means: ‘Not willing to take a risk” and
the value 10 means ‘fully prepared to take risks’.
1
Not willing
to take a risk




18. Suppose you were given the choice between receiving some money today or some
money in one year. We will present to you three different situations. For each of these
situations we would like to know which option you would choose. These situations
are hypothetical. Please mark your answer with an X.
(a) Would you rather receive 100,000 Ariary today or 150,000 Ariary in 1 year?
 Today
 In one year
(b) Would you rather receive 100,000 Ariary today or 125,000 Ariary in 1 year?
 Today
 In one year
(c) Would you rather receive 100,000 Ariary today or 105,000 Ariary in 1 year?
 Today
 In one year
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19. Imagine a coin is flipped six times. Before each time, a lottery is offered to you and
you could decide whether you want to accept or reject it. The amount that could
be won is the same in all lotteries, while the amount that could be lost increases.
Please decide whether you would accept or reject each of the following lotteries. As
the amount that could be lost increases along the lotteries, you can only switch from
“Accept” to “Reject” once. Please mark your answer with an X.
Hypothetical Lottery Accept Reject
#1. If the coin turns head up, then you would lose 1,000 Ariary;
if the coin turns up tails, you would win 3,000 Ariary
#2. If the coin turns head up, then you would lose 1,500 Ariary;
if the coin turns up tails, you would win 3,000 Ariary
#3. If the coin turns head up, then you would lose 2,000 Ariary;
if the coin turns up tails, you would win 3,000 Ariary
#4. If the coin turns head up, then you would lose 2,500 Ariary;
if the coin turns up tails, you would win 3,000 Ariary
#5. If the coin turns head up, then you would lose 3,000 Ariary;
if the coin turns up tails, you would win 3,000 Ariary
#5. If the coin turns head up, then you would lose 3,500 Ariary;
if the coin turns up tails, you would win 3,000 Ariary










a) Learn general mathematics
b) Learn biology
c) Learn reading, writing, and language skills
d) Learn to use computers
e) Learn science
f) Learn a foreign language
h) Learn social studies
21. Please rate the truthfulness of the following statements, according to how you see
yourself. On the scale, 1 means ‘not true of myself’ and 5 means ‘true of myself’.
Please mark your answer with an X.
(a) I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough.
1
Not true of myself
2
Slightly true of myself
3
Half true of myself
4
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(b) If someone opposes me, I can find the means and ways to get what I want.
1
Not true of myself
2
Slightly true of myself
3
Half true of myself
4
Mostly true of myself
5
True of myself
(c) It is easy for me to stick to my aims and accomplish my goals.
1
Not true of myself
2
Slightly true of myself
3
Half true of myself
4
Mostly true of myself
5
True of myself
(d) I am confident that I could deal with unexpected events.
1
Not true of myself
2
Slightly true of myself
3
Half true of myself
4
Mostly true of myself
5
True of myself
(e) Thanks to my resourcefulness, I know how to handle unforeseen situations.
1
Not true of myself
2
Slightly true of myself
3
Half true of myself
4
Mostly true of myself
5
True of myself
(f) I can solve most problems if I invest the necessary effort.
1
Not true of myself
2
Slightly true of myself
3
Half true of myself
4
Mostly true of myself
5
True of myself
(g) I can remain calm when facing difficulties because I can rely on my abilities to
reduce stress.
1
Not true of myself
2
Slightly true of myself
3
Half true of myself
4
Mostly true of myself
5
True of myself
(h) When I have problems, usually think of a solution.
1
Not true of myself
2
Slightly true of myself
3
Half true of myself
4
Mostly true of myself
5
True of myself
(i) If I am in trouble, I can usually think of a solution.
1
Not true of myself
2
Slightly true of myself
3
Half true of myself
4
Mostly true of myself
5
True of myself
(j) I can usually handle whatever comes on my way.
1
Not true of myself
2
Slightly true of myself
3
Half true of myself
4
Mostly true of myself
5
True of myself
22. In the following you will be presented with a pair of two statements: A and B. Please
state for each pair with which statement you agree most. Please mark your answer
with an X.
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(a) A: Many of the unhappy things in people’s lives are partly due to bad luck.
B: People’s misfortunes result from the mistakes they make.
1
I agree much more
with A
2
I agree slightly more
with A
3
I agree slightly more
with B
4
I agree much more
with B
(b) A: In the case of the well prepared student there is rarely if ever such a thing as
an unfair test.
B: Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course work that
studying is really useless.
1
I agree much more
with A
2
I agree slightly more
with A
3
I agree slightly more
with B
4
I agree much more
with B
(c) A: Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little or nothing to do
with it.
B: Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the right
time.
1
I agree much more
with A
2
I agree slightly more
with A
3
I agree slightly more
with B
4
I agree much more
with B
(d) A: When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work.
B: It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to
be a matter of good or bad fortune anyhow.
1
I agree much more
with A
2
I agree slightly more
with A
3
I agree slightly more
with B
4
I agree much more
with B
(e) A: Sometimes I can’t understand how teachers arrive at the grades they give.
B: There is a direct connection between how hard I study and the grades I get.
1
I agree much more
with A
2
I agree slightly more
with A
3
I agree slightly more
with B
4
I agree much more
with B
(f) A: What happens to me is my own doing.
B: Sometimes I feel that I don’t have enough control over the direction my life
is taking.
1
I agree much more
with A
2
I agree slightly more
with A
3
I agree slightly more
with B
4
I agree much more
with B
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24. In which year were you born?
25. Where have you been raised? Please mark your answer with an X.
 In a big city
 In the rural area
26. What is your gender? Please mark your answer with an X.  Female  Male
27. How many brothers do you have? Please write how many.
28. How many sisters do you have? Please write how many.
29. Please indicate your economic situation on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means ‘poor’






30. Do you have a job? Please mark your answer with an X.
 Yes
 No
31. How many hours a week do you work? hours per week
32. Does your family cultivate vanilla? Please mark your answer with an X.
 Yes
 No











34. What is your name:
Thank you very much for your participation!
177
4.10.4 Field Experiment Instructions – Job Announcement
[Researcher enters the room and communicates the following:]
Thank you very much for your participation today! Before you go, I would like to share
with you some information about a job opening in our research project. In my work I visit
different villages from the SAVA region and I am in contact with vanilla farmers. For my
next visit, I am looking for assistants and a coordinator to work with me. The job will be
starting this year in October until December [starting next year in May until June]. In this
paper that I will distribute to all of you, you can find more information about the jobs and
application process.
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JOB ANNOUNCEMENT – PUBLIC Decision Sheet
Before finishing the workshop of today, we would like to inform you about a job opening
at our research project. Our project works with vanilla farmers in the SAVA region. We
are looking for assistants and a coordinator who help us with our data collection starting
this year in October until December [starting next year in May until June]. During the
data collection we will do different workshops with the farmers. The job of the assistant
consists in helping with the organization of the workshops and to fill in questionnaires with
different farmers once the workshop is finished. The job of the coordinator is to visit the
villages and plan the workshops in advance with the village chief. As the coordinator has
more responsibilities than the assistant, the salary of the coordinator is 13 percent higher.
The candidates for each position should be motivated to work in rural areas, be good team
members and have good communications skills. Fluency in French or English is ideal but
not a must.
If you are interested in applying for the job and want to know more about it please
mark in the box below that you are interested. Once we have collected the decisions of all
the people in the room we will call your name out loud to confirm that you are interested
in applying for the job. If you mark that you are not interested, your name will not be
called. Please remain in your seat and don’t discuss your decision with the people around you.
Are you interested in applying for the job?
 I am interested
 I am not interested
If you are interested in the job, for which position exactly?
 Assistant
 Coordinator
For those who are interested, we will collect your name, E-Mail address and/or phone
number and when we come back next week to give you your additional earnings of the
workshop, you will have to fill in a job application. If you mark that you are not interested
you will not have to fill in a job application next week. Your name, E-mail and/or telephone
numbers will only be used for the job selection process. If you are interested in applying,
please write down your name, E-Mail address/ telephone number here:
Name:
Email/Telephone number:
Your name, E-mail and/or telephone numbers will only be used for the job selection
process.
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JOB ANNOUNCEMENT – PRIVATE Decision Sheet
Before finishing the workshop of today, we would like to inform you about a job opening
at our research project. Our project works with vanilla farmers in the SAVA region. We
are looking for assistants and a coordinator who help us with our data collection starting
this year in October until December [starting next year in May until June]. During the
data collection we will do different workshops with the farmers. The job of the assistant
consists in helping with the organization of the workshops and to fill in questionnaires with
different farmers once the workshop is finished. The job of the coordinator is to visit the
villages and plan the workshops in advance with the village chief. As the coordinator has
more responsibilities than the assistant, the salary of the coordinator is 13 percent higher.
The candidates for each position should be motivated to work in rural areas, be good team
members and have good communications skills. Fluency in French or English is ideal but
not a must.
If you are interested in applying for the job and want to know more about it, please
mark in the box below that you are interested. If you are not interested please mark in the
box below that you are not interested. Your decision will not be shared with anybody in the
room. Please remain in your seat and don’t discuss your decision with the people around you.
Are you interested in applying for the job?
 I am interested
 I am not interested
If you are interested in the job, for which position exactly?
 Assistant
 Coordinator
For those who are interested, we will collect your name, E-Mail address and/or phone
number and when we come back next week to give you your additional earnings of the
workshop, you will have to fill in a job application. If you mark that you are not interested
you will not have to fill in a job application next week. If you are interested in applying,
please write down your name, E-Mail address/ telephone number here:
Name:
Email/Telephone number:
Your name, E-mail and/or telephone numbers will only be used for the job selection
process.
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[After students have filled one of the decision sheets, the researcher tells them the
following:]
Thank you for your time. As we mentioned before, in exactly one week we will be
here at the same time to distribute the earnings of activity X [activity randomly selected
for payment]. In addition, for those who expressed their interest in any of the job positions,
we will bring the application forms on that day so you can fill them with your personal
information. It is important that you bring one photo of you, as we will attached it to the
application form. Please do not forget to bring the photo, otherwise your application will
not be taken into account for the selection process. Now, please make a line at the front so
each of you can receive the 2,000 Ariary for your participation today.
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Where do you live?
Would you be able to find accommodation
in Sambava for this job?
Date available to start:
Track of study:
Average grade Terminal (last year of school):
Language skills:
English:  Very good  Good  So so  Not good
French:  Very good  Good  So so  Not good
Did you hear about the project before we
visited you school?
 Yes  No
What are your salary expectations?
Do you like working in a team?  Yes  No
Do you have health problems that might
impede you to travel by car or moto?
 Yes  No
If yes, which ones?
Have you worked in the past?  Yes  No
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4.11. Appendix C – Video Scripts
4.11.1 Female Role Model Video
Marie Rolande
Narrator: "This is Marie Rolande. She is 27 years old. Originally she is from Antsahanoro,
but she has been living in Antalaha since 1991. Her goal was to become a research teacher
of environmental conservation. At the moment she is teaching in CURSA (Centre Universi-
taire Régional de la SAVA) and at the same time she started her PhD with University of
Mahajanga in cooperation with a University in Germany. Marie Rolande will tell us her
story of how she achieved her goal:"
Marie Rolande: “During my Bachelor studies I always dreamed of becoming a research
teacher, somebody who is important and respected by most of the people in the society I
live in. I knew that in order to fulfill my goal, I have to exert a lot of effort by continuing
my education. Working as a research teacher requires having minimum a Degree of Master2."
Narrator: "Acquiring a Master 2 Degree in Madagascar encompasses a long journey.
People need to study for many years and in the first place they need to have the financial
resources to fund it."
Marie Rolande: “My parents supported me for my studies during primary and sec-
ondary school. However, for my university studies their help was not enough. To fully fund
my studies, I received help from the Malagasy government which was not easy to obtain as
they support only the best students. But this did not keep me from trying. During the time
of my studies I studied very hard, always giving my best to be able to get the financial aid”."
Narrator: "After 1 year of studying hard, Marie succeeded and received a grant from the
government to fund her second and third year of her Bachelor studies."
Marie Rolande: “I was very happy and surprised when I received the news of my
grant. Especially because I consider myself an average student and I knew many students,
some way better than me, were applying for it. I think that what helped me to succeed
was the commitment to my goal and my courage to keep going."
Narrator: "Apart from receiving a grant from the Malagasy government, Marie Rolande
also found other sources of financial support that gave her the opportunity to start her
Master 2 Degree Program. After she finished her Bachelor, Marie Rolande started searching
for different international programs where she could obtain her Master2 Degree. She found
a suitable program in Forest Management at the University of Kinshasa in Republic of
Congo. It was a big step for Marie to do her Master2 abroad, especially coming from
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a country where it is not common that a woman her age keeps on studying instead of
marrying, starting a family or cultivating vanilla. However, most of Marie Rolande’s family
did not understand why she kept studying so much and not focusing on having a family.
Also, other people started questioning her decision on not cultivating vanilla and told her
that studying for so long was not worth it. She has been feeling this pressure for 5 years now."
Marie Rolande: “I am aware that some people, especially in my village, don’t agree
with the decisions I have made in my life. But my dream of becoming a research teacher
was my priority and having a family just didn’t fit at that moment. I can still start a fam-
ily or plant vanilla in the future but now I want to focus on my teaching and on my research."
Narrator: "After obtaining her Master2 Degree she was confident enough to apply for
a research teacher position at CURSA. After some months of waiting, she finally got a
positive response and got the dream job that she always wanted. Succeeding was not easy,
it took her many years of studying and endurance until she was prepared to apply for the
position."
Marie Rolande: “I am very happy to work for CURSA. Now I can finally focus on sharing
the knowledge I have with my students and also doing research in my favorite field of study."
Narrator: "Besides achieving her goal, this job at CURSA has opened many doors
for Marie. For example she started in 2016 a PhD with the University of Mahjanga in
cooperation with a University in Germany. Furthermore, she has had the opportunity to
work in other projects with international students that have visited the SAVA region."
Marie Rolande: “Becoming a research teacher at CURSA has opened me many doors and
I am sure that there are more projects to come. Also, my family has played a key role in
the last years. Especially, I wouldn’t have achieved all this without the help of my mother
and grandfather. They have been very important to me because they have supported me
to continue my dreams all the time."
Mother of Marie Rolande: “I am very proud of my daughter and I know that with her
commitment and strength she has a great future ahead. You know, she was like any other
kid but as years passed by she started imaging something different for her life. I know how
difficult it was for her and all the obstacles she had to face, but at the end she succeeded.
Now, she can tell her story to others and help them to overcome their fears."
Narrator: "Some people think that she is losing her time with that job; however, her
students and colleagues see her with other eyes. They see her as a person that follows her
objectives and who is ready to make sacrifices along the way to achieve them."
Friend of Marie Rolande: “Some people in the village think that she should be doing
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something different, like having children and planting vanilla, but there are also people like
me that see her life different and who admire her decision to keep on studying, to follow
her dream. I was very happy when I got to know that she got the job at CURSA because I
knew how much she wanted that job."
Colleague of Marie Rolande: “She is a great role model for all of our students. I
have heard several times that they would like to be like her. She also tells her students
that when she was young, she was like them and that if they want to succeed they need to
have confidence in themselves and study hard."
Narrator: "The story of Marie Rolande shows that if one aims at doing something
and works towards it, it is possible to achieve it. She imagined a different life than most of
her friends and family have, and even though the journey was long and with many obstacles,
she was able to make that imagination a reality."
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4.11.2 Male Role Model Video
Fulgence
Narrator: "This is Fulgence. He is 33 years old. Originally he is from from Antsahamanena
but he has been living in Antalaha since 2015. His goal was to become a research teacher
in zoology. At the moment he is teaching at CURSA (Centre Universitaire Régional de
la SAVA) and at the same time he started his PhD with University of Antananarivo in
cooperation with a University in Germany. Fulgence will tell us his story on how he achieved
his goal:"
Fulgence: “During my Bachelor studies I always dreamed of becoming a research teacher,
somebody who is important and respected by most of the people in the society I live in.
I knew that in order to fulfill my goal, I have to exert a lot of effort by continuing my
education. Working as a research teacher requires having minimum a Degree of Master."
Narrator: "Acquiring a Master 2 Degree in Madagascar encompasses a long journey.
People need to study for many years and in the first place they need to have the financial
resources to fund it."
Fulgence: “My family supported me for my studies during primary and secondary school.
However, for my university studies their help was not enough. To fully fund my studies, I
received help from the Malagasy government which was not easy to obtain as they support
only the best students. But this did not keep me from trying. During the time of my
studies I studied very hard, always giving my best to be able to get the financial aid.”
Narrator: "After 1 year of studying hard, Fulgence succeeded and received a grant
from the government to fund his second and third year of his Bachelor studies."
Fulgence: “I was very happy and surprised when I received the news of my grant. Es-
pecially because I consider myself an average student and I knew many students, some
way better than me, were applying for it. I think that what helped me to succeed was the
commitment to my goal and my courage to keep going."
Narrator: "Apart from receiving a grant from the Malagasy government, Fulgence got
support from his older brother who decided to work in his place so that he could continue
studying. After he finished his Bachelor, Fulgence started searching for different programs
where he could obtain his Master2 Degree. He found a suitable program in Science at
the University of Mahajanga. It was a big step for Fulgence to do his Master2 in another
region of Madagascar, especially as he is coming from a rural area that is located far away
from that University. However, some people from Fulgence family did not understand why
he kept studying so much and not focus on cultivating vanilla instead. They think that
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studying for so long was not worth it."
Fulgence: “I am aware that some people, especially in my village, don’t agree with
the decisions I have made in my life. But my dream of becoming a research teacher was
my priority and cultivating vanilla before just didn’t fit at that moment. I can still plant
vanilla in the future but now I want to focus on my teaching and on my research."
Narrator: "After obtaining his Master2 Degree he was confident enough to apply for a
research teacher position at CURSA. After some months of waiting, he finally got a positive
response and got the dream job that he always wanted. Succeeding was not easy, it took
him many years of studying and endurance until he was prepared to apply for the position."
Fulgence: “I am very happy to work for CURSA. Now I can finally focus on sharing
the knowledge I have with my students and also doing research in my favorite field of
study."
Narrator: "Besides achieving his goal, this job at CURSA has opened many doors for
Fulgence. For example he started in 2016 a PhD with the University of Tana in cooperation
with a University in Germany. Furthermore, he has had the opportunity to get in contact
with international researchers that have helped him to improve his research."
Fulgence: “Becoming a research teacher at CURSA has opened me many doors and
I am sure that there are more projects to come. Also, my family has played a key role in the
last years. Especially, I wouldn’t have achieved all this without the help of my mother, my
father and my aunt. They have been very important to me because they have supported
me to continue my dreams all the time."
Mother of Fulgence: “I am very proud of my son and I know that with his commitment
and strength he has a great future ahead. You know, he was like any other kid but as years
passed by he started imaging something different for his life. I know how difficult it was for
him and all the obstacles he had to face, but at the end he succeeded. Now, he can tell his
story to others and help them to overcome their fears."
Narrator: "Some people think that he is losing his time with that job; however, his
students and colleagues see him with other eyes. They see him as a person that follows his
objectives and who is ready to make sacrifices along the way to achieve them."
Friend of Fulgence: “Some people in the village think that he should be doing something
different, like planting vanilla, but there are also people like me that see his life different
and who admire his decision to keep on studying, to follow his dream. I was very happy
when I got to know that he got the job at CURSA because I knew how much he wanted
that job."
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Colleague of Fulgence: “He is a great role model for all of our students. I have heard
several times that they would like to be like him. He also tells his students that when he
was young, he was like them and that if they want to succeed they need to have confidence
in themselves and study hard."
Narrator: "The story of Fulgence shows that if one aims at doing something and works
towards it, it is possible to achieve it. He imagined a different life than most of his friends
and family have, and even though the journey was long and with many obstacles, he was
able to make that imagination a reality."
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4.11.3 Placebo Video
Rural and Urban Life in the Sava Region
Narrator: "Life in cities is very attractive for young people. They often migrate to cities
like Antalaha to find a job. There they find opportunities they do not have in the villages
they come from. Marie Rolande is a young woman who left her village and came to the city
to study and then work as a research teacher at CURSA, the Centre Universitaire Régional
de la SAVA. Here she is teaching students in environmental conservation and at the same
time she is doing her Phd with University of Mahajanga in cooperation with a University
in Germany."
Marie: “Originally I am from Antsahanoro. However I have been living here in An-
talaha since 1991. I think that the urban life is not the same as the life in villages. In the
villages people mostly earn their living with farming. This also is reflected in their clothing.
Farmers wear long shirts and trousers that protect them from injuries and mosquito bites.
In the cities, clothing is different. Here people like to wear short clothes due to the warm
climate.”
Narrator: "Fulgence is a young man who lives in Antalaha. As Marie, he is also a
research teacher at CURSA. He is teaching students in zoology. He is doing his PhD with
University of Antananarivo in cooperation with a University in Germany, too."
Fulgence: “I have been living in bigger cities for the course of my studies. The life
in a city like Antalaha is different than in rural areas. First the city is more developed as
the rural area. Here you have more shops, markets; better infrastructure in general. Also
lifestyle is different. Here people enjoy going out; watching films and dancing in discos. In
the rural area this is different; there you have fewer opportunities even though some people
have solar panels which enable them to watch videos.”
Fulgence: “Not only rural and urban life differ in many aspects, but also the cities
among each other. The first difference is the climate. Antalaha and Sambava have the
same climate, but not Vohemar and Andapa. The second difference lies in the ethnicity. In
Sambava for example we can find all ethnicities. Here in Antalaha the biggest ethnicity is
the “Bezimzaraka."
Marie: “Some people of my family still live in Antsahanoro, where I come from. I
visit them often; especially when there are traditional ceremonies in the village. For wed-
dings for example, they invite not only the family of the woman and the man but all people
in the village who want to come. And they prepare a big party for that: They kill a Zebu,
they prepare a lot of rice and a lot of good things to eat, and they have beautiful music.
City weddings are smaller; not so much people are invited."
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Narrator: "Rural and urban life is connected through farming and breeding livestock.
Many occupations in the urban area depend on the cultivation that takes place in the rural
area. Most products that are sold on markets in the city are usually from fields outside
the cities, such as vanilla and rice. But there is also trade in the other direction. Products
from Tana or from Tamatav are imported to the cities and sold in the rural areas."
Marie: “This is Antsahanoro. Here I spent many days of my life. Here, life is slower than
in Antalaha and you know everybody in the village. When I am 60 years old, I will need
some tranquility and a calm place, so I think I will return to the village. But, I am not
really sure about the others, but me, I really like environment, nature.”
Narrator: "Fulgence comes from Antsahamanena a village that is located in a remote
area. The fastest way of reaching it, is to go by pirogue. Here most of the people cultivate
vanilla. They spent most of their days in the field. As the do not have electricity there,
they hear radio with batteries while they are working. The radio does not only serve as
entertainment, but also as information source; so they know what is happening in the region."
Fulgence: “This is the village I come from. I really like coming here for traditional
ceremonies, when we have Zebu meat. Here in the villages Zebu is more valuable than
in the cities, so people are used to have Zebu for celebrations.” Narrator: In Antalaha, if
you don’t have enough money, people just buy some meat or some chicken in the market,
instead of having a Zebu. In Fulgence’s family it is his mother who prepares the Zebu for
traditional ceremonies, while Fulgence’s father takes care of the vanilla."
Fulgence’s mother: “Yes, Zebu is our traditional meal. Usually we eat it with rice
and romazava. Everybody from our big family joins for special ceremonies, which means
that I have to prepare a lot. Here in the villages it is normal for people to have very big
families.”
Marie’s mother: “Families here are very big and they are getting bigger with every
generation. But the land stays the same, so that there is often not enough land for young
people. They need to move away into the big cities just to discover another way to conduct
their lives. And maybe often they want to move away because they are just lazy to live like
a farmer.”
Narrator: "Most of the friends of Marie and Fulgence also did not want to become
a farmer. At the moment they live in Antalaha and some are working as teachers, too. But
as a teacher you do not necessarily have to live in the big city."
Fulgence’s female friend: “I know many young people that try to find a job in the
city. Most young people try to make it by working in the vanilla business. At the moment
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the vanilla prices are very high and this is very attractive for young people, but maybe in
some years it will not be like that anymore.”
Colleague of Marie: “Another difference between rural and urban areas is that only in
big cities you can find public schools where students can finish their secondary education.
Because of this, many students have to move to the cities to continue studying."
Narrator: "Living in the city has advantages and disadvantages, same as in the rural area.
However, this diversity makes the Sava region a beautiful place to live."
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5 Conclusion and Way Forward
This thesis presents new evidence on the role of aspirations in development outcomes. It
includes three studies that investigate four research objectives. The first research objective
is to explore the relationship between aspirations that one has for one’s community, defined
as community aspirations, and cooperative behavior. We propose that community aspi-
rations are an important determinant of collective action. In our study in chapter 2 we
develop empirical measures for community aspirations and find evidence that our measure
is positively related with contributions to a real public good as well as with a reported
measure on participation in village work, but negatively related with reported measures
that capture monetary contributions to village projects and general trust in the village.
Since these results are based on correlations, future research should conduct causal analysis
to understand the direction of causality. It could be that lower trust among villagers
and unclear handling of village treasury contributions decreases community aspirations.
The latter points to the importance to also understand how local institutions determine
collective action through community aspirations. Also, future work should provide further
tests on the validity and reliability of our proposed measure of community aspirations.
With respect to validity the questions that could be addressed are: Do the dimensions of
community aspirations reflect participants’ definition of welfare? Can some dimension be
relaxed, while another indicator should be included? In terms of reliability, future work
is advised to test for consistency in respondents’ answers over a specific time period and
the role of participants’ mood as well as anchoring effects of asking for the current level
of achievements before the actual aspiration question (as Bernard & Taffesse (2014) have
done for their individual aspiration measure).
The second research objective of this thesis is to investigate the determinants of com-
munity aspirations. Chapter 2 and 3 both test the hypothesis that community role models
presented in videos can widen the "aspiration window" and thereby raise community aspira-
tions. Results of a natural field and a lab-in-the-field experiment conducted in the same area
in rural Zambia provide similar results. We find that a video that uses a narrative frame
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in depicting the role models (village life video) is effective in increasing contributions to a
public good, while a video that additionally includes prescriptive messages (collective action
video) did not affect contributions in the lab-in-the-field, but in the natural field experiment.
The study in Chapter 3 addresses the third research objective, i.e. understanding how
the design and content of the video intervention affects collective action. Comparing the
effects of the two videos, the paper finds that while the village life video is effective at
increasing contributions compared to the control, there are no significant differences in the
level of conditional contributions between the different treatment videos. The finding that
the narrative, and not the prescriptive video, is more effective at increasing contributions
compared to the control is in line with theoretical literature on education entertainment
that posits that the desirable behavior or the educational message should not be made too
salient in order to prevent resistance among the viewers (Moyer-Gusé, 2008).1 Future work
could test for participants’ resistance by adding questions on their impression of behavioral
change intentions of the experimenter. It could also be that participants do not relate with
the characters in the collective action video. They might perceive the level of cooperation
too far away from what they think they can achieve in their village and thus do not consider
them to be a relevant reference group (Tankard & Paluck, 2016). Even though 63 percent
of the participants in the collective action video treatment rate the characters to be similar
to them, most of the answers of those who do not agree indicate that they perceive the
video characters to be more cooperative and more hard-working. Future interventions could
collect control questions that explicitly target how participants rate the characters’ success
in collective action.
The increase in contributions to the public good among participants who saw the vil-
lage life video, compared to participants in the no video condition, cannot be explained
by an increase in community aspirations. In the lab-in-the-field experiment we find that
the village life video has no effect on community aspirations and a negative effect on
contributions in the natural field experiment. Instead, the mechanism seems to run through
village efficacy and perceived norms of cooperation. The study in chapter 3 analyzes the
latter by testing whether the expectation that the other group member saw the video
influences contribution decisions. The study finds that unconditional and conditional
contributions are higher in the village life video treatment if both participants of the group
of two were shown the video compared to the no-video and one-person treatment. Thus,
these results suggest that common knowledge in having seen the video is important and
could be a potential mechanism. However, future research should analyze the joint role and
interaction of village efficacy, perceived norms of cooperation and community aspirations in
the decision to cooperate. Also, since we find no correlation of community aspirations with
contribution decisions, but find that individual aspirations are negatively correlated with
1Both videos did not mention the public good used as an outcome measure in the natural field experiment
(seed capital for newly formed savings groups) so that we can rule out that the effects are driven by the
information provided in the treatment video.
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unconditional contributions in the lab-in-the-field experiment, future work could analyze
the relative importance and interaction of community and individual aspirations. It could
be that community aspirations conflict with individual goals to which participants attach
greater importance.
The fourth and last research objective considers whether female’s aspirations and willingness
to apply to a competitive job can be affected through exposure to a role model video. The
hypothesis is that female adolescents in developing countries lack female role models who
can serve as reference points. This can trap them in a situation with low aspirations and
low investments. Chapter 4 presents results of a field experiment conducted in Madagascar
in which students in their last year of secondary school were randomly assigned to either a
female, a male or a placebo video screening. After video exposure, we gave the students the
opportunity to apply to an assistant or a coordinator position in a research project of one
of the principal investigators. The results of the study provide evidence that female role
models in videos are effective at increasing applications of female as well as male students
to any of the two jobs. Moreover, the results suggest that the male role model video
encourages female students to apply to the more competitive job, the coordinator position.
As a result the gender gap in applications to this position, which is prevalent in the placebo
group, shrinks. Whereas the decision to apply in the female video group can partly be
explained by aspirations and current achievements, competitive preferences can explain
the decision to apply to the coordinator position in the male video group. This chapter
thus provides evidence that role models do not need to be of the same gender. Instead,
our results suggest that the traits of the gender matter. Past research has argued that in
general men are perceived more competitive compared to women (Blau & Kahn, 2017). An
extension could be to test for the importance of traits by asking control questions on the
perceived competence of the role models in different domains and capture stereotypes on
the abilities of men and women in the respective setting. In addition, this study does not
provide a pure control group. The effects of the study are evaluated against a placebo group,
which could also not be free of values and messages that could influence participants’ behav-
ior. Future work should therefore test whether another placebo video provides similar results.
The studies of this thesis only report the short-term results of a one-time video screening
and thus cannot make any statements on the sustainability of the observed effects. An
extension is to include the follow-up results of the paper in chapter 2 and 4. Studying the
long-term effects is important in order to understand how possible changes in aspirations
due to role model interventions interact with external factors. This is especially relevant
in contexts were there are not only internal but external constraints to the individual
that diminish the possibility of realizing aspired outcomes. What happens if increased
aspirations are not achieved? Especially in competitions that involve winners and also
losers? Does this lead to the predicted frustration (Genicot & Ray, 2017)? How does an
individual develop after a goal has been reached? Does it aspire higher? We cannot tell
for sure whether the video intervention gives false hope. Yet, we can claim that the role
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models in our videos are not fictional, but have a similar background as the viewers, and
the stories about their success are real. As Bernard et al. (2014), the videos also do not
provide information on the steps that are necessary to achieve a specific outcome that could
prove to be misleading.
There are some limitations to the external validity of our findings. The treatment ef-
fects that we observe depend on our chosen role models. Different cultures might have
a different understanding on what constitutes success and thus whether they perceive
someone to be a role model. Also, the results on community aspirations could be different
in other contexts, where communities have a peculiar understanding of community welfare.
Moreover, the results might be different for people living in contexts with more access
to information. The sample of our studies conducted in Zambia can be argued to have
only limited access to media and information through mobile phones. Over half of the
respondents in our studies of Chapter 2 and 3 report to never use a mobile phone or to
watch television. Only about 10 percent of the respondents state to watch television or
to use a mobile phone once or more than once a week. As television and mobile phones
provide individuals with the opportunity to increase their "aspirations window", similar
results can only be expected in contexts with comparable access to information.
On the basis of these results, several policy recommendations can be formulated. Yet, these
should be backed by further evidence. First, initiatives that would like to promote collective
action can show examples of the impacts of collective action instead of directly referring to
the value and need of cooperation. Second, companies or organizations which would like to
increase the share of applicants can use inspirational videos with characters that are similar
to those of the participants. The advantage of videos is that, once produced, their use can
be up-scaled at very low costs. Yet, these interventions should be combined with measures
that lift external constraints of people. All in all, I hope that these studies inspire other
researchers and policy makers to conduct further studies on how individuals and groups of
people can be encouraged to increase their well-being by making the necessary investments,
especially of those who do not have a vision for and belief in themselves. Could a soap
opera displaying ecologically sustainable communities foster more climate action? I hope
policy makers and researchers consider this idea in the quest of combating climate change.
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